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ABSTRACT
This study is about the emergence ofacademic earmarking and its effect on the
distribution offederal research funding. The study examines four basic research
questions. First, does receiving earmarks improve the ability ofan institution to receive
other types offederal funding? Second, how does awarding earmarks affect the
geographical distribution offederal research funding? Third, are earmarks additive, or do
they come at the expense ofpeer reviewed funding? Finally, is there much difference
between the institutions which garner the most earmarked funding and those which
receive the most peer reviewed funding?
There are six major findings ofthe study:
1.

Receiving earmarks generally does not improve the ability of
institutions to receive other types offederal funding although in a few
instances it does;

2.

Earmarking has had somewhat ofa redistributive effect on the
geographical distribution offederal research funding by sending some
funding to places where it would otherwise not go;

3.

Earmarked funding is such a small part oftotal federal research funding
that it makes little difference in the overall general geographical
distribution offederal research funds;

4.

When peer reviewed and total funding levels per state are figured on a
per institution basis there are some notable exceptions to the long held
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beliefthat peer reviewed funding goes mostly to institutions in the
northeast Atlantic and west coast regions ofthe United States;
5.

In general earmarks appear to be an additive feature ofthe federal
research funding scheme although within individual programs
earmarking activity may consume funds which historically have been
and could otherwise be awarded in peer reviewed competitions;

6.

With earmarking and peer reviewed funding both now firmly
established as different but acceptable forms ofawarding federal
research funding, the difference between the institutions doing the best
at receiving earmarks and the institutions doing the best at receiving
peer reviewed funding is lessening and a rising tide ofearmarking
activity is most likely preferentially lifting the boats ofthose
institutions which do the best at receiving peer reviewed funding.
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CHAPTERl
THE EFFECT OF ACADEMIC EARMARKING ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF
FEDERAL RESEARCH FUNDING

INTRODUCTION
In 1977 President Jean Mayer of Tufts University secured $10 million for a new
College of Veterinary Medicine at his institution through what at that time was a novel
method of funding. Mayer did not raise the money from donors. He did not secure it
from the State of Massachusetts in which Tufts University is located, nor did he secure
the funding by applying for it in a grant process administered by some agency of the
federal government. Mayer hired two Washington lobbyists, Kenneth Schlossberg and
Gerald Cassidy, to plead his case directly to Congressional appropriators. Schlossberg
and Cassidy were successful in getting the $10 million for Tufts's College of Veterinary
Medicine inserted directly into the 1977 fiscal year appropriation for the Department of
Agriculture. Thus, the practice of academic earmarking was born. (Savage 1999)
Academic earmarking refers to appropriations Congress makes directly to
academic institutions in the appropriations bills for the various units of the federal
government. Sometimes these appropriations are not included in the actual
appropriations bills but are rather specified in non-binding report language that
accompanies the bills. This non-binding report language has proven to be as effective a
way for Congress to direct funds as specifying the institutions to receive funding in the
bill. Federal agencies are loathe to anger their Congressional benefactors by not spending
money appropriated to the agency in the way that Congress wishes for it to be spent.
Earmarks are not requested by the agencies funded in appropriations bills, nor are they
1

usually authorized by the Congressional committees that hold hearings and authorize
agency requests for funding. Earmarks are a creature ofthe appropriations process.
In the federal budget process, the President proposes a budget to Congress.
Congress divides the President's budget request among various committees which have
jurisdiction over different areas ofthe federal budget. These committees authorize
spending in the areas in which they specialize. The House and Senate Appropriations
Committees then work up 13 different spending bills each year that are supposed to
include the spending authorized by the authorizing committees. In order for the federal
government to spend money, both houses ofCongress must pass these appropriations
bills and the President must sign them. When the budget process takes more time or is
more protracted, these 13 spending bills are lumped into omnibus spending bills that
incorporate into one bill what would normally be taken up in separate bills. Also, when
Congress is not able to complete appropriations bills before the fiscal year starts, a
continuing resolution is passed by Congress and signed by the President which allows the
government to function at the previous year's funding levels until the appropriations
process can be completed. The point is that spending cannot take place without
Congressional action and the President signing that action into law. Appropriations is the
part ofthe process in which actual spending is approved.
Academic earmarks are usually added during what is called the "markup" ofone
ofthe 13 appropriations bills. Each ofthe 13 appropriations bills is handled by a sub
committee ofthe House or Senate Appropriations Committee. These sub-committees are
headed by a chair chosen from the party holding the majority in the chamber. The chairs
ofthe appropriations sub-committees are very powerful and have been referred to
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collectively as the "College of Cardinals" in budgeting literature. Each Cardinal is given
a certain amount of budgeting authority by the Chair of the full appropriations committee
to use in developing his appropriations bill. Individual members of Congress request
earmarks of the different subcommittee chairmen. Subcommittee chairs take these
requests, as well as other budget requests, into account during the markup of the
appropriations bill. During this markup, which is done in private and zealously lorded
over by the Cardinal of the subcommittee, the specifics for how all of the budget
authority allocated for the appropriations bill will be used are written into the bill. If a
member's earmark is not included in the markup, it is very difficult to get it approved.
Including an earmark that was excluded during markup would require the removal of
something included in the bill to make funds available to pay for the excluded earmark.
(Savage 1999)
The House of Representatives and Senate act separately on appropriations bills.
When the bills approved by the House and Senate are different, the House and Senate
must work out their differences in conference and develop a conference bill that both
chambers can pass. If different earmarks are approved by the House and Senate, the
conference has to decide which earmarks get funded. Conference committees have
seldom reduced the earmarks passed by either chamber. More often, the committees
have chosen to fund both sets of earmarks. Earmarks left out during one chamber's
process have sometimes been added into the conference bill. (Savage 1999)
Academic earmarks are a means by which individual members of Congress can
direct federal funds to institutions in their states or districts. Since their arrival on the
scene in 1977, they have grown to the point that they comprised 7.55% of all federal
3

science and engineering funding for academic institutions and amounted to $2.012 billion
in fiscal year 2003 (Brainard and Borrego 2003, National Science Foundation 2006).
Despite the fact that college and university Presidents and their surrogates lobby
members ofCongress for academic earmarks all the time, these earmarks have been
controversial within the academic community and have been seen as a major challenge to
the predominant practice ofallocating federal funding for academic research through
competitive merit review processes. The merit review process is presided over by
leading experts in the academic disciplines for which research awards are allocated.
Because the reviewers are drawn from the discipline in which the awards are made, the
competitive merit review process is often referred to as the peer review process. A high
pitched battle has been waged between proponents ofearmarking and advocates ofpeer
review about the propriety ofearmarking and the distributional effects ofthe peer review
method ofdistributing federal research money. This policy battle has been well covered
in the Chronicle ofHigher Education and other media sources, but very little attention
has been paid to the phenomena ofacademic earmarking in academic lite�ature.
This study builds upon the few good studies ofacademic earmarking that precede
it by following in the tradition ofa policy study. It focuses on federal research funding
policy as a case in which Congress's universalistic distributive impulses, as exemplified
by academic earmarks, run headlong into a dominant policy regime, represented by the
peer review funding method. The study's central task is to examine the emergence of
academic earmarking and its effect on the distribution of federal research funds. The
study will examine four principal questions about the distribution of federal research
funds. First among these questions is whether receiving earmarks improves the ability of
4

an institution to receive other types offederal research funds. Second, this study will
attempt to discern how the awarding ofearmarks affects the geographical distribution of
federal research funding. Thirdly, this study will delve into the question ofwhether
academic earmarks are additive or come at the expense ofpeer reviewed funding.
Finally, this study will look at the important question ofwhether there is much difference,
particularly now that both academic earmarking and peer review funding methods seem
firmly established, in the institutions that secure the most funding from academic
earmarking and the institutions that secure the most funding in peer reviewed
competitions.
It is important to study these questions and the subject ofacademic earmarking
because, since World War II, the federal government has been the largest source of
academic research funding (Drew 1985, Geiger 1993, Kleinaman 1995). The federal
investment in academic research has paid off for Americans in producing the finest
medical care system and most technologically advanced society in the history ofthe
world. During the majority ofthe time the federal government has been involved in
funding academic research, peer review methods ofallocating funds have dominated.
Science and scientists have been able to dictate their own agenda. For the most part,
lawmakers have deferred to scientists on allocation questions even though the desire to
distribute funds so that local constituents are advantaged has been strong ever since forms
ofgovernment based on geographical representation were created. Academic earmarking
is a relatively new entry into the federal research funding arena. It represents a measure
ofsecond guessing ofthe scientific establishment by members ofCongress on allocation
questions; an assertion by Congress ofits ability to understand scientific issues well
5

enough to make at least some allocation decisions; and a recognition by Congress that
some secondary effects, like regional economic development, seemingly ignored when
the scientists were making all ofthe allocation decisions, go along with the funding of
research. Because academic earmarking changes the federal research funding landscape,
it is important that we look into its role. The stakes are very high, particularly when one
considers the potential advancements in medicine and technology that new knowledge,
properly nurtured and supported by effective federal funding, could bring to light.
(Ruscio 1994)
The remainder ofthis chapter will be devoted to discussing eight studies in the
academic literature that touch on academic earmarking in some way. Chapter 2 will
present a narrative history ofacademic earmarking and the policy debate that has
surrounded it since its onset in 1977. Chapter 3 will discuss the data and methods which
will be employed to answer this study's research questions. Chapter 4 will present and
analyze the findings derived from examining these questions. Chapter 5 will present
some conclusions and recommendations for further study.

THE ACADEMIC EARMARKING LITERATURE
Scott A. Frisch provides a rather interesting look at earmarks in general (not just
academic earmarks) through the lens ofthe distributive theory ofCongressional
budgeting. Frisch makes much ofthe difference between things Congress funds through
formulas and items about which Congress actually makes a distributive decision. He
holds that a very small minority ofdecisions about where to send funds are actually
determined directly by Congress. Earmarks are within this small minority ofdecisions.
6

They operate at the margins. He offers that academic earmarks may bring an element of
geographical equity to federal research funding by sending money where it would not
otherwise go. By increasing this geographical equity, earmarks make federal research
funding more �iversalistic and thus make a system, in which a very few select
institutions gamer most ofthe funds available, palatable to a broader coalition. Frisch
characterizes academic earmarks as the sweetener that makes the whole system digestible
and the pressure valve that keeps those who are not the largest recipients in the peer
review system from rebelling. His argument is similar to arguments about the role social
welfare programs have played in modem capitalistic systems in tempering the extremes
ofmarket competition so that those with lower socio-economic status do not grow so
tired ofthose at the top ofthe socio-economic pyramid that they fight to overthrow the
. system. Frisch also deals with electoral connection theory, or how lawmaker's reelection
desires are connected to the pursuit ofearmarks and whether securing earmarks is
connected to election victories. He finds considerable reasons to question whether
legislators are single-minded reelection seekers. (Frisch 1998)
Constance Cook discusses earmarks as one ofseveral factors that caused the
image ofhigher education to suffer in the early 1990's in her book Lobbying for Higher
Education: How Colleges and Universities Influence Federal Policy. She discusses

some ofthe arguments for and against earmarks, and the higher education association's
efforts to fight earmarking. These topics will be discussed in Chapter 2. Cook's
narrative is negative towards earmarking. She characterizes earmarks as being pitted
against peer review funding methods, pitting individual institutions against the higher
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education associations, and lowering the high prestige higher education had previously
enjoyed by making it look like any other special interest. (Cook 1998)
Gary J. Andres uses academic earmarks in a graph he includes with an article that
argues that earmarks in general are higher during times when Congress and the
Presidency are under the control of different parties. Andres maintains that whether one
party controls both branches is what affects earmarking the most. He characterizes
earmarks as a statutory way for Congress to lock in its distributive intent. In times when
the same party controls both the Executive and Legislative branches, Congress does not
have to earmark as much because what it wants is more often included in the budget
requests of the Executive. (Andres 1995)
Steven J. Balla, Eric D. Lawrence, Forrest Maltzman, and Lee Sigelman use
academic earmarking data to show that the majority party allows the minority party some
earmarks to inoculate itself from charges of wasteful spending but reserves the most
valuable earmarking awards for its own members. (Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, and
Sigelman 2002)
A. Abigail Payne examines the effect of earmarks and set aside programs on the
quality and quantity of the publications of the institutions that receive them. Set aside
programs are peer reviewed programs administered by federal agencies in which the
states allowed to compete for the awards are limited. The Experimental Program to
Stimulate Competitive Research, a program of the National Science Foundation, is
probably the most famous set aside program. Payne finds very modest changes in
research funding distribution since 1990 as a result of earmarking and set aside programs.
She finds that earmarks increase the quantity of publications but not the quality, while set
8

aside programs increase the quality ofpublications but not the quantity. She measures
the quality ofpublications by the number oftimes a publication is cited. (Payne 2003)
John M. de Figueiredo and Brian S. Silverman model earmarking in a study
focused on calculating the returns to lobbying. Their study uses data on earmarking and
lobbying from fiscal years 1997 through 1999. They find that the size ofan earmark is a
function ofinstitutional ranking. Higher ranking institutions are less likely to receive
earmarks. Presence ofa Ph.D. program, presence ofa medical school, representation of
an institution's legislative delegation on either the House or Senate appropriations
committee, and amount oflobbying done by the institution are significant variables in
their model. As far as their central question about the returns oflobbying, they find
universities not represented on either the House or Senate appropriations committees get
virtually no return for their lobbying expenditures. Those with Senate appropriations
representation get between $11 and $17 for each dollar they spend on lobbying. Those
with House representation get between $20 and $36 for each dollar spent. They also find
that most universities which could benefit from lobbying do not do so, and that the
universities which do lobby may be lobbying up to the marginal benefit point beyond
which further lobbying would not be rewarded. (de Figueiredo and Silverman 2002)
James D. Savage uses academic earmarking data to show that "Saintly Cardinals",
those appropriations sub-committee chairmen against pork-barrel spending and for
general benefits, can limit earmarking in the appropriations bills under their control. This
notion ofthe Saintly Cardinal effect on earmarking runs contrary to distributive theory
which holds that these saints will be few in number, ineffective in their pursuits, and
punished for their efforts. Savage points to saintly Cardinals like Representative Edward
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Boland of Massachusetts, Representative William Natcher of Kentucky, Senator William
Proxmire of Wisconsin, and Senator Jake Garn of Utah who kept academic earmarks out
of their bills. These Saintly Cardinals were able to keep earmarks out of the budgets of
peer review programs like the National Institutes of Health and National Science
Foundation. As chairs of their subcommittees they had control of the initial markup of
their appropriation bill, release of that markup to the rest of the sub-committee, and
committee staff to use as resources to oppose academic earmarking. Savage maintains
that the existence of Saintly Cardinals and their effect on academic earmarking shows
that individual preference outliers do have influence in Congress. (Savage 1991)
Savage also writes the most complete study of academic earmarking published to
date. In his Funding Science in America: Congress, Universities, and the Politics ofthe
Academic Pork Barrel, Savage discusses peer review as a Kuhnian paradigm or dominant

policy regime with all of its cultural and normative facets. He characterizes academic
earmarking as a small revolution afoot within the dominant policy regime. He also
discusses earmarking in the terms of a collective action problem. Institutions benefiting
from earmarks are in effect free riding and double dipping from both the peer review and
earmarking systems. Many of the common solutions to collective action dilemmas, like
sanctions, do not seem to apply to earmarking. Finally, he frames earmarking as a
function of the roles that college presidents and appropriations Cardinals have due to
their positions and preferences. He maintains the motivations that spring from these roles
explain much about earmarking. (Savage 1999)
Savage discusses in detail the incentives institutions have to earmark, the reasons
for opposition to earmarking, the Association of American Universities futile fight
10

against earmarking, the shortage of federal facilities funding that has made the pressure
for earmarking more intense, the role of the paid lobbyist in the pursuit of earmarks, and
the efforts of certain members of Congress to fight earmarks (Savage 1999). These
issues will be discussed in Chapter 2.
Savage also presents data on the distribution of academic earmarks between 1980
and 1996 by state, institution, and region. He discusses the effectiveness of academic
earmarks by assessing how states and institutions fiscal year 1994 rank in total research
funding differs from their rank in the first year they received an earmark. If an institution
or state has gained rank, Savage deems the earmarking to have been effective. If the
institution or state has lost rank, he states that the earmarking was not effective. The
results of this analysis are mixed. (Savage 1999)
Savage also delves into whether certain types of earmarks are more productive
than others. He maintains that the source of an earmark has a great deal to do with
whether an institution has an opportunity to improve its total research funding ranking.
For example, earmarks which increase an institution's capacity to compete for biomedical
research funding have the potential to increase the institution's overall research funding
rank. These earmarks are often found in the Department of Health and Human Services
appropriation but also may be found in the appropriation for the Department of Defense,
the Department of Energy, and even other appropriation bills. Biomedical research,
particularly that funded by the National Institutes of Health, is by far the largest area that
peer reviewed funding is directed towards. Agriculture earmarks, which accounted for
25.1 % of all earmarked funding in Savage's study, however, do not generally increase
overall research funding ranking because there are less peer review funds available for
11

agriculture. (Savage 1 999) Savage's data differs from the data presented in this study in
that it is drawn from different sources and different time periods. Savage used his own
database for earmarks. This study uses a database of academic earmarks drawn from the
Chronicle of Higher Education for its analysis. Different methods are also used in the

analysis of data in this study.
In his 1 999 book, Savage concludes that the incentives for earmarking made it
proliferate; that earmarking has remained a small revolution in the peer review dominated
policy regime because it has yet to challenge peer review funding in an institutionalized,
routinized, regular way; and that the higher education community's opposition to
earmarking has been ineffective because higher education leaders contradict themselves
by criticizing earmarks on the one hand and seeking them on the other (Savage 1 999).

CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has introduced the topic of this study and the research questions the
study will address. The topic of this study is the emergence of academic earmarking and
its effect on the distribution of federal research funds. The study will examine four
principal questions about the distribution of federal research funds. First among these
questions is whether receiving earmarks improve the ability of an institution to receive
other types of federal research funds. Second, this study will attempt to discern how the
awarding of earmarks affects the geographical distribution of federal research funding.
Thirdly, this study will delve into the question of whether academic earmarks are additive
or come at the expense of peer reviewed funding. Finally, this study will look at the
important question of whether there is much difference, particularly now that both
12

academic earmarking and peer review funding methods seem firmly established, in the
institutions that secure the most funding from academic earmarking and the institutions
that secure the most funding in peer reviewed competitions.
The chapter has also defined academic earmarking and discussed the
appropriations process in which earmarks are made. Academic earmarks are
appropriations Congress makes directly to academic institutions in the appropriations
bills for the various units ofthe federal government or specifies in non-binding report
language accompanying these appropriations bills. They are creatures ofthe
appropriations process and are generally added to appropriations bills when those bills
are "marked up" by appropriations subcommittee chairmen in the markup phase ofthe
appropriations process.
Finally, this chapter has discussed the importance ofstudying this issue and the
scholarly literature produced thus far which addresses academic earmarking. It is
important to study academic earmarking's effect on the distribution offederal research
funding because the federal government's investment in academic research has paid large
dividends for American society and has the potential to pay even larger dividends in the
future. The method by which federal research funds are allocated and how they are
distributed could dramatically affect potential breakthroughs in medicine and science
which could transform the future. There have been eight studies which have addressed
issues related to academic earmarking. This study builds upon these earlier studies and
attempts to elucidate the policy effects ofacademic earmarking by addressing the study
research questions.
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In Chapter 2, a narrative history of academic earmarking and the policy debate
that has swirled around it since its onset in 1977 is presented. Chapter 3 discusses the
data and methods which will be employed to answer this study's research questions.
Chapter 4 presents and analyzes the findings derived from examining these questions.
Chapter 5 presents some conclusions and recommendations for further study.
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CHAPTER 2
THE STORY OF ACADEMIC EARMARKS

INTRODUCTION
The federal government was not a major player in academic research until World
War II. The war effort pumped a lot of funding into weapons systems, biomedical
research, the atomic bomb, training programs, and other research areas. Congress relied
on the War Department and scientists to determine how funds for research should best be
spent. Following the war, the federal role in research funding continued, and Congress
continued to take the word of scientists, almost on faith, about what was needed. By the
mid-1960's, however, members of Congress began to gain some science expertise of their
own, became less deferential, and began to question whether federal research funds were
being distributed properly. In 1966, 68% of all federal research funds were going to just
25 of over 2,000 academic institutions in the United States. Congress began to take
notice that where research funds were sent, economic development seemed to follow.
(Greenberg 1966)
A decade later, academic earmarking began with the 1977 grant of $10 million to
Tufts for their College of Veterinary Medicine (Savage 1999). Academic earmarking
really burst on the scene in 1983 when Catholic University of America and Columbia
University both received $5 million earmarks. Both Catholic Univ�rsity and Columbia
were then, and are today, members of the prestigious Association of American
Universities. (Budiansky 1983, David 1983, Savage 1999)
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This chapter chronicles the rise ofacademic earmarking. It discusses the early
years ofacademic earmarking from 1983 to about 1990, the trends in academic
earmarking from 1990 to 2003, and more recent trends in academic earmarking since
2003. The arguments that the proponents and opponents ofacademic earmarking have
made against and in support ofacademic earmarking are also discussed. Efforts by the
higher education associations and by individual members ofCongress and the President
to fight the practice ofacademic earmarking are detailed. Finally, a section on the role of
paid lobbyists and the reporting oflobbying expenses and a chapter summary conclude
the chapter.

THE EARLY YEARS OF ACADEMIC EARMARKING
As mentioned in the introduction above, the age ofacademic earmarking really
came into being when two $5 million earmarks were awarded to Catholic University and
Columbia University in 1983. Catholic University received its earmark for a new
materials facility. The earmark was reported to have come from funds which would have
gone for materials research at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory at the University of
California, Berkeley. The Speaker ofthe House, Tip O'Neill ofMassachusetts, was
reported to have been a key player in getting the earmark for Catholic University.
Representative Norman Mineta ofCalifornia did Speaker O'Neill's bidding in committee
and on the floor ofthe House. The speculation, advanced at the time, was that Mineta
would be paid off for his effort with future funding for the Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory. (Budiansky 1983, David 1983, Savage 1999)
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Columbia's earmark was for a National Center for Chemical Research. It was
reported to have come from funds which would have been spent for accelerator upgrades
at laboratories run by Yale University and the University of Washington. (Budiansky
1983, David 1983, Savage 1999)
Both the Catholic and Columbia projects did not go through any review by the
federal science bureaucracy or science authorizing committees of the House or Senate.
This made many University Presidents angry and was a big issue at the fall 1983 AAU
meeting. Catholic and Columbia pointed out at the meeting that the money they received
was for buildings not programs. (Budiansky 1983, David 1983, Savage 1999)
Making this matter all the more murky, a National Center for Advanced Materials
had been proposed for the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in the President's budget, but
was cut during the Congressional appropriations process from $26 million to $3 million
because it did not go through peer review. (Budiansky 1983, David 1983, Savage 1999)
The Association of American Universities, the National Academy of Sciences,
and the National Science Board all condemned the practice of academic earmarking after
the Catholic and Columbia earmarks. Earmarking, however, continued unabated. In
fiscal year 1985 appropriations, Senator Warren Rudman of New Hampshire was able to
direct $5 million for engineering facilities to Dartmouth University. Senator Robert
Packwood of Oregon was able to direct $10 million to Oregon Health Sciences
University. Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah was able to direct $6 million for two Utah
projects - one a cancer research project the other an energy project - through the bill
funding the Head Start program. Senator Robert Dole of Kansas was able to send
$200,000 for remote sensing research to the University of Kansas. Senator Edward
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Kennedy ofMassachusetts earmarked $500,000 for a China/United States exchange
program at Tufts University. Senator Alphonse D'Amato ofNew York directed $ 1
million for computer research to Syracuse University. The Syracuse earmark was
reported to have come from a $25 million pot ofmoney in the Department ofDefense bill
that was to be used for investigator-initiated, peer-reviewed basic research grants.
(Budiansky 1985)
Beginning in 1983 and throughout 1984 and 1985, an earmark sought by
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. provoked great controversy. The earmark
was for a coal gasification project. Georgetown had no engineering school, and most
observers thought it really just wanted its own power plant. To get its power plant, its
earmarking proposal to Congress promised to build three other coal burning power plants
in Alaska, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The University ofAlaska, the University of
Scranton, and the University ofTexas El Paso would operate the power plants in their
states. The proposal had a cost ofover $160 million spread over 5 years and was to come
from the Army Research Office budget in the Department ofDefense appropriation.
Critics ofthe proposal maintained that the funds used for the project would otherwise be
available to support peer-reviewed basic research. (Tenzer 1985)
The project fell apart, temporarily at least, when the University ofAlaska, the
University ofScranton, and University ofTexas El Paso denied knowing they were
included and declined participation. The Army also told Congress it did not need the
power plants, and the Association ofAmerican Universities and the National Association
ofState Universities and Land Grant Colleges publicly opposed the project and lobbied
Congress against it. The project was defeated in 1984. Georgetown, however, came
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back in 1985 with a $160 million request that did not include Alaska, Pennsylvania, and
Texas. The University also requested from Congress $19.4 million to fund an addition to
its law library in 1985. Both 1985 requests were funded. (Tenzer 1985)
In 1989, James Savage did a study of academic earmarks for the University of
California. Savage was working at the time in federal relations for the University.
Savage found that many institutions and states double dip taking advantage of both peer
review and academic earmarking opportunities. His study showed that five states
received 42% of the money earmarked between fiscal year 1980 and fiscal year 1989.
Massachusetts, New York, and Illinois were among those five and also among the top 10
in overall research funding received during the same period. Oregon and Florida were
the other two members of the top five for academic earmarking during the study period.
Ten states in Savage's study received 63% of the academic earmarking funding doled out
in the 1980's. Only West Virginia was among the top ten in receiving earmarks and the
bottom ten in overall research funding. The bottom ten in overall research funding
received less than 8% of the academic earmarks given away during that period.
Association of American Universities member institutions claimed about 30% of the
academic earmark funding distributed. Several critics of Savage's study questioned
whether agricultural earmarks should be included in the study. Agriculture has a long
tradition of dispersing its money through earmarking. (Cordes 1989a)
Savage concluded that states that do poorly in winning peer review funds
probably have less scientists and engineers and thus less research activity. These factors
may create less of a need for earmarked funds in these states. Savage thought set aside
programs, which limit peer review competition to those states underperforming in the
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winning of peer review funds, might be a more effective way than earmarking to break
low ranking states out of the cycle that keeps them low. Set aside programs provide a
sort of sheltered form of competition and are designed to increase the research capacity of
low performing states and make them more able to compete in peer review competitions.
Savage maintained that breaking the cycle of low performance would have to happen
before a more equitable geographic distribution would occur. (Cordes 1989a)
Later on in 1989, alarms were sounded about agriculture earmarks. Many
institutions were receiving academic earmarks in the agriculture appropriations bill to
plan or start facilities projects. There was some concern that Congress was assuming
some contingent liability to continue funding the facilities it was issuing earmarks to
start. The alternative to a continuation of funding would be to leave an institution with an
unfinished facility. The real concern was that the extent of the liability Congress was
taking on was a big unknown. (Cordes 1989c)
Another concern was that some agriculture earmarks were going for non
agricultural purposes. Institutions were lobbying Congress for agriculture earmarks to
pay for facilities already funded through private donations, state support, and debt. The
most egregious example of this was the University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center which had used nutrition as a doorway to lobby Congress for $20 million in
agriculture earmarks to retire bonds secured to pay for equipment in one of its hospitals.
(Cordes 1989c)
Early in 1990, Colleen Cordes reported that earmarks for research facilities had
helped some universities recruit scientists and relieve crowding problems in their
research facilities. She also reported that some universities had struggled to do the work
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associated with the earmarks they had received and that earmarks seemed to get less
scrutiny than other forms of funding. This lack of scrutiny gave universities a freer hand
in how they spent the money. In some cases, Cordes reported earmarks had enabled
innovative risky cutting-edge research that peer review methods of funding would never
have funded. In other cases, waste and scandal had been the result. Cordes also reported
that many institutions return to Congress for more money after receiving earmarks for
facilities in order to keep researchers busy in the buildings built for them. (Cordes
1990a)
Cordes reported some success stories. Oregon doubled its federal grant money
after making improvements to its research facilities upon receiving $45 million directed
to it through the efforts of Senator Mark Hatfield. The $45 million funded 2/3 of the cost
of the facilities upgrades. Columbia, however, received earmarks for a National Center
for Chemical Research, but did not really use the money to create a national center.
Instead Columbia used the funding to build a new facility for its chemistry department.
Also, LSU had been unable to spend earmarked money it had received from the
Department of Defense for nutrition studies because it had not been able to create any
nutrition programs useful to the military. (Cordes 1990a)
In the early years of academic earmarking, prominent institutions pioneered the
practice, but concerns about the efficacy of academic earmarking and its effect on peer
reviewed funding were heard in the academic community. There were also concerns
about whether Congress was creating contingent liability for itself by starting to fund
projects that would continue to need funding in future years and whether earmarks were
being used for the purposes for which they were awarded. At the end of this early era,
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the results from academic earmarking were mixed with some accounts of waste and
scandal balanced by some notable success stories.

TRENDS IN ACADEMIC EARMARKING - 1990 THROUGH 2003
The early years of academic earmarking gave way to a period of exponential
growth from 1990 through 2003 with the exception of a short period of time clustered
around the transfer of the Congressional majority from the Democrats to the Republicans
in 1994. Academic earmarking dipped briefly following the Republican takeover of both
Houses of Congress but rebounded after reaching a low in fiscal year 1996 to rise to
record heights by the end of this period. Figure 1 is a bar graph representation of the
value of all earmarks awarded to institutions of higher learning in each year of the period
from 1990 to 2003. Figure 2 is a bar graph representation of the number of higher
learning institutions receiving earmarks in each year of the same period. Figure 3 is a bar
graph representation of the number of earmarks awarded to institutions of higher learning
in each year of this period. 1
At the beginning of this period in fiscal year 1990, $270 million in academic
earmarks were handed out to 1 1 7 institutions. These totals were down from an estimated
$3 15 million given to fewer institutions in fiscal year 1989. West Virginia was one of the
larger recipients of academic earmarks in 1990 largely due to the influence of senior
Senator Robert Byrd who chaired the Senate Appropriations Committee. During 1990, a
hybrid of earmarking became prevalent on the scene. This hybrid directed an earmark to
a consortium. The consortium then handed out grants to participating institutions based
1

All figures and tables are located in the Appendix.
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on some merit review process. Earmarking in 1990 not only went for facilities but also
was directed towards research. It was noted in 1990, that individual investigators were
sometimes going to Congress on their own for earmarks rather than taking a stab at the
peer review process. Members of Congress were also approaching institutions and
initiating earmarks. (Cordes 1990b)
In fiscal year 1991, $493 million in academic earmarks was awarded to 124
institutions. The lack of a technology policy by the Bush administration and the lack of a
funding program for research facilities were cited as factors that drove Congress to fund
research on campuses in their states and districts. The contingent liability problem
Congress had assumed by funding a large number of agriculture earmarks to start
agriculture facilities was dealt with in 1991 budget process. An agriculture facilities
program was funded in the agriculture appropriation. Iowa State University, one of the
leaders in securing agriculture earmarks, announced that it would not seek agriculture
earmarks for facilities but would instead seek to have more funding appropriated to the
agriculture facilities program. (Cordes 1991a)
Iowa State was one of the larger recipients of academic earmarks in 1991
garnering $24 million for 20 projects from six different agencies. Iowa State received
over $100 million in earmarks between 1986 and 1991. University officials stated the
earmarks were part of an effort to make Iowa State the number one agricultural research
institution in the country. Iowa State's number of peer-reviewed proposals went up 25%
from 1986 to 1991, and its NSF support doubled during the same period. (Cordes 1991b)
In mid-199 1, a report entitled "Federally -Funded Research: Decisions for a
Decade" was disseminated by the United States Congress Office of Technology
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Assessment. The report claimed earmarking distorts the budgets of federal agencies and
benefits only a few states and institutions. It reported that $270 million was earmarked to
academic institutions in fiscal year 1990 and that $900 million for 300 projects was
earmarked to academic institutions from 1980 through 1989. The report noted that critics
of earmarking say it promotes bad science, while its proponents say it produces a better
distribution of federal research funding and provides much needed money for research
facilities. The report stated that since major facilities money was not likely to be on the
way, earmarking was likely to remain an important source of facilities funding.
However, the report found earmarking fared worse in addressing the distribution
problem. According to the report, from 1980 to 1989, 40% of earmarked funds went to 5
states and 40% went to 10 universities. The report concluded that earmarking hurts
agency budgets by forcing agencies to pull money away from their other programs in
order to fund earmarks. (Myers 1991)
In June 1991, the chairs of both the House and Senate appropriations
subcommittees, with jurisdiction over the General Services Administration, announced
that earmarks would not be funded in the fiscal year 1992 appropriation for the GSA.
They cited budget constraints as the reason for the denial of earmarks. This agreement
would only be for one year. ("Ways & Means: GSA Money for Higher Education Dries
Up." 1991)
In fiscal year 1992, $684 million in academic earmarks was given to 208
recipients. The lack of a federal technology program and research facilities funding
program was cited again as causes for the escalation of academic earmarks. Once again,
West Virginia was a large recipient of academic earmarks. Delaware was the only state
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that did not receive an earmark. Five states comprised 35% ofthe 1992 academic
earmark total. Ten states comprised 52%. Seven ofthe top ten in 1992 academic
earmarks ranked also in the top ten in total research funding. For the first time, some
institutions complained that, because they received earmarks, they were labeled and
discriminated against in peer review competitions. (Cordes and Goodman 1992)
West Virginia, which was the largest recipient of 1992 academic earmarks, was
consistently a large recipient ofearmarks throughout the late 1980' s and early 1990' s.
By their own estimates, West Virginia University and Wheeling Jesuit University
received $120 million in academic earmarks from fiscal year 1987 through fiscal year
1992. Senator Robert Byrd and Representative Allan Mollohan steered most ofthese
earmarks West Virginia's way. (Cordes 1992c)
West Virginia University focused its earmarking effort during this period on
projects that benefited West Virginia industries and people. Earmarks for West Virginia
University did not fund bad science or increase the University's capacity to win peer
reviewed funds. The University sometimes put faculty with National Science Foundation
and other grants up for academic earmarks and felt during this time that the location of
Morgantown made it hard to market new technologies. (Cordes 1992c)
Wheeling Jesuit University, primarily an undergraduate institution with about
1,400 students and only $60,000 in research grants in 1992, was, and is, the home ofthe
National Technology Transfer Center and the Classroom ofthe Future. Both the
technology center and classroom were funded with academic earmarks from the National
Aeronautical and Space Administration's budget. The technology center's mission was,
and is, to transfer new knowledge from federal laboratories to the market. The
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Classroom of the Future sought, and seeks, to develop new technology which schools and
colleges can use to improve science and math education. Wheeling Jesuit's campus was
wracked with concerns during this period about the cultural changes its earmarked
projects would bring to the campus and about the sustainability of funding for the
projects. Wheeling Jesuit's operating budget in 1992 was about $23 million, but its two
NASA projects were funded at about $30 million in fiscal year 1992. NASA provided $9
million of the $30 million for 1992, and Congress earmarked the remaining $21 million.
Wheeling Jesuit officials admitted the technology center got off to a slow start but
insisted that small institutions have the advantage of not being distracted when they try to
do big things. (Cordes 1992c)
In fiscal year 1993, $763 million in academic earmarks for 212 institutions were
approved. Election year politics, a belief by some members of Congress that support for
research and training would help certain industries, and the lack of a research facilities
funding program were all cited as reasons for the continuing escalation in earmarking.
Tight spending limits and a growing deficit in 1993 did not seem to affect earmarking.
(Cordes and Mccarron 1993)
Representative William Natcher of Kentucky took over as chair of the House
Appropriations.Committee in fiscal year 1993. He was known to oppose most forms of
earmarking. Natcher's ascension to chair, the fact that Congressional Democrats should
not have to resort to earmarking because they could get what they want for their
constituents from Democrats in the Executive Branch, a tight budget situation, and the
beginning of some hearings on academic earmarking by the House Science Committee all
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seemed to indicate that the environment for earmarking would not be as hospitable in the
future. (Cordes and McCarron 1993)
One of the largest recipients of academic earmarks in 1993 was the Consortium
for International Earth Science Information Network or CIESIN (pronounced season).
CIESIN received $73 million in earmarks in fiscal year 1993 thanks largely to
Representative Robert Traxler of Michigan. (Cordes and McCarron 1993) Between
fiscal year 1990 and 1993, Traxler was able to direct $111 million in earmarks to the
consortium. CIESIN, a consortium composed largely of Michigan institutions, supported
a research program on earth science issues like global warming. The University of
Michigan, Saginaw Valley State University, and Michigan State were all original
members of the consortium. Saginaw Valley State, in Traxler's district, was the
headquarters for CIESIN. Polytechnic University in the state of New York, Utah State
University, and the University of Maryland were added to the consortium by Traxler to
broaden its appeal. Maryland was a particularly strategic addition, because its Senator,
Barbara Mikulski, chaired the Senate appropriations sub-committee that had jurisdiction
over CIESIN's funding. (Cordes 1993g)
Traxler retired from Congress in 1993. Mikulski did not tum out to be a supporter
of CIESIN. Congress took back $7 million from CIESIN's 1993 earmarks at the request
of NASA. The Michigan Senators salvaged $59 million in earmarks for CIESIN, but
earmarks for a $37 million building for CIESIN were cut. CIESIN was also put on notice
that, in the future, it would have to compete for funds in National Science Foundation
administered processes. The CIESIN episode pointed out some of the dangers of being
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dependent on earmarks. Earmarking is political, and, ifyou live by politics, you can die
by politics, especially ifyou lose your patron. (Cordes 1993g)
As fiscal year 1994 got underway, academic earmarking appeared to be on the
wane. Spending pressures were leading some appropriations "Cardinals" to make
accords that projects not be funded unless they were first authorized by an authorizing
committee. The House Appropriations Committee's authority appeared to be declining
as it was under attack within the institution ofCongress. The House Science Committee
hearings were shedding negative light on academic earmarking. Some thought a major
research facilities funding program was on the horizon. (Speicher 1994) The Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory, run by the University ofCalifornia, turned down a $10 million
earmark in the Office ofNaval Research budget after a letter went out from ONR that
blamed cuts for peer-reviewed grants to individual scientists on earmarks (Ornstein
1994a).
In fiscal year 1994, $650.8 million in academic earmarks for 196 institutions were
approved. This total was about 15% less than the total in fiscal year 1993. Budget
constraints and the negative light shed on earmarking by the House Science Committee
hearings were cited as reasons for the decrease. (Cordes and Ornstein 1994)
Pennsylvania led all states in earmarks received in 1994, and the University of
Pittsburgh was at the top in earmarks among Pennsylvania institutions. Concurrent
Technologies Corporation, a corporation owned by the University ofPittsburgh and
located in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, received most ofthe University ofPittsburgh's
earmarked money. Johnstown is in the heart ofRepresentative John Murtha's district.
(Cordes and Ornstein 1994)
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The practice ofsoft earmarking was first noted in 1994. Soft earmarking is when
Congress suggests in the reports accompanying appropriations that certain proposals be
examined or sets up funding criteria without specifically mentioning an institution to
receive the funds. In practice, soft earmarks often have the same effect as explicit
earmarks. Agencies often contact members ofCongress to find out where the money was
intended to go. (Cordes and Ornstein 1994)
In early fiscal year 1995 activity, Simpson College received an earmark of$1.5
million for a science building in a Senate bill authorizing $65 million for the restoration
ofhistoric facilities at Historically Black Colleges and Universities. In 1994, 3% of
Simpson's students were black. (Jaschik 1994c)
The downward trend in academic earmarking continued in fiscal year 1995. $600
million in academic earmarks for 202 institutions were approved for that year. That total
was $51 million and 8% less than the fiscal year 1994 total. (Cordes and Rivera 1995)
The Republicans took control ofCongress in fiscal year 1995 but did not go after
earmarks in their 1995 budget rescission efforts. The Congressional Republicans vowed
to balance the budget in seven years without raising taxes. It was unclear in 1995 what
this would mean for earmarking. On the one hand, this effort would perhaps restrict the
money available for earmarks. On the other hand, cuts made elsewhere in the budget
might compel more institutions to go directly to their representatives in Congress for the
money they needed. (Cordes and Rivera 1995)
In fiscal year 1996, academic earmarks dropped 50% to $296 million. This was
the lowest total for academic earmarks since 1990. Only 128 institutions received an
earmark in 1996. The new Republican freshman members ofCongress apparently did
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not know how to use incumbency to their advantage. There was also a great battle over
the budget between President Clinton and Congress in fiscal year 1996. This battle
delayed progress on the appropriations bills until the last minute and left little time for
earmarking. (Cordes and Gorman 1996)
The University of Hawaii, with Senator Daniel K. Inouye's help, was one of the
largest recipients of academic earmarks in fiscal year 1996. Hawaii received a $45
million earmark for an oceanographic research vessel in fiscal year 1 996. Such vessels
are usually funded by the Navy and the National Science Foundation and awarded in a
peer review competition. The Scripps Institution of Oceanography, Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute, and the University of Washington had previously won ships in
earlier competitions. These institutions expressed concern that the University of Hawaii
ship would compete with their ships for operating funds. (Gorman 1 996) Because of
their concerns, the Navy later elected to hold a peer review contest to award the $45
million earmarked for the University of Hawaii ship. Hawaii won the contest. (Martin
1997)
Academic earmarks were on the rise again in fiscal year 1997. Earmarks totaled
$440 million that year, 49% more than they had in fiscal year 1996. 150 institutions
received an earmark in 1997. The budget process in 1997 was more orderly than the
previous year, and the Republicans in Congress had become more comfortable being in
the majority. (Cordes 1997)
In fiscal year 1 998, academic earmarks again rose, but at a much slower rate than
in 1997. Earmarks totaled $528 million that year, 1 2% more than in 1997. 208
institutions received an earmark in 1998. (Cordes 1998b)
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The transportation appropriations bill in 1998 was loaded with earmarks. $ 1 3 1 .8
million was earmarked by the bill to about two dozen campus research centers. The bill
sent another $44 million to 11 other institutions for projects and included funds for the
Salt Lake City Olympics, which benefited the University of Utah. {Lederman 1998a)
Shepherd College in West Virginia received $3.22 million in earmarks in the
· 1998 appropriation for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Economic
Development Initiative. The Economic Development Initiative is a program that is
supposed to spur economic development in distressed areas. Shepherd College used its
earmark to enlarge and update its library. Shepherdstown, West Virginia, where the
college is located, is 60 miles southeast of Washington, D.C. In 1998, it had the lowest
unemployment rate in the state of West Virginia and was also doing well by other
economic indicators. (Ramage 1998)
In fiscal year 1999, $797 million in academic earmarks to 305 institutions were
awarded. At that time, the 1999 total was the largest ever and was 51 % larger than the
previous year's total. A budget surplus, a budget process in which most of the
appropriations bills were combined into a large omnibus bill passed late in the year, and
fading opposition to the practice of earmarking were all cited as reasons for the large
increase in 1999. 45 of the 62 American members of the Association of American
Universities received academic earmarks in 1999. Practically all of the states that
received the most earmarked money had representatives on the House or Senate
appropriations committees. Four of the ten states that received the least money in
earmarks did not have representation on an appropriations committee. Nine of the top ten
states in earmarks were represented by either the chair or ranking member of an
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appropriations sub-committee. Only three of the bottom ten states had such
representation. (Brainard and Cordes 1 999)
Loma Linda University received a $30 million earmark in the 1 999 Federal
Emergency Management Agency appropriation to use to earthquake retrofit its hospital.
Representative Jerry Lewis of California represented the district in which Loma Linda
was located and chaired the House appropriations sub-committee with jurisdiction over
FEMA's budget. FEMA had a competitive program for earthquake retrofitting. The
winners in the competitive program had to provide some funds of their own towards their
earthquake retrofitting needs; Loma Linda did not. Loma Linda's earmark was supposed
to fund a novel way of retrofitting that could perhaps be duplicated if successful. The
National Science Foundation's total budget for earthquake research in 1 999 was $29.2
million. Representative Lewis had also steered earmarks for proton radiation cancer
treatment research to Loma Linda in previous years. (Brainard 1 999b)
In late 1 999, Jeffrey Brainard reported that biomedical research and development
and the budget of the National Institutes of Health were on track to double between 1 998
and 2003 . Congress and President Clinton had settled on this strategy and embarked
upon it in the late 1 990's when budget surpluses started to appear. The strategy enjoyed
broad bipartisan support. The National Institutes of Health is by far the largest federal
source of peer-reviewed competitive grants to individual investigators for research.
(Brainard 1 999e)
Brainard reported that virtually none of the additional funds allocated to
accomplish this doubling were to go for research facilities. A research space crunch
seemed to be looming. Congress had passed two major facilities bills in the past - one in
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the 1 960's and one in 1 988. The 1 988 bill authorized the National Science Foundation to
spend $250 million a year. Congress never appropriated that much, however. The
facilities program reached about $50 million in funding before being terminated in fiscal
year 1 997. (Brainard 1 999e)
A major factor hampering facilities funding seemed to be that some people
thought facilities money would come at the expense ofgrant money. Lawmakers and
those in the scientific community both seemed to favor grants over facilities. Grants
actually funded the carrying out ofresearch. Facilities seemed secondary by comparison
and not as close to the action. Brainard also reported that there was some concern that
the emphasis on biomedical research funding might be coming at the expense ofother
disciplines like engineering and physics (Brainard 1 999e).
In fiscal year 2000, academic earmarking rose 31 % and crossed the billion dollar
mark. $ 1 .044 billion was earmarked to 386 institutions. The budget surplus was cited as
the main reason for the increase. The budget surplus in fiscal year 1 999 was $ 1 24 billion.
(Brainard and Southwick 2000)
Neal F. Lane, President Clinton's science advisor in 2000 said the rise in
earmarks, "threatens to undermine America's position as the world's leader in science
and technology" and that the economy, "has grown by leaps and bounds, because ofthe
rapid pace ofdiscovery and innovation made possible by funding the highest quality
research" (Brainard and Southwick 2000, A29). The average National Science
Foundation grant was $95,000 in 2000. National Science Foundation grants were then,
and are now, awarded in peer review competition. Academic earmarks in 2000 ranged up
into the millions and in a few cases tens ofmillions ofdollars. (Brainard and Southwick
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2000) By 2000, academic earmarks appeared to some like Lane to be a way for
institutions to secure larger than normal sums ofmoney for projects not subjected to the
same quality control scrutiny to which peer reviewed projects are subjected.
In fiscal year 200 l , $1.668 billion was earmarked to 528 academic institutions.
That total was $624 million more than in fiscal year 2000 and at that time represented the
largest single year increase in funds earmarked and the largest number ofinstitutions
receiving an earmark in a single year. Among the institutions receiving earmarks in
2001, the University ofIdaho received $700,000 to study historic jazz, and the University
ofAlaska at Fairbanks received $645,000 to make a machine that can de-bone wild
salmon. The budget surplus and election year pressures were cited as reasons for the rise
in earmarking activity. The federal government had a budget surplus of$236 billion in
fiscal year 2000. President Bush and Senator John McCain vowed to fight earmarks in
2001 but were largely unsuccessful. (Brainard and Southwick 2001b)
Congress earmarked $345 million for 118 building projects in 2001. The
National Institutes ofHealth had $75 million, to be competed for by all institutions, in its
facilities funding program in fiscal year 2001. Ofthe $345 million Congress earmarked
for facilities, $168.3 million for 58 projects was in the Department ofHealth and Human
Services appropriation. The Department ofHealth and Human Services appropriation
includes the National Institutes ofHealth budget. In some budgets, like NASA's, funds
for peer-reviewed awards appeared to be pitted against earmarks. The budgets for the
National Institutes ofHealth and National Science Foundation, however, remained off
limits to earmarks. The National Institutes ofHealth and the National Science
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Foundation are by far the two largest sources ofpeer-reviewed competitive research
grants to individual investigators. (Brainard and Southwick 2001b)
There was, however, a scare ofsorts with regard to the National Science
Foundation appropriation in 2001. The 2001 National Science Foundation appropriation
contained the Children's Research Initiative. Congress went into detail in the report
accompanying the NSF appropriation about the criteria by which it hoped proposals to
the Children's Research Initiative would be evaluated. It also went into great detail about
the profile ofinstitutions it hoped would be awarded grants. The report included
language stating that Children's Research Initiative grants should be competitively
awarded, but some observers felt Congress was getting dangerously close to earmarking
the previously sacred NSF budget. (Southwick 2001)
The efforts of Mississippi Senator Thad Cochran to influence the National
Institutes ofHealth grant process prompted similar concerns. Cochran made direct
appeals to the top administration at the NIH for funds to support bio-imaging grants at the
University ofMississippi Medical Center. He wanted these grants to be made outside the
NIH's normal competitive peer-reviewed grant process. His intervention alarmed some
people, and he received some negative feedback and chose to back off. (Brainard 2002a)
A third ofall the NIH grant money in fiscal year 2001 went to investigators in
California, New York, and Pennsylvania. The ten states receiving the least in NIH grants
received less than 1% ofthe grants awarded. The NIH budget in fiscal year 2001 was
$23.6 billion. (Brainard 2002a)
Another development in 2001 was the emergence ofcommunity colleges as
players in the earmarking game. Prior to 2001, community colleges had mostly relied
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solely on their associations for federal lobbying. 2001 saw more community colleges
lobbying themselves and hiring lobbyists to lobby for them. Community colleges
received $6 million in academic earmarks in fiscal year 1997. They received $48 million
in fiscal year 2001. (Evelyn 2001)
In late 2001, a group met in Washington to discuss academic earmarking. There
were some at the meeting who said academic earmarking would not go down until
institutions curbed their appetites and some who said attention should be focused on
making sure earmarked money is spent better. Former Senator J. Bennett Johnson of
Louisiana said he thought earmarking stimulated Congress to support research. (Brainard
2001d)
In the first shot of the fiscal year 2002 budget battle, President Bush proposed a
budget that would increase funding for basic research by 6%. Most of that increase was
accounted for by a proposed 13.4% increase in the NIH budget. An increase of that
amount would keep the NIH on track to double by 2003. Bush's budget included $100
million in the NIH budget for facilities funding. It also included a 1.3% increase for the
National Science Foundation, a .1% for the Energy science budget, a 2% increase for the
NASA research budget, and no increase for agriculture research. Some critics
complained that outside of the NIH increase, the budget really held little good news.
Some concern was also expressed that an imbalance was developing because biomedical
research was being funded while other important areas of science were not. The Bush
administration maintained that fiscal discipline and tax cuts restricted a rise in budgets
other than the NIH's. (Brainard and Southwick 2001a)
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By the time the appropriations process had run its course in fiscal year 2002,
$1.837 billion had been earmarked to 668 colleges and universities. Both ofthese totals
were new highs. Budget deficits returned in fiscal year 2002 but did not seem to slow
earmarks. 74% ofthe academic earmarks in 2002 went to fund projects. 13% went to
fund facilities construction projects. (Brainard 2002c)
The September 11, 2001 attacks and the war on terror broke budget discipline
across the board in 2002. Discretionary spending in the entire fiscal year 2002 budget
went up 13%. The Department ofDefense appropriations bill was the most earmarked
bill. Colleges and universities received $116 million for 35 terrorism related projects in
the Department ofDefense appropriation. The total budget for the Department of
Defense in fiscal year 2002 was $351 billion, so earmarks were a rather small part ofthe
overall budget. 56 ofthe 61 American members ofthe Association ofAmerican
Universities received academic earmarks in fiscal year 2002. (Brainard 2002c)
Among these institutions, the largest award went to Auburn University which
received $20 million for construction costs on a Center for Transportation Technology
(Brainard 2002c). Other large recipients in 2002 were Wheeling Jesuit University, which
received $45.5 million from 1990 to 2002 with the help ofSenator Robert C. Byrd for its
National Technology Transfer Center (Brainard 2002h); the University ofAlaska at
Fairbanks, which received $72 million from 199 1 to 2002 with the help ofSenator Ted
Stevens for its Arctic Region Supercomputing Center (Brainard 2002g); the Medical
University ofSouth Carolina, which received $72 million from 1990 to 2002 with the
help ofSenator Ernest F. Hollings for its Ernest F. Hollings Cancer Center (Brainard
2002f); Loma Linda University, which received $60.3 million from 1994 to 2002 with
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the help of Representative Jerry Lewis for its National Medical Technology Testbed - a
program which takes in earmarks and awards grants through a peer review process to
other institutions (Brainard 2002e); and Georgetown University, which received $44.5
million from 1991 to 2002 to develop a hydrogen-fueled bus (Brainard 2002d).
President Bush sought a 15.7% increase for the NIH in his fiscal year 2003 budget
but again sought minimal increases for the National Science Foundation, agriculture, and
the research budget of the Department of Defense. Critics complained that physics,
computer science, and other non-biomedical science areas were languishing. Some made
the point that advances in bio-medical research were often dependent on advances in
other scientific disciplines like physics and computer science. (Brainard and Southwick
2002)
While Bush's overall 2003 budget proposal for agriculture research was flat, he
did propose a doubling of the National Research Initiative, agriculture's primary
competitive peer-reviewed grant program. The program had been funded at $120 million
in fiscal year 2002. Bush proposed funding it at $240 million in fiscal year 2003. Bush
proposed cutting agriculture earmarks to finance the National Research Initiative's
doubling. (Hebel 2002)
During the 2003 appropriations process, a movement to double the National
Science Foundation budget in five years started. This movement was very similar to the
effort that had· been made to double the NIH budget between 1998 and 2003. The House
Science Committee authorized a 15% increase for three years which would put the NSF
budget on the proper pace to double. The Senate Appropriations Committee sub
committee over the NSF budget approved a 12% increase in the NSF budget for fiscal
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year 2003. This was a little short of what would be needed to put the NSF budget on a
doubling pace. Both the House and Senate committees expressed a clear preference for
funding increases in peer-reviewed competitive research grants to individual investigators
over facilities funding. NSF facilities funding was cut by 43% during the appropriations
process. (Brainard 2002b)
At the end of the fiscal year 2003 appropriations process, $2.012 billion in
academic earmarks had been appropriated to 716 institutions. This was an increase of
10% over the previous year. Homeland security and anti-terrorism earmarks accounted
for $223 million of the $2.012 billion total. The homeland security/anti-terrorism total
had been $126 million in fiscal year 2002 and $73 million in fiscal year 2001. 60% of
the earmarks in 2003 went to research projects. 13% went to research buildings or
equipment. Many earmarks were much larger than the typical peer-reviewed grants
handed out by the NIH or NSF. The NIH facilities program had $120 million in its fiscal
year 2003 budget. Academic earmarks for facilities and equipment in 2003 totaled $232
million. (Brainard and Borrego 2003)
The $223 million in homeland security earmarks in fiscal year 2003 was a 68%
increase over the total in fiscal year 2002. Competitive peer-reviewed homeland security
research grants were also up in 2003. (Borrego and Brainard 2003a)
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology clearly led the pack in homeland
security and overall earmarks in 2003. New Mexico Institute received $50 million in
academic earmarks in fiscal year 2003. It received another $35 million in earmarks from
2000 through 2002. Most of its earmarks have gone to train fire, police, emergency
technicians, and other first responders to respond to terrorism. $5 million of a $20
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million earmark received in 2003 was used to buy a 160 acre ghost town in southern New
Mexico to use as a training ground. (Borrego 2003b)
New Mexico Institute had always been good in explosives research. In the
1990's, it moved into training and formed the National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium with Louisiana State University, Texas A&M University, and two federal
research and training facilities. In 2003, the New Mexico Institute was training 120
people each week. The people trained went back to their agencies and trained others.
(Borrego 2003b)
Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico was instrumental in sending New Mexico
Institute its earmarks. The Institute's normal course in pursuing earmarks was to go for
large expensive equipment-laden projects and eschew smaller grants to individual
investigators. (Borrego 2003b)
Other institutions receiving large homeland security earmarks in 2003 were
Dartmouth College, which received $78 million from 1999 to 2003 for its Institute for
Security Technology Studies with the help of Senator Judd Gregg, and the University of
South Florida, which received $32 million in 2002 and 2003 for its Center for Biological
Defense with the help of Representative Bill Young. The Center for Biological Defense
distributed $22.6 million of the earmarked funds it received in 2002 and 2003 to other
institutions. (Borrego and Brainard 2003b)
The period from 1990 to 2003 saw academic earmarking really come into its own
and grow to $2.0 1 2 billion by the end of the period. There was a dip in the middle of the
period which for the most part corresponded with a change in the political party which
controlled a majority in both Houses of Congress. However, there were two fiscal years,
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prior to this change of power and the low point of the dip in fiscal year 1996, in which
academic earmarking was going down somewhat seemingly in response to fiscal
pressures and the negative light being shined on it by Congressional hearings. After the
change of power in Congress, academic earmarking bottomed out in fiscal year 1996 and
then rebounded steadily in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 before reaching new heights in
fiscal year 1999 and continuing to rise until the end of this period in 2003.
This is the general trend when the value of all earmarks in each year of the period
is taken into account, but the trend is rather consistent, with only a single minor
difference, when the number of institutions receiving earmarks and the number of
earmarks granted in each year are considered. The single minor difference in the trend
for the number of institutions receiving earmarks and the number of earmarks granted is
that these totals are slightly higher in fiscal year 1995 than in fiscal year 1994 before
dipping in fiscal year 1996 along with the value of earmarks awarded.
During this period of time when earmarks grew so significantly, some major
programs which utilize peer reviewed competitions to award their funding also saw
significant increases in their budgets. The National Institutes of Health, which is the
largest federal source of peer-reviewed competitive grants to individual investigators for
research, saw its budget double between 1998 and 2003. The National Science
Foundation, second only to the NIH in federal grant making, also saw increases in its
budget during this period.
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RECENT TRENDS IN ACADEMIC EARMARKING
In recent years, academic earmarking has continued to be a prominent feature of
the federal appropriations process. President Bush requested $3 .2 billion for homeland
security research in his fiscal year 2004 budget. This amount was more than four times
the amount spent in fiscal year 2002. In fiscal year 2002, 35 institutions received $126
million in homeland security academic earmarks. David Goldston, the ChiefofStaff to
Republicans on the House Science Committee, commented on Bush's request by saying,
"This is exactly what the federal-funding system is supposed to do - direct researchers
that have fairly widely applicable expertise to issues ofnational concern." (Borrego
2003a, A22)
In 2005, a lawsuit was filed by atheists and agnostics which sought to block
academic earmarks to Alaska Christian College. The lawsuit charged the earmarks to the
college violated the separation ofchurch and state guaranteed by the constitution. Alaska
Christian College received $1, 185,000 in earmarks from 2003 to 2005. The lawsuit
sought to block a $435,000 earmark to Alaska Christian College included in the 2005
appropriation for the Fund for the Improvement ofPost Secondary Education, a program
ofthe Department ofEducation. (Field 2005c, Field 2005d) The suit entitled Freedom
from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Margaret Spellings was filed in United States District
Court in the Western District ofWisconsin on April 2 1, 2005. Judge John C. Shabaz
dismissed the case with prejudice on October 12, 2005. (Web PACER 2007)
Early in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations process, Congress considered lifting a
2 year ban it had imposed upon itselfwhich forbade the placing ofearmarks in the
Homeland Security appropriations bill in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Those arguing to
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lift the ban pointed out the Department ofDefense and Department ofJustice
appropriations bills in 2004 and 2005 had been earmarked. Their argument was, if
Defense and Justice could be earmarked, why not Homeland Security. (Field 2005b)
In fiscal year 2006, the transportation bill that sends gas tax money back to the
states came before the House and Senate. This bill comes up every six years. The 2006
bill contained a record 174 academic earmarks to 142 institutions totaling $602,74 1,940.
The earmarks funded everything from bus depots, parking garages, and pedestrian
walkways to a materials-research institute. Tennessee received the most ofany state in
the bill receiving $4 1 million including $20 million that went to the University of
Tennessee at Knoxville for a new materials-research institute. (Field 2005e)
Later in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations process, a tight spending environment
caused Senators and Representatives in conference to take all the earmarks out ofthe
Labor-Health and Human Services-Education appropriations bill. Taking the earmarks
out freed up about $1 billion for other spending needs. Some in the House and Senate
wanted to use a surplus in the Pell Grant program to fund earmarks and a larger increase
in the NIH budget. (Burd and Brainard 2005) The House rejected this conference bill
because members on both sides ofthe aisle were angry about the earmarks left out
(Brainiard 2005a).
The House and Senate eventually passed a second compromise Labor-Health and
Human Services-Education appropriations bill. The second compromise bill had no
earmarks, but it had an additional $90 million for health programs in rural areas put into
the bill to win back enough House Republicans to pass the bill. No House Democrats
voted for either compromise bill. Enough Senate Democrats voted to pass the second
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compromise bill because they were convinced the alternative, funding at fiscal year 2005
levels through a continuing resolution, would be worse than the bill. (Brainard 2005b)
In early 2006, Jeffrey Brainard reported that a tighter funding environment would
mean one in five NIH and NSF grant applications would be funded in fiscal year 2006.
Approximately one in three were funded in fiscal year 2001. Brainard also reported that
the doubling ofthe NIH budget from 1998 to 2003 had made some people believe the
institutes could do without additional funding in a tougher tighter time. (Brainard 2006a)
Later in the 2006 appropriations process, the Department ofDefense
appropriations bill was passed with a measure that imposed a 1% across the board cut on
all appropriations, even those already made in other appropriations bills. The 1% cut
meant that research and student aid would be cut in fiscal year 2006 for the first time
since 1982. (Brainard, Burd, Field, and Selingo 2006)
In his 2006 State ofthe Union, President Bush advanced a plan that would double
budgets for the NSF, Department ofEnergy's Office ofScience, and the Department of
Commerce's National Institute ofStandards and Technology. Bush proposed that $50
billion be put towards this objective over the next ten years. (Field 2006)
In the wake ofa scandal involving former California Republican Representative
Randy "Duke" Cunningham and another scandal involving lobbyist Jack Abramoff,
Republicans in the House and Senate considered placing limits on earmarks.
Cunningham was indicted for taking a bribe in exchange for supporting an earmark for a
defense contractor. Abramoff was known for securing earmarks for his clients and has
been indicted for violating a number of lobbying laws. Among the things considered by
Republicans were placing a limit on the number ofearmarks a member ofCongress can
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request, making known which member ofCongress is sponsoring each earmark, and
making known a justification for each earmark. (Brainard 2006b)
The Senate passed a bill later in 2006 that required disclosure ofsponsors and
justifications but set no limit on the number ofearmarks a member could pursue. The
Senate bill also allowed Senators to make a point oforder to strip an earmark from any
bill brought to the floor ofthe Senate. When the point oforder is made, the earmark
would be stripped unless 60 Senators voted to keep it. (Brainard 2006c)
The House passed its own bill restricting earmarks. The House bill required
disclosure ofsponsors but not justifications. It also defined earmark in such a way that
earmarks which do not specify a certain recipient are not considered earmarks. (Selingo
2006) The House and Senate bills were in conference at the time this study was written.
In May 2006, John H. Marburger III, President Bush's science advisor, said
earmarks obscured how much federal spending for peer reviewed projects is going up or
down. Marburger maintained that earmarks were difficult to disaggregate from totals of
federal research spending. (Brainard 2006d)
Academic earmarking in recent years has occurred within a tighter funding
environment. This tighter funding environment has also affected the budgets ofthe
National Institutes ofHealth and National Science Foundation which enjoyed increases in
the more flush funding times ofthe late 1990's and early part ofthe 2000's. Scandals
involving members ofCongress and lobbyists have caused academic earmarks and all
earmarks to be viewed with more scrutiny. As this study was being completed, both
Houses ofCongress were considering various regulations which would affect academic
earmarks such as limits on the number ofearmarks a member ofCongress can request
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and disclosure of the name of the member sponsoring an earmark and some justification
for why an earmark should be granted.

ARGUMENTS MADE FOR AND AGAINST ACADEMIC EARMARKING
Members of Congress earmark because they believe bringing federal funds home
will enhance their image with voters in their state or district and thus enhance their
chances of being reelected. Other motivations for earmarking include a desire to enact
good public policy or exercise power in Congress. Most members of Congress consider
earmarking their right. It is a means by which they can sweeten the pot and make
legislation more palatable. It is probably only human nature that members enjoy
directing funds. Opportunities to honor themselves or other members by naming
buildings or programs in their states and districts are quite enticing. (Andres 1995,
Savage 1999) While reelection motivation may prompt most earmarking, Congressmen
and Senators are dependent on the lobbying effort of Colleges and Universities to supply
them with important information about how much to send back and for what to send it
(de Figueiredo and Silverman 2002).
Academic institutions have many motivations to seek earmarks. The number of
scientists in the United States has grown as the various scientific disciplines have
developed and training in the scientific disciplines has become more readily available.
The fact there are more scientists means more competition for the research money
available. The amount of peer reviewed research money available to scientists has not
kept pace with the growth in trained scientists. Consequently, research dollars per
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scientist have declined. The ambitions of researchers and institutions have tended to
exceed the amount of funding available. (Savage 1999)
There has also been little federal money available to institutions to build research
facilities. The only consistent money available, besides earmarks, for providing research
facilities has been the amount of money included in grants for indirect costs. Indirect
· costs are the costs not directly related to carrying out the research activities a grant funds.
Indirect costs include things like utilities, copies, and depreciation on buildings and
equipment. Most federal grants for research include some funding for indirect costs that
goes to the institution in which the investigator winning the grant will carry out his
research. The majority of the funds in federal research grants go to individual
investigators to fund their research activities. (Savage 1999)
The indirect cost reimbursement part of federal research grants has been the only
consistent way the federal government has supported research facilities. This has created
pressures for earmarking. Practically the only way for an institution to get funding for
facilities, besides getting an earmark for them, has been to have investigators on their
faculty who were bringing in federal research grants. This creates a major problem for
institutions lacking both adequate research facilities and grant-winning faculty members.
Oftentimes, the only way to get grant-winning faculty members is to build facilities for
them, but practically all of the money available for facilities costs comes only after an
institution has faculty who are receiving grants. In order to get into the federal research
game, an institution has either had to receive an earmark, raise money from private
sources, receive state funding, or direct other institutional funds towards facilities cost.
Newer, less-established, less-prestigious institutions often have not had established
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alumni and donor lists from which to raise money, adequate state support, or other
sources offunding they could direct to research facilities. Even institutions with research
facilities and grant-winning faculty members have had strong incentives to earmark
because the up-front costs offacilities have to be borne by institutions before indirect cost
reimbursement from federal research grant activity can be enjoyed. (Cook 1998,
Ketcham and Wells 1991, Rose 1986, Savage 1999, Tenzer 1985)
Some have argued that building research facilities more broadly throughout the
country leads to more competition for peer-reviewed research grants and that earmarks
for facilities are truly an add-on and have little to do with the financing ofbasic research
or the peer review process (Schlossberg 1990). Earmarks for facilities also have the
effect ofholding down indirect cost rates because institutions cannot bill the government
for the interest on debt they assume to build facilities or for depreciation. Institutions are
able to charge for depreciation when they fund facilities from non-federal sources.
(Cordes 1992b)
The main argument proponents ofacademic earmarking have made is that it
addresses geographical and institutional inequities in how the peer review system of
awarding federal research money distributes funds. Since the 1960's, it has been well
documented that a very few institutions, located mainly in the northeast and on the west
coast ofthe United States, have received most ofthe federal funding for academic
research. These institutions have been considered the most prestigious institutions and
have been advantaged in facilities and resources, tradition ofphilanthropic support from
alumni and friends, and attracting the best and brightest scholars to their faculties. Some
have compared the system ofawarding research grants to individual investigators based
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on the merit ofproposals they submit to committees oftheir peers to an "old boy's
network". The reviewers, who sit on peer review committees, tend to come from the
institutions that get the awards peer review committees pass out. (Rose 1986, Savage
1999)
Dr. John Silber, President ofBoston University from the 1980's to the early part
ofthe 2000's, was perhaps earmarking's most vociferous and effective proponent. Silber
maintained that the peer review process rewarded the conventional at the expense ofthe
novel or creative and that earmarks were a way for the have-not institutions to penetrate
into the peer review system and become able to win peer-reviewed grants. (Savage 1999)
Silber said in 2001, "Peer review is understandably and inevitably biased in favor of
established programs whose faculties dominate the review process. The rich have always
tended to see the system that made them rich as the best and noblest." (Brainard 2001b,
A30)
Proponents ofearmarking have pointed out Congress has its own powers of
review and may have a better grip on the economic development ramifications of
awarding federal research money than scientists do. Members of Congress are also at
least accountable to voters while those serving on peer review committees are not directly
accountable for the decisions they make. (Rose 1986)
Earmarking proponents argue there is favoritism in the peer review process,
geographic dispersal offederal research money is desirable, research infrastructure needs
to be developed across the nation, economic development needs to occur in all regions,
non-elite institutions deserve federal research support too, earmarking keeps rich
institutions from getting richer, earmarking meets national needs in targeted ways, and
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earmarking promotes access and diversity within academic research. Proponents also
argue that earmarks bolster the ability ofinstitutions, not in the elite club ofinstitutions
which consistently gamer the most peer-reviewed grants, to compete for peer-reviewed
funding and that earmarks go to states and institutions which otherwise would receive
little federal research money. Arguments have also been made that earmarks go to non
research projects, like facilities, and are add-ons in the federal appropriations process that
do not come at the expense ofother funds appropriated for peer-reviewed individual
investigator grants. It has also been pointed out that earmarks comprise a small
percentage ofthe total amount spent by the federal government to support academic
research. (Brainard 2001c, Cook 1998, Feller 2004, Rose 1986)
Opponents to academic earmarking have often had a general cultural and
professional beliefin the scientific method and the peer review method ofawarding
federal research money. Faculty winning peer-reviewed grants have probably had the
most commitment to the peer-reviewed system and most objections to the practice of
academic earmarking. It is these faculty who write grants, do the research, and sit on the
peer review panels that hand out peer-reviewed money. These faculty often have a
problem with money being awarded by Congress without a proposal being written and
reviewed for scientific merit. They are also frequently concerned about funds being
awarded based on which institution's Representatives or Senators are most influential or
strategically placed within Congress. Arguments have been made that bypassing peer
review leads to an erosion ofquality in research and that money appropriated for
earmarks reduces the money available for peer-reviewed grants. Others have stated their
beliefthat peer review encourages learning by both individuals and institutions about
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what it takes to be competitive. The general argument ofopponents ofearmarking and
proponents ofthe peer review system ofresearch funding has been that peer review
promotes the best science and that earmarking lacks any quality control. (Feller 2004,
Savage 1999, Tenzer 1985)
Irwin Feller ofPennsylvania State University argued in 2004 that the federal
interest in supporting research needed to be clarified and that the number and
geographical dispersion ofinstitutions the government should and is willing to support
should be determined. He argued for assessing earmarking results. Feller advocated a
role for the Association ofAmerican Universities similar to the role the National
Collegiate Athletic Association plays in regulating college athletics. Feller felt the AAU
should punish Universities reputationally for seeking earmarks through some sanctioning
procedure similar to the enforcement procedures the NCAA uses to enforce athletic
regulations. (Feller 2004)
Norrine Noonan, the former chiefofthe Environmental Protection Agency's
research office said in 2001 that earmarks hampered that agency's operations. She
complained that, while she headed the EPA research office, agency personnel had to
work with earmark recipients to insure their work was worthy and contributed to the
EPA's mission. This took time and hampered the effectiveness ofthe agency. (Brainard
2001b)
Some have felt that the inequities in the distribution ofresearch funds by the peer
review system could better be addressed by set aside programs. Both the National
Institutes ofHealth and National Science Foundation have had set aside programs. Set
aside programs limit peer review competition to those states underperforming in the
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receiving ofpeer review funds. They provide a sort ofsheltered form ofcompetition and
are designed to increase the research capacity oflow performing states and make them
more able to compete in peer review competitions. (Brainard 1999d, Brainard 2002a)
The National Science Foundation's main set aside program has been the
Experimental Program for the Stimulation ofCompetitive Research (EPSCOR). A study
ofEPSCOR states in the program conducted in 1999 showed that about halfofthe states
in the program had improved in receiving peer-reviewed grants and halfhad not. One of
the major criticisms ofthe EPSCOR program is that states that do improve do not
graduate from the program. The EPSCOR program requires states and institutions to
kick in some oftheir own money to match some ofthe funds provided by EPSCOR
grants. (Brainard 1999d)
The National Institutes ofHealth started awarding Institutional Development
Awards in 2002. In 2002, these awards provided institutions in 23 states up to $2 million
a year for three years to recruit faculty, buy equipment, and renovate laboratories so that
they could compete more successfully in the NIH's other peer reviewed programs. Every
institution that applied in 2002 received an award prompting some to criticize the
program as nothing more than a ruse for earmarking. Still, the program, funded at $160
million in 2002, was a small part ofthe NIH's $23.6 billion budget in fiscal year 2002.
The EPSCOR program was funded at $110 million in 2002. (Brainard 2002a)
Set aside programs have generally not been funded at high enough levels to affect
the distributional inequities which concern proponents ofearmarking. Smaller states in
the set aside programs file fewer grant applications than other states. In 2000, the set
aside states only filed 8% ofall NIH grant applications filed. This 8% roughly matched
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the share ofgrants approved for investigators in set aside states. Set aside states also
have a smaller percentage ofgrants approved. In 2000, 24% ofthe applications filed by
investigators in the set aside states were approved. 31% ofall applications were
approved. (Brainard 2002a)
Some have felt that the lack ofa uniform definition for what constitutes an
earmark has obscured earmarks and made them difficult to fight. Earmarks have been
defined as any award that has not gone through external peer or merit review, as an award
directly funded by Congress, and as an appropriation for an institution not authorized by
an authorizing committee in Congress. Some have also thought agriculture earmarks
should not be counted because agriculture has a long tradition ofawarding research
funding through earmarking and that monies earmarked to a consortium which are
subsequently awarded to other institutions through some sort ofreview process should
not count either. (Savage 1993)
The Citizens Against Government Waste has classified as pork any project that is
initiated by the House or Senate but not both, that is not authorized by a Congressional
authorizing committee, that is not competitively awarded, that is not requested by the
President, that is funded at more than the level the President requests, that is not
subjected to a Congressional hearing, and that serves local or special interests. To be
pork, a project need meet only one ofthe Citizens Against Government Waste's criteria.
(Cordes 1998a)
A lack ofconsensus on what constitutes an earmark has without doubt clouded
the policy debate over earmarks. It has weakened the arguments on both sides ofthe
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debate but has vexed those against earmarking most because it has made earmarks an
elusive target.
In sum, there are many motivations for members of the House and Senate to
earmark but greatest among these motivations is the motivation to further their reelection
prospects by noticeably bringing federal resources to their districts and states. Members
of the House and Senate also earmark to enact what they feel is good policy and
sometimes use earmarks to entice other members into voting for policies for which they
might not otherwise vote.
Those within academia have many motivations to seek earmarks. Their greatest
motivations, however, are economic as there are more scientists than ever before and less
money available per scientist. The lack of facilities money available has also motivated
academic leaders to seek earmarks for their institution's facilities needs.
Those for academic earmarks have insisted that they remedy geographical and
institutional inequities of the peer review process and send money where it would
otherwise not go. They believe that Congress has powers of review at least as good as
committees of academic experts and is more accountable to citizens than the experts who
serve on peer review committees, that the geographic dispersal of federal research
funding is desirable, and that earmarks help meet national needs in targeted ways.
Those against the practice of academic earmarking believe in the superiority of
the scientific method and the peer review process. They believe that bypassing peer
review leads to erosion in the quality of research, that earmarking takes away funds
which-could otherwise be awarded in peer reviewed competitions, and that peer reviewed
competitions for grants promote the best science while earmarking lacks effective quality
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control. While those against earmarking have often espoused competitive set aside
programs as the best means to combat any geographical or institutional inequities the
peer reviewed system may reinforce, set aside programs have never been funded at a high
enough level to affect distributional inequities.

THE HIGHER EDUCATION ASSOCIATIONS FIGHT EARMARKS
The higher education community is filled with many associations that represent
member institutions and groups offaculty, students, and administrators. These
associations have traditionally played a major role in federal relations. They have
lobbied Congress on financial aid, research policy, Medicare reimbursement, and
immigration laws concerning foreign students. (Cook 1998)
There are six associations which are considered the peak associations in the
higher education _community. These six associations all have institutional members but
some ofthem also have other associations as members. The broadest ofthe "Big Six"
associations is the American Council on Education (ACE). Most ofthe higher education
institutions in the United States belong to it as do each ofthe other five "Big Six"
associations. ACE has traditionally played a coordinating role among the other
associations in the higher education community.
The smallest and most elite ofthe "Big Six" is the Association ofAmerican
Universities (AAU). To become a member ofthe AAU, an institution must be invited.
Most ofthe prestigious private research Universities, like Harvard University, and many
ofthe more prestigious state Universities, like the University ofCalifornia-Berkeley, are
members ofthe AAU.
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The second smallest of the "Big Six" is the National Association of State
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC). Its members are public colleges and
universities, especially land-grant institutions and state flagship universities, as well as
public higher education systems.
The American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) is the
next largest of the "Big Six". It is composed of master's institutions, regional
universities, and state systems of higher education.
The next largest of the "Big Six" is the National Association of Independent
Colleges and Universities (NAICU). It is composed of independent or private colleges
and universities as well as some organizations which coordinate private higher education
within states and some other smaller associations of private institutions.
The largest of the "Big Six" associations, except for ACE, is the American
Association of Community Colleges (AACC). Its membership is composed of public and
private two-year degree granting institutions. (Cook 1998)
The "Big Six" associations opposed the practice of earmarking to varying degrees
in the 1980's and 1990's. The Association of American Universities opposed earmarking
most vigorously. This is not too surprising considering AAU member institutions were
then and are now some of the largest recipients of peer reviewed federal research grants.
The National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges and the
American Council on Education were the next most active associations on the earmarking
issue. Some feel the earmarking question demonstrated the impotence of the associations
as none of the associations, despite being on the record against earmarking, were able to
convince their member institutions not to participate in earmarking. (Cook 1998)
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After Catholic University and Columbia University, both AAU members,
received $5 million earmarks in 1983, Robert Rosenzwieg, the President ofthe AAU,
was spurred into action. The AAU and NASULGC both passed resolutions declaring a
moratorium on earmarking in the mid-1980's. ACE, the National Academy ofSciences,
the Council ofScientific Society Presidents, the American Association for the
Advancement ofScience, the National Science Board, AASCU, the American Physical
Society, the Federation ofAmerican Societies for Experimental Biology, and the Council
ofGraduate Schools followed suit. The moratoriums did not stop earmarking. The
associations did not enforce the moratoriums on their members and did not sanction
members receiving earmarks because ofthe voluntary nature ofassociation membership.
None ofthe associations took an institution's earmarking into account when considering
new members. Also, the associations found it difficult to lobby against specific earmarks
because it was difficult to know an earmark was in the works until it surfaced in one of
the appropriations committees. Once an earmark had surfaced, it had supporters.
(Savage 1999)
In 1986 and 1987, Donald Langenberg, Chancellor ofthe University of Illinois Chicago Circle, chaired a committee sponsored by the AAU, NASULGC, the Council of
Graduate Schools, and ACE that looked into the earmarking issue. The committee's
report encouraged Congress to use merit assessments in considering earmarks; for
associations to oppose any earmarking in the NIH, NSF, National Endowment for the
Humanities, National Endowment for the Arts, and four other federal research agency
budgets; more facilities funding; and efforts to educate the public about the negatives of
earmarking. Arthur Sussman, President ofthe University ofChicago filed a dissenting
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addendum to the Langenberg report which stated any earmarking was bad. In 1987,
AAU members adopted the Langenberg report with a resolution to discuss it further in
future meetings. (Palca 1987, Savage 1999)
The Langenberg report was more accommodating to earmarking than the
moratorium on earmarking the AAU had previously passed. After the Langenberg report,
the AAU's moratorium remained in effect, but the AAU's policy was to not waste energy
fighting earmarks once they became visible, to fight earmarks for research projects but
not facilities, and to fight the earmarking of major peer-reviewed budgets like the NSF's
and NIH's. Also, AAU policy was not to sanction any of its members which received
earmarks. Robert Rosenzwieg, the President of the AAU, particularly, opposed
publishing lists of institutions receiving earmarks. He did not feel that this form of public
embarrassment would be effective in curtailing earmarking activity and also thought that
it would reflect negatively on the AAU. (Savage 1999)
The moratorium on earmarking was never adhered to by those AAU institutions
which voted against it. The University of Pennsylvania was the first institution which
voted for the moratorium to pursue an earmark. Penn's President Sheldon Hackney
needed money for facilities and sought an earmark for facilities in 1988. Rosenzwieg and
other University Presidents in the AAU's leadership strongly opposed to the practice of
earmarking, like Chancellor Joe B. Wyatt of Vanderbilt, were quite dismayed by
Hackney's decision. The AAU, however, took no formal action in response to Penn's
defection from the moratorium. (Savage 1999)
In April 1989, the AAU passed a resolution at its spring meeting in Washington
calling for more facilities funding but denouncing earmarking. The resolution had no
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language about AAU member institutions participating in an earmarking moratorium.
The resolution also supported set aside programs as the proper way to address concerns
about the geographical dispersion offederal research funds. Later in 1989, another
resolution was passed at the AAU's fall meeting calling for no earmarking in the NIH,
NSF, Department ofDefense, NASA, and Department ofEnergy budgets. (Savage 1999)
The AAU's fight against earmarks in the 1980's was hampered by the AAU's
willingness to go down the path oftrying to distinguish good earmarks from bad ones.
Further muddying the waters was the fact Congress traditionally supported Historically
Black Colleges and Universities, Galludet University for the Deaf, and Native American
schools. Also university-managed Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
and University Affiliated Research Centers like the Stanford Linear Accelerator, the
Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University, and the Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory ofthe University ofCalifornia were awarded non-competitive sole source
contracts by the government. Some pointed to these sole source contracts, which the
AAU supported and did not consider earmarks, as points ofhypocrisy in the AAU's
policy. The AAU's moratorium leaked from the beginning, but it may have restrained
some institutions from participating in earmarking while it was in effect. (Savage 1999)
In the early 1990's, the AAU seemed to stop trying to even oppose earmarking.
In 1994, Cornelius J. Pings, who succeeded Robert Rosenzwieg as President ofthe AAU,
said, "I have a personal view that money for research and money for research facilities
are always best awarded based on merit reviews in open competition but I acknowledge
that Congress has its own rules and prerogatives." (Jaschik 1994d, A30) By 1998,
associations, like the AAU, had muted their criticism ofearmarking, begun to note that
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the vast majority of research funding still flowed through peer reviewed programs, and
were admitting that some earmarks fund worthwhile things (Cordes 1998b). In 1999,
Nils Hasselmo, who succeeded Pings as AAU President, called for more facilities
funding to abate earmarking pressures and said some earmarks go to worthy causes. The
AAU under Hasselmo in 1999 was largely silent on the earmarking issue and focused
only on keeping earmarks out of the NIH and NSF budgets. (Brainard and Cordes 1999)
In 2000, C. Peter McGrath, President of NASULGC, said he thought many
earmarks supported worthy programs and that earmarks were add-ons in the funding
process. McGrath said he would rather see earmarked money go to the NSF or National
Endowment for the Humanities budgets, but he did not think earmarked money would be
appropriated at all if it were not earmarked. (Brainard and Southwick 2000)
A big surge in earmarks in fiscal year 2001 prompted the AAU to resume its
opposition to earmarking. Hasselmo called on AAU members to at least refrain from
taking earmarks that undermine peer review. 51 of the 61 American members of the
AAU received earmarks in fiscal year 2001. Hasselmo said in 2001, "To have individual
members (of Congress) decide how individual research grants are awarded can only be
harmful to the scientific research enterprise in the long run." (Brainard and Southwick
2001b, A20)
· C. Peter McGrath, the President ofNASULGC, pointed out that some of the
members of Congress who earmark are also big supporters of the NIH and NSF.
McGrath thought it imperative that the associations not antagonize these members with
condemnations of earmarking. (Brainard and Southwick 2001b)
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At its fall 2001 meeting, the AAU discussed earmarking but could not arrive at a
consensus about what to do. The association affirmed statements that merit based awards
should be favored over earmarks and also that set aside peer-reviewed programs were the
right way to address distributional equity concerns. (Brainard 2001e) 56 of 61 American
AAU members received earmarks in fiscal year 2002 (Brainard 2002h).
In sum, the AAU led the charge against academic earmarking early on with
NASULGC and ACE in prominent supporting roles. In the mid- 1980's, the AAU passed
a resolution calling for AAU member institutions to observe a moratorium on seeking
earmark funding. The moratorium leaked from the beginning but was dealt a mortal
blow when the University of Pennsylvania, which had been for the moratorium in AA U
deliberations, sought an earmark for facilities in 1988. From the beginning the AAU's
and the other associations' efforts at opposing the practice of earmarking were hampered
by the associations' willingness to debate the difference between good and bad earmarks;
by the associations' support of historical preferential funding for Historically Black
Colleges and Universities, Galludet University for the Deaf, and Native American
schools; and by the associations' belief that non-competitive sole source contracts
awarded to university-managed Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
and University Affiliated Research Centers should not be challenged. In the 1990's, the
AAU, NASULGC, and the other associations generally pursued a strategy of
accommodation with regard to the practice of earmarking. In 2001, the AAU resumed its
opposition to academic earmarking when the amount and number of earmarks spiked
significantly. By 2001 most AAU member institutions were receiving earmarks.
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NASULGC and the other associations did not join the AAU when it resumed hostilities
in 2001.

CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO FIGHT EARMARKING
Members of Congress have fought earmarks by using their seniority, proposing
amendments to strike earmarks from bills brought to the floor ofthe House or Senate,
using rules to delete earmarks, and holding hearings. There have been many opponents
ofearmarking in both the Senate and House. Among these opponents some ofthe
strongest have been Senator Jake Garn ofUtah, Senator William Proxmire ofWisconsin,
Senator Jeff Bingaman ofNew Mexico, Senator John Danforth ofMissouri, Senator
Lawton Chiles ofFlorida, Senator James Sasser ofTennessee, Senator Sam Nunn of
Georgia, Representative Edward Boland ofMassachusetts, Representative George Brown
ofCalifornia, Representative William Natcher ofKentucky, and Representative Robert
Walker ofPennsylvania. (Savage 1999)
Natcher was very effective as chair ofthe House appropriations sub-committee
which handled the Labor-Health and Human Services-Education appropriation in keeping
earmarks out ofhis bill. The Labor-Health and Human Services-Education bill includes
the appropriation for the National Institutes ofHealth. Natcher was so effective in
blocking earmarks in his bill that many earmarks for biomedical research and facilities
migrated to other bills like the Energy and Water bill. (Savage 1999)
In 1986, the Department ofDefense refused to spend $65.6 million earmarked for
10 Universities in reports accompanying the Defense appropriation bill because the
earmarked projects had never been submitted to the Defense department for review. The
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House and Senate appropriations committees put funding for 9 ofthe 10 projects into a
supplemental appropriations bill to force the Department ofDefense to spend the money.
The tenth project not included in the supplemental appropriations bill was a $10 million
computer research grant to Cornell University. Cornell University's President Frank
Rhodes refused to accept any money not awarded through a competitive process. (Spitler
1986)
The battle between Congress and the Department ofDefense over these earmarks
spilled out onto the Senate floor. Senators Danforth, Bingaman, and Sasser proposed an
amendment on the Senate floor which would strip the supplemental appropriations bill of
the earmarks. Senators Stevens and DeConcini made a distributive argument against the
amendment pointing out that the peer-reviewed system sent funds to a relatively small
number ofstates and institutions and that these earmarks were a way to distribute funds
more broadly. Senator Weicker made a motion to table the Danforth, Bingaman, Sasser
amendment. Weicker's motion was defeated, and the amendment was subsequently
passed by a voice vote. Senator Dole and Speaker Tip O'Neill added the 9 projects
deleted by the amendment back into the conference version ofthe appropriations bill, and
the Senate passed the conference version ofthe bill. There was a similar debate in the
House in 1986 in which an anti-earmarking bill went down to defeat. (Spitler 1986)
In 1989, an effort was made by Senator Sam Nunn ofGeorgia to pass a law that
would require the Department ofDefense to use competitive procedures to award all
grants and contracts to colleges and universities. This effort was sidetracked by concerns
about what to do about sole source non-competitive contracts awarded to university
operated laboratories like the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. The Johns
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Hopkins APL, and other similar laboratories, had enjoyed a special relationship with the
Department of Defense since World War II. Labs of this sort did very special one-of-a
kind, often classified, technical work. Nunn and others pushing for the law requiring
competitive procedures yielded to arguments that, without sole source contracting for
these labs, businesses would beat out universities for these sorts of awards because they
would be the only entities capable of funding competition, national security would be
compromised, and efficiency would be undermined because labs would not be rewarded
for specializing. Nunn's effort to curtail earmarking failed in large part because the
exception he was willing to make to his rule for the special arrangements the Defense
department had with university operated laboratories opened the door back up to
earmarking in Department of Defense appropriations bills. (Cordes 1989b)
In 1991, Nunn raised objections to $135 million in academic earmarks in the
fiscal year 1992 Department of Defense appropriations bill. He was particularly angered
by 16 projects that gave $94.6 million to institutions in 12 states. Among the institutions
receiving these earmarks were Boston University which was due $29 million; Louisiana
State University, Marywood College, and the University of Minnesota which were
scheduled to receive $10 million each; and Kansas State University which was due $7.7
million. Nunn was so incensed by these earmarks that he voted against the full Defense
Department appropriations bill for the first time. The DOD appropriations bill passed by
a margin of more than two to one. ("Ways & Means: Colleges Still Reap Set-Aside
From Military Budget." 1991)
In the 1993 fiscal year military spending bill the Senate included $96 million in
academic earmarks for 12 projects but gave the Pentagon discretion on how much to
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award for each project. Senator Nunn was successful in getting an amendment passed
that replaced the earmarks with a competitive process that would involve a panel of
reviewers chosen by the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant
Colleges and the American Association of State Colleges and Universities. Reviewers
chosen by these associations were offered as a remedy to arguments that a few selected
elites dominated peer review processes. In conference, the House had its own list of
earmarks, and the Senate added back money for its earmarks. However, Senator Nunn's
amendment was kept in force for the Senate earmarks. Some criticized Nunn's
amendment saying it improperly limited reviewers and that agencies should have the
right to pick the most knowledgeable reviewers without regard to how elite the
institutions they come from might be. (Cordes 1992f)
Perhaps the single greatest crusader against academic earmarking in Congress was
Representative George Brown of California. Representative Brown chaired the House
Science, Space, and Technology Committee and held hearings on earmarking in the mid1990's. In 1992, the Congressional Research Service prepared two reports for Brown's
committee prior to its hearings on earmarking. The reports showed that $2.5 billion had
been earmarked since 1989. Half of this amount had come in fiscal years 1991 and 1992.
There were 234 recipients of these awards and awards were made for both research and
facilities. Ten states got more than 50% of the money, and ten institutions received about
a third of the money awarded. Half of the money went to institutions not in the top 100
in total federal research funding received. 70% of the funding came from the Energy and
Water, Agriculture, and military spending bills. Upon receiving this report, Brown
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recommended that no earmarks for projects be approved unless the projects had been
reviewed and authorized by an authorizing comm�ttee of Congress. (Cordes 1992d)
Later in 1992, Brown was successful in getting a floor amendment passed that
redirected some money left for earmarks in the fiscal year 1993 Energy appropriations
bill to a competitive merit-reviewed process. The merit review process would make
awards for academic research facilities. Ten projects amounting to about $95 million lost
their earmark status because of Brown's amendment. Brown's problem with the
earmarks in the bill was not that they had bypassed peer review but that Congress itself
had not reviewed the projects through its normal procedures. (Cordes 1992e)
When Brown's committee convened hearings on earmarks later in 1993, it was
noted in opening remarks that earmarking was spiraling out of control. In fiscal year
1992 over 500 earmarks totaling $707 million had been made. The focus of the House
committee's hearings was to be on the value of projects begun in the 1980's, whether
these projects improved the ability of the institutions receiving them to compete for peer
reviewed funding, whether agencies gave preference to earmarked projects with regard to
oversight and evaluation, whether earmarks robbed other research programs in agency
budgets of funds, and the motivations of university presidents and members of Congress
to earmark. (McDonald 1993) Early in the hearings, Brown's committee looked at
alternatives to earmarking like expanding the NSF facilities program and set aside
programs like the Experimental Program for the Stimulation of Competitive Research
(Cordes 1993a).
The committee tried to find out if institutions were using earmarks well.
Chancellor William Danforth of Washington University in St. Louis argued that, when
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monies were earmarked to a consortium and then distributed to institutions through some
sort ofreview procedures, institutions receiving funds should not be considered to have
received an earmark. The University ofCalifornia San Diego did not consider its
research on materials for bridge construction to be subject to peer review because the
research brought industry, university, and government together in pursuit ofdefense
conversion and regional economic development goals. Columbia University had tapped
the Environmental Protection Agency budget for biomedical research facilities.
Columbia called a building it built with EPA earmarks the Center for Disease Prevention.
The Chronicle ofHigher Education reported, after reviewing forms Columbia submitted
to Representative Brown's committee, that some research in the $75 million center was to
be focused on the environment/disease link but that a lot ofthe research in the building
would not concern the environment. The Chronicle also reported that Columbia had used
the moniker "environment research center" in its efforts to secure funding from Congress
but had allocated the monies received to the Center for Disease Prevention. Similarly,
Michigan State had received a $4.6 million earmark for a National Food Safety and
Toxicology Center. The center was supposed to promote microbiology as a means to
improve meat inspections even though the Chronicle reported Michigan State admitted
little competence in microbiology. Delta College stated in forms submitted to
Representative Brown's committee that it did not know the meaning ofpeer review but
was grateful to NASA for the $8 million it received for a science learning center and
planetarium. The University ofAlabama Birmingham reported receiving $19.5 million
ofthe $37 million cost for a Center for Human Genome Structure and Function Research.
(Cordes 1993b)
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In one of the first reports released by Brown's committee, Brown wrote that
academic earmarking "destroys rational efforts to set priorities tied to national needs"
(Cordes 1993c, A37). He also decried the closed door lobbyist facilitated rape of
taxpayers by appropriations committee members attempting to do favors for their
constituents. (Cordes 1993c)
In September 1993, officials from Columbia University, Tufts University, and the
University of Alabama Birmingham appeared before Brown's committee. Louisiana
State University did not appear before the committee and instead sent written testimony.
LSU claimed it was too expensive to make the trip to Washington. The institutions
appearing before the committee were asked the size of their endowments, how much they
had paid lobbyists to represent them, and what they would do when their Congressional
patrons left office. (Cordes 1993d)
Tufts had paid more than $3 million in lobbying fees to Cassidy and Associates
from 1984 to 1993. Tufts had paid as much as $360,000 in lobbying fees in single year.
Tufts had received a $3 million earmark for a Center for Environmental Management in
the EPA budget in fiscal year 1993. (Cordes 1993d)
Columbia reported it had an endowment of more than $1 billion, that it was
paying Cassidy and Associates $10,000 a month for representation, and that it received a
$10 million earmark in fiscal year 1993 from the EPA for its Center for Disease
Prevention. Columbia brought letters from the Mayor of New York City and the
Governor of New York endorsing its earmarked projects. (Cordes 1993d)
The University of Alabama Birmingham received a $10 million earmark for a
new biomedical research facility from the Department of Energy in fiscal year 1993. In
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testimony, UAB officials stated their institution was a relatively new institution and
therefore had a small base ofprivate support. UAB's endowment was $1 02 million in
1993. Officials stated UAB had to rely on earmarks for facilities funding in order to
compete with other older more established institutions. (Cordes 1993d)
Brown and committee members commented at the hearings that the process of
academic earmarking was flawed but that the projects funded by earmarks were not
necessarily poor investments (Cordes 1993d).
Later in 1993, Brown sought help in his fight against earmarking from Vice
President Gore. Brown sent a letter to Gore in which he suggested the President issue an
order stating that report language accompanying appropriations bills was not binding and
that agencies should not follow it in funding earmarks which had not been authorized by
Congressional authorizing committees. Brown's letter proposed that earmarks be
approved by both authorizing and spending committees in order to be funded. When not
approved by both types ofcommittees, he proposed that the funds appropriated for the
earmark be transferred by the authorizing and spending committees to programs that have
been authorized. Ifall ofthe committees in the House and Senate could not agree on
these transfers, Brown's proposal was that the money for the earmark in question be
returned to the treasury. (Cordes 1993e)
Early in fiscal year 1994, it appeared that Brown's efforts were succeeding. A
study offour spending bills by his committee showed earmarking was down in all but
one ofthe bills studied. The bills studied were the Energy bill; the bill funding the
National Science Foundation and NASA; the Agriculture bill; and the bill funding the
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Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State. The only bill in which earmarking had
increased was the Commerce, Justice, and State bill. (Cordes 1993f)
Later in 1994, Brown and Representative Robert Walker of Pennsylvania
proposed that institutions receiving earmarks be ineligible for National Science
Foundation grants (McDonald 1994). In the NSF reauthorization bill, which sets the
spending ceiling for the NSF appropriation, Brown and Walker were successful in
including a provision that prohibited institutions receiving earmarks for facilities from
competing for NSF facilities funding (Cordes 1994a).
Brown and Representative John P. Murtha of Pennsylvania squared off about
earmarking in 1994. Murtha, a powerful member of the House Armed Services
Committee and strong supporter of earmarking, told the Pentagon not to release
documents showing Department of Defense earmarks to Brown's committee in 1994.
Brown's committee reacted by threatening to use its subpoena power. Speaker of the
House Foley intervened and promised to get the documents from the Pentagon to Brown
and his committee. (Cordes 1994b)
Murtha then got mad because he felt the universities he had helped with earmarks
had not been appreciative and supported him in his fight with Brown. He threatened to
cut $900 million allocated for university research out of the Department of Defense fiscal
year 1995 budget. (Cordes 1994c) He was successful in getting a House bill passed with
the $900 million cut and went a step further by promising to hold hearings of his own on
indirect cost rates. Murtha cited a tight Pentagon budget and too much university
research money spent on overhead as reasons for the cuts in the Defense budget. Most
observers thought the real reason for the cut was that Murtha was piqued that universities
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did not come to his defense in his fight over earmarks with Brown. Despite the cuts for
university research in the Department of Defense bill, there were still earmarks in the bill
including some for institutions in Murtha' s district. (Jaschik 1994b)
Later in the year, a conference bill passed by both the House and Senate cut the
military research budget by $200 million rather than the $900 million Murtha had
shepherded through the House. The report accompanying the conference bill blamed
overhead rates for the cut. (Jaschik 1994d)
When earmarks dropped to $650.8 million in fiscal year 1994, Brown stated he
wanted to see them fall below $100 million a year. Murtha's retaliatory actions,
however, seemed to have scared the associations and other university lobbyists into
silence. The Association of American Universities refused to comment on the decrease
in earmarks in 1994. (Cordes and Ornstein 1994)
Murtha had been quite successful in directing earmarks to institutions in his
district sending $333 million to Pennsylvania and $202 million to his district between
fiscal years 1990 and 1994. He was quoted in 1994 as saying, "Nobody knows better
than the members which projects need to be done in their districts." (Cordes 1994f, A4950)
Brown's fight with Murtha, however, had an effect on earmarks to Pennsylvania
institutions. The University of Pittsburgh severed most, but not all, of its corporate links
to Concurrent Technologies Corporation located in Murtha's district in part because of
the unfavorable light shed on CTC and the University by Murtha's earmarking activities.
(Cordes 1994t)
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Murtha, however, received campaign contributions in 1992 and 1994 from
officials at Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Pittsburgh, Seton Hill College,
and the University of Pennsylvania. Each of these institutions had received earmarks,
thanks to Murtha, in the years preceding these elections. (Burd 1994)
Brown's committee documented in 1994 that most earmarked money went to
states that had representation on the House or Senate Appropriations Committee. Brown
particularly highlighted the money that went to Pennsylvania because of Murtha, the
chair, and Representative Joseph McDade of Pennsylvania, the ranking Republican on
the House Defense appropriations subcommittee. Brown was quoted about the
earmarking process in 1994 as saying, "When you get right down to it there's no equity
or justice or any other fundamental principle except the principle of exercising brute
power." (Cordes l 994e, A29)
Later in 1994, the Energy Department wrote to four committees in Congress
asking for permission to shift $2.4 million from an equipment account to an operating
account to fund three earmarks. Such reprogramming requests are usually approved
almost automatically, but Brown's committee voted to deny the request in this case.
After the committee's denial, the Energy Department was puzzled about what to do.
(Ornstein 1994b)
In later committee proceedings, Brown threatened to lead the California
delegation into the pork barrel if earmarking was not brought under control. President
John Silber of Boston University testified that peer review was appropriate for choosing
between the research projects of individual scientists but not for choosing which facilities
requests to fund. Silber also defended Boston University earmarks by claiming they were
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in the national interest. Brown expressed dismay about the fact that federal research
officials listened more to appropriations staff than to him as Chair of the House Science,
Space, and Technology Committee. Several agency staff also defended their funding of
earmarks in their testimony while generally decrying the practice of earmarking. (Cordes
1994d)
Representative George Brown died on July 15, 1999 at the age of 79. He was the
senior minority member of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee when
he died. (Evangelauf 1999)
In an interesting postscript to Brown's death, California State University at San
Bernardino asked Congress for a $19. 7 million earmark in 2001 to name a science
building after the late Representative George Brown. Brown and his widow had thought
the money for the science building was to come through a competitive program. Brown's
widow asked for Brown's name to be removed from the building when she found out
about the earmark. The University complied. ("Ways & Means: Archenemy of Pork
Barrel Spending Almost Has College Building Named After Him." 2001)
In 2003, eight dissident Republicans tried to strip all earmarks out of a large fiscal
year 2003 spending bill passed in February. They pointed to $300,000 earmarked to
Iowa State University for research on universal kitchen design as one of the worst
examples of earmarking. (Brainard 2003a)
Later in 2003, Representative Ralph Regula, the Cardinal of the subcommittee
over the Labor-Health and Human Services-Education appropriations bill, vowed to
punish 198 Democrats who voted against his fiscal year 2004 bill because they thought it
had too small an increase in public school and social program spending by denying them
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any earmarks. Regula also vowed to punish nine Republicans and an independent who
voted against his bill. (Brainard 2003b) The Democrats punished by Regula fought back
by issuing a report that blamed Republicans for pork-barrel spending (Borrego and Burd
2003).
Representative Jeff Flake of Arizona started introducing amendments on the
House floor to strip earmarks from appropriations bills in 2006. Flake was the first to do
this in the House. His amendments have thus far always been soundly defeated.
(Brainard 2006e)
While there have been many individual members of the House and Senate who
have crusaded with some effect against the practice of academic earmarking, their efforts
have failed to stymie what has generally been an unabated trend of annual increases in
the amount and number of earmarks awarded and in the number of institutions receiving
earmarks. California Representative George Brown's efforts stand out as perhaps the
only member's efforts which seemed to make a difference in the overall trend. The
. hearings he held on earmarking of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee
in the mid-1990's seemed to have had an effect. When coupled with the fiscal constraints
of a tight funding environment, the negative light cast on earmarking by these hearings
seemed to deter other member's enthusiasm for earmarking and may have played a role
in a decrease in the amount of earmarks funded in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. This
decrease was followed by a substantial decrease in the amount of earmarks in fiscal year
1996 after the Republicans had taken control ofboth Houses of Congress. These lows,
however, were short lived as earmarking began its ascent anew in fiscal year 1997.
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Other than Brown, other crusaders have made a difference in some instances and
won certain battles but have had little effect on the overall trend. Notable among these
crusaders are Representative William Natcher ofKentucky, who as chair ofthe House
appropriations sub-committee which handled the Labor-Health and Human Services
Education appropriation in the early-1990's was successful in keeping earmarks out of
his bill, and Senator Sam Nunn ofGeorgia, who was successful in a few key battles
regarding earmarks to the Department ofDefense appropriation. In recent years,
members ofCongress in both Houses opposing the practice ofearmarking have been on
the dissident fringe oftheir parties and clearly in the minority.

PRESIDENTIAL EFFORTS TO FIGHT EARMARKING
Presidents have also taken on the practice ofearmarking by seeking budget
rescissions striking earmarks, using the line item veto to strike earmarks during the short
time the President had this power, and campaigning against earmarks.
In 1992, President George Herbert Walker Bush sent several proposals to rescind
earmarks to Congress in his 1992 fiscal year budget proposal. (Cordes 1992a) The
House and Senate subsequently passed rescission proposals cutting more than $90
million in fiscal year 1992 academic earmarks from the Department ofDefense
appropriations bill. Senator Robert Byrd was so angered by the cutting ofthese earmarks
that he went after 3 peer-reviewed grants made by the National Institute ofDental
Research and 31 peer-reviewed National Science Foundation grants that he thought
funded ridiculous projects. Byrd was successful in inserting his own rescissions into the
Senate bill. (Goodman 1992a)
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After the House and Senate conference, both chambers passed $8. 1 billion in
budget rescissions for fiscal year 1992. The rescissions cut more than $ 100 million in
earmarks. Specifically, the rescissions only eliminated $1.349 million in earmarks but
allowed the Secretary ofDefense to choose not to fund $115.9 million earmarked for 19
projects. The $1.349 million specifically cut included $750,000 that was to go to West
Virginia University for Appalachian-hardwoods research, $500,000 that was to go to
North Dakota State University for a road, $50,000 that was to go to the University of
Arkansas for seedless-table-grape research, and $49,000 that was to go to the University
ofVermont for integrated orchard management. The conference bill passed did not
include Senator Byrd's specific cuts ofNSF grants but required the NSF to cut $2 million
from its budget and suggested the 31 grants that should be targeted in that cut. The
conference bill did include rescissions for halfofthe dental grants Senator Byrd went
after. President Bush signed the conference bill. (Goodman 1992b)
In 1997, President Clinton used the line item veto to strike a $5 million earmark to
Montana State University for research on environmentally friendly building technologies.
He also line item vetoed $1 million in Agriculture earmarks to four different institutions
in 1 997. (Cordes 1997b)
In 2002, President George W. Bush asked Congress to pay for a shortfall in the
Pell Grant budget by rescinding $1.3 billion in earmarks and other low priority projects.
The shortfall was created when Congress did not appropriate enough money to cover an
increase in the Pell Grant award it passed. (Burd 2002a)
Later in 2002 when Bush submitted his fiscal year 2003 budget, his budget
request kept the Pell Grant at the same level as in fiscal year 2002. He again asked
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Congress to rescind the funds for 1,626 earmarks in the fiscal year 2002 Labor-Health
and Human Services-Education appropriation. Bush proposed that the rescissions be
used to pay for the shortfall in the Pell Grant program and be passed as part ofa
supplemental appropriations bill. Representative C.W. (Bill) Young ofFlorida, the
Republican Chair ofthe House Appropriations Committee, did not take Bush's proposal
very seriously stating, "All wisdom on the allocation offederal grant funding does not
reside in the Executive Branch. Members know the needs oftheir districts better than
civil servants working in Washington, D.C. Many ofthese projects are in rural
communities or from small community-based organizations that lack the capacity to hire
grant writers and compete with more sophisticated organizations for funding." (Burd
2002b, A27)
Later in 2002, Congress appropriated $1 billion in a supplemental appropriations
bill to fund the shortfall in the Pell Grant budget. This did not fund the entire shortfall.
Additional funds were left to be appropriated in fiscal year 2003 appropriations towards
the shortfall. By taking this step, Congress rejected President Bush's plan to fund the
shortfall by rescinding earmarks. (Burd 2002c)
In late 2002, Mitch Daniels, President Bush's Director ofthe Office of
Management and Budget and a crusader for the administration against earmarking,
backed off in his opposition to earmarks stating that he would be happy ifCongress just
stayed within the overall spending limits set by the White House (Brainard 2002g). Just
after leaving office in June 2003 to run for Governor of Indiana, Daniels remarked about
his fight with Congress over earmarking, "Ifwe were ever very persuasive with members
ofCongress on this subject, I couldn't detect it." (Brainard and Borrego 2003, A18)
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In the fiscal year 2005 budgeting process, Bush tried to cut Department of
Defense research spending by defunding earmarks. Congress defied him by adding the
earmarks members wanted to the Defense spending bill. Bush signed the bill. (Field
2004)
Presidential efforts at cutting earmarks through budget rescissions have usually
run into opposition in Congress. A few such efforts have led Congress to rescind a few
earmarks but have also prompted reprisals towards other funding objectives from angered
Congressional patrons. Clinton's use of the line item veto was successful in excising a
few earmarks from appropriations bills while the President had use of this power, but the
line item veto was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court on June
25, 1998. In general, Presidential efforts to fight the practice of earmarking have had
little effect and less effect than efforts against earmarking undertaken by members of
Congress. This is largely because earmarking is a creature of the appropriations process
and, as such, is more fully under the control of Congress than it is of the President.

PAID LOBBYISTS AND THE REPORTING OF LOBBYING EXPENSES
A little bit of attention has been paid in reports about earmarking to the role paid
lobbyists play in helping institutions secure earmarks. The two most famous hired-gun
lobbyists in the earmarking game have without doubt been Gerald Cassidy and Kenneth
Schlossberg. Schlossberg and Cassidy worked together when earmarking first began and
later split into separate firms. Cassidy and Associates, Cassidy's firm after he split with
Schlossberg, has been one of the biggest players in the earmarking game and one of the
largest and most well known lobbying firms on the Washington scene. Lobbyists, like
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Cassidy and Schlossberg, are selective in picking their clients. They generally do not like
to pursue lost causes. (Savage 1999)
In 1991, it was reported that colleges and universities were hiring more paid
lobbyists to pursue earmarks and advise on other matters than ever before. The
University of Hawaii paid $636,000 between 1987 and 1991 to Cassidy and Associates
and got $33 million in earmarks for two campus science projects. As hiring paid
lobbyists became more commonplace, some expressed concerns about a backlash against
earmarking and hired gun representation. (Cordes 1991c)
These concerns seemed well founded when Senator Robert Byrd reportedly
tongue-lashed West Virginia University officials who showed up for a meeting with their
Cassidy and Associates representative. Byrd chastised West Virginia University for
wasting money on representation maintaining he needed no prodding to direct funding to
his constituents. While he was angry, Byrd pushed legislation through the Senate that
required a report to be filed when an institution paid a lobbyist to help them win any
specific grant of $100,000 or more. (Cordes 1991c)
In 1994, a new lobbying law was considered that would require colleges and
universities to keep up with lobbying activities of their faculty and file reports if at least
one employee devoted 10% or more of their time to lobbying activities or $1,000 to
$2,500 was spent on lobbying in a six month period (Jaschik 1994a).
These efforts to impose reporting requirements on institutions culminated in the
Lobbying Disclosure Act in 1996. This law required institutions to register if they spend
$20,000 on lobbying in a six month period or have at least one person devoting 20% of
their time to lobbying. The Lobbying Disclosure Act had a stricter definition of lobbying
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than IRS laws mandating lobbying disclosure. The Lobbying Disclosure Act defined
most contacts with Congress and Congressional staff and some contacts with Executive
branch officials as lobbying. Contacts with Department of Education and science agency
officials were also covered under the law. (Lederman 1996)
Compliance to this act by colleges and universities has historically been spotty.
For example, Rutgers University registered its government affairs office. Princeton
University, Brown University, Duke University, Indiana University, Purdue University,
Washington University, and Georgetown University did not. The AACC, ACE, and
NAICU registered. The AAU, AASCU, and NASULGC did not. The American
Association of Medical Colleges registered. The NCAA did not. The reason why
seemingly similar government relations operations from similar institutions made
different choices about whether to register or not was that the law as written applied
differently to different types of institutions. All public institutions had to follow the law,
but private institutions could follow the law or follow an IRS reporting standard based on
whether their government relations activities were targeted towards influencing
legislation. (Lederman 1996) IRS regulations required reporting lobbying expenditures
on the IRS form 990 all non-profits have to file. A study in 1998 found that few colleges
and universities reported any lobbying expenses on their form 990. (Lederman 1998b) It
would seem many colleges and universities have been able to avoid the lobbying
disclosure requirements Congress has attempted to impose on them.
In 2000, Jeffrey Brainard reported that 182 institutions employed independent
paid lobbyists in 1999. This was an increase over the approximately 150 institutions that
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employed such lobbyists in 1997. Brainard noted that most institutions receiving
earmarks in 1999 did not hire a lobbyist. (Brainard 2000)
In 2004, Brainard reported that academic institutions had spent $6 1. 7 million on
lobbying in 2003. Most ofthis lobbying expense was reported to have been spent on
lobbying for earmarks. College and university officials surveyed reported that paid
independent lobbyists were especially helpful in determining in which appropriations bill
it was best to try to place an institution's earmark. For example, since Congress
traditionally does not place earmarks in the National Institutes ofHealth budget,
biomedical earmarks often end up in the Department ofDefense appropriations bill.
Consultants help point where best and from whom to seek earmark funding. (Brainard
2004)
Paid lobbyists, particularly Gerald Cassidy and Kenneth Schlossberg, have played
an important role in the birth and development ofacademic earmarking. Efforts to
require that colleges and universities report their lobbying expenses, however, have met
with a mixed result as different interpretations ofthe laws passed and what they actually
require have led to less than uniform compliance across the entire universe ofhigher
education institutions and associations.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has chronicled the rise ofacademic earmarking. It has discussed the
early years ofacademic earmarking from 1983 to about 1990. In the early years of
academic earmarking, prominent institutions pioneered the practice but concerns about
the efficacy ofacademic earmarking and its effect on peer reviewed funding were heard
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in the academic community. There were also concerns about whether Congress was
creating contingent liability for itselfby starting to fund projects that would continue to
need funding in future years and about whether earmarks were being used for the
purposes for which they were being awarded. At the end ofthis early era, the results
from academic earmarking were mixed with some accounts ofwaste and scandal
balanced by some notable success stories.
The trends in academic earmarking from 1990 to 2003 have also been discussed.
The period from 1990 to 2003 saw academic earmarking really come into its own and
grow to $2.012 billion by the end ofthe period. There was a dip in the middle ofthe
period which for the most part corresponded with a change in the political party which
controlled a majority in both Houses ofCongress. However, there were two fiscal years,
prior to this change ofpower and the low point ofthe dip in fiscal year 1996, in which
academic earmarking was going down somewhat seemingly in response to fiscal
pressures and the negative light being shined on it by Congressional hearings. After the
change ofpower in Congress, academic earmarking hit its low point in the dip in fiscal
year 1996 and then rebounded steadily in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 before reaching new
heights in fiscal year 1999 and continuing to rise until the end ofthis period in 2003.
This is the general trend when the value ofall earmarks in each year ofthe period
is taken into account, but the trend is rather consistent, with only a single minor
difference, when the number ofinstitutions receiving earmarks and the number of
earmarks granted in each year are considered. The single minor difference in the trend
for the number ofinstitutions receiving earmarks and the number of earmarks granted is
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that these totals are slightly higher in fiscal year 1995 than in fiscal year 1994 before
dipping in fiscal year 1996 along with the value of earmarks awarded.
During this period of time when earmarks grew so significantly, some major
programs which utilize peer reviewed competitions to award their funding also saw
significant increases in their budgets. The National Institutes of Health, which is the
largest federal source of peer-reviewed competitive grants to individual investigators for
research, saw its budget double between 1998 and 2003. The National Science
Foundation, second only to the NIH in federal grant making, also saw increases in its
budget during this period.
The chapter has also briefly discussed more recent trends in academic earmarking
since 2003. Academic earmarking in recent years has occurred within a tighter funding
environment. This tighter funding environment has also affected the budgets of the
National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation which enjoyed increases in
the more flush funding times of the late 1990 's and early part of the 2000 's. Scandals
involving members of Congress and lobbyists have caused academic earmarks and all
earmarks to be viewed with more scrutiny. As this study was being completed, both
Houses of Congress were considering various regulations which would affect academic
earmarks such as limits on the number of earmarks a member of Congress can request
and disclosure of the name of the member sponsoring an earmark and some justification
for why an earmark should be granted.
The arguments proponents and opponents of academic earmarking have made
against and in support of academic earmarking have also been examined in the chapter.
There are many motivations for members of the House and Senate to earmark but greatest
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among these motivations is the motivation to further their reelection prospects by
noticeably bringing federal resources to their districts and states. Members ofthe House
and Senate also earmark to enact what they feel is good policy and sometimes use
earmarks to entice other members into voting for policies for which they might not
otherwise vote.
Those within academia have many motivations to seek earmarks. Their greatest
motivations, however, are economic as there are more scientists than ever before and less
money available per scientist. The lack offacilities money available has also motivated
academic leaders to seek earmarks for their institution's facilities needs.
Those for academic earmarks have insisted that they remedy geographical and
institutional inequities ofthe peer review process and send money where it would
otherwise not go. They believe that Congress has powers ofreview at least as good as
committees ofacademic experts and is more accountable to citizens than the experts who
serve on peer review committees, that the geographic dispersal offederal research
funding is desirable, and that earmarks help meet national needs in targeted ways.
Those against the practice ofacademic earmarking believe in the superiority of
the scientific method and the peer review process. They believe that bypassing peer
review leads to erosion in the quality ofresearch, that earmarking takes away funds
which could otherwise be awarded in peer reviewed competitions, and that peer reviewed
competitions for grants promote the best science while earmarking lacks effective quality
control. While those against earmarking have often espoused competitive set aside
programs as the best means to combat any geographical or institutional inequities the
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peer reviewed system may reinforce, set aside programs have never been funded at a high
enough level to affect distributional inequities.
This chapter has detailed efforts by the higher education associations to fight the
practice of academic earmarking. The AAU led the charge against academic earmarking
early on with NASULGC and ACE in prominent supporting roles. In the mid-1980's, the
AAU passed a resolution calling for AAU member institutions to observe a moratorium
on seeking earmark funding. The moratorium leaked from the beginning but was dealt a
mortal blow when the University of Pennsylvania, which had been for the moratorium in
AAU deliberations, sought an earmark for facilities in 1988. From the beginning the
AAU's and the other associations' efforts at opposing the practice of earmarking were
hampered by the associations' willingness to debate the difference between good and bad
earmarks; by the associations' support of historical preferential funding for Historically
Black Colleges and Universities, Galludet University for the Deaf, and Native American
schools; and by the associations' belief that non-competitive sole source contracts
awarded to university-managed Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
and University Affiliated Research Centers should not be challenged. In the 1990's, the
AAU, NASULGC, and the other associations generally pursued a strategy of
accommodation with regard to the practice of earmarking. In 2001, the AAU resumed its
opposition to academic earmarking when the amount and number of earmarks spiked
significantly. By 2001 most AAU member institutions were receiving earmarks.
NASULGC and the other associations did not join the AAU when it resumed hostilities
in 2001.
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Efforts by individual members of Congress and the President to fight the practice
of academic earmarking have also been detailed. While there have been many individual
members of the House and Senate who have crusaded with some effect against the
practice of academic earmarking, their efforts have failed to stymie what has generally
been an unabated trend of annual increases in the amount and number of earmarks
awarded and in the number of institutions receiving earmarks. California Representative
George Brown's efforts stand out as perhaps the only member's efforts which seemed to
make a difference in the overall trend. The hearings on earmarking he held of the House
Science, Space, and Technology Committee in the mid-1990's seemed to have had an
effect. When coupled with the fiscal constraints of a tight funding environment, the
negative light cast on earmarking by these hearings seemed to deter other member's
enthusiasm for earmarking and may have played a role in a decrease in the amount of
earmarks funded in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. This decrease was followed by a
substantial decrease in the amount of earmarks in fiscal year 1996 after the Republicans
had taken control of both Houses of Congress. These lows, however, were short lived as
earmarking began its ascent anew in fiscal year 1997.
Other than Brown, other crusaders have made a difference in some instances and
won certain battles but have had little effect on the overall trend. Notable among these
crusaders are Representative William Natcher of Kentucky, who as chair of the House
appropriations sub-committee which handled the Labor-Health and Human Services
Education appropriation in the early-1990's was successful in keeping earmarks out of
his bill, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who was successful in a few key battles
regarding earmarks to the Department of Defense appropriation. In recent years,
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members ofCongress in both Houses opposing the practice ofearmarking have been on
the dissident fringe oftheir parties and clearly in the minority.
Presidential efforts at cutting earmarks through budget rescissions have usually
run into opposition in Congress. A few such efforts have led Congress to rescind a few
earmarks but have also prompted reprisals towards other funding objectives from angered
Congressional patrons. Clinton's use ofthe line item veto was successful in excising a
few earmarks from appropriations bills while the President had use ofthis power, but the
line item veto was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court on June
25, 1998. In general, Presidential efforts to fight the practice ofearmarking have had
little effect and less effect than efforts against earmarking undertaken by members of
Congress. This is largely because earmarking is a creature ofthe appropriations process
and, as such, is more fully under the control ofCongress than it is ofthe President.
Finally, the chapter has discussed the role ofpaid lobbyists and the reporting of
lobbying expenses. Paid lobbyists, particularly Gerald Cassidy and Kenneth Schlossberg,
have played an important role in the birth and development ofacademic earmarking.
Efforts to require that colleges and universities report their lobbying expenses, however,
have met with a mixed result as different interpretations ofthe laws passed and what they
actually require have led to less than uniform compliance across the entire universe of
higher education institutions and associations.
The next chapter, Chapter 3, discusses the data and methods which will be
employed to answer this study's research questions.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODS
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the sources of data used in this study and the steps taken in
collecting data from these sources are discussed. The chapter also discusses the methods
employed in answering the study's four basic research questions. A chapter summary
concludes the chapter.

DATA
This study utilizes three different sources of data. The first source is a set of
statistical tables compiled by the National Science Foundation. Each year the National
Science Foundation surveys the 18 major federal agencies most involved in federal
research funding and prepares a report for the President. The agencies surveyed are the
Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Appalachian
Regional Commission, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Energy, the Department of Education, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Labor, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National
Science Foundation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Social Security
Administration, and the Department of Transportation. The National Science Foundation
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maintains that these 18 agencies provide virtually all ofthe federal funding for science
and engineering research and development at United States universities and colleges.
The National Science Foundation's annual report to the President is published on
the National Science Foundation's website and is available for federal fiscal years 1992
to 2003. This study uses information from the set ·oftables entitled, "Federal Science and
Engineering Support to Universities, Colleges, and NPO's: Fiscal Year 2003" and the
sets oftables with the same title for previous fiscal years. Specifically, this study draws
information from Table 16 in the 2003 set oftables and from the table that corresponds
with this table in the sets oftables for previous fiscal years. Table 16 is entitled, "Federal
obligations for science and engineering to universities and colleges by location,
institution, and agency: FY 2003." Table 16 includes a figure for the total amount of
federal science and engineering obligations for that fiscal.year for all academic
institutions as well as a figure for the total amount offederal science and engineering
obligations for that fiscal year for each specific academic institution. Earmarks are
included in Table 16's totals but are lumped in with the total and cannot be distinguished
from the other types offunding that make up the total. (National Science Foundation
2007) This set ofNational Science Foundation tables is the only known source offederal
research obligations data which provides a figure for each specific institution. The figure
for total science and engineering obligations, both for all institutions and for each specific
institution, is used as a surrogate for total federal research funding at times in this study.
There are two problems with using the science and engineering obligations
figures in this way. First, ifan earmark is added to the appropriation of, or a grant is
made by, an agency, which is not one ofthe 18 agencies the National Science Foundation
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pulls its data from, this federal research funding will not be reflected in the National
Science Foundation science and engineering obligations totals. Secondly, there are a few
grants, and some earmarks, made to academic institutions for non-science and
engineering purposes. I am referring specifically to grants towards the arts and
humanities which might be made by the National Endowment for the Humanities or the
National Endowment for the Arts and earmarks which might have a non-science and
engineering purpose. The National Science Foundation collected data on non-science
and engineering obligations until 1995 and last published this data in 1992. In 1992, total
obligations for federal research funding totaled $19,047,464,000, total science and
engineering obligations totaled $12,729,720,000, and non-science and engineering
activities totaled $6,317,744,000. (National Science Foundation 2007)
The fact that the National Science Foundation has discontinued collecting non
science and engineering activities data in its annual survey places a serious limitation on
the use ofNational Science Foundation data in this study. Because ofthis
discontinuation, potentially a significant chunk offederal research funding might not be
included in the annual science and engineering obligations totals posted after 1992. Still,
the National Science Foundation annual survey is the most complete compilation of
federal research obligations and the only compilation which lists obligations by specific
institution. To deal with this limitation on the use ofNational Science Foundation data, I
have limited much ofmy study to an examination ofthe distribution ofscience and
engineering funding rather than the distribution ofall federal research funding. I have
also taken steps in the compilation and use ofother data sources to match them with this
limitation and clearly identified at all times during this study when figures represent
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science and engineering obligations totals only and when they represent something else.
Science and engineering research still composes a clear majority ofall federally funded
research, and it is my beliefthat a study ofhow academic earmarking affects the
distribution ofscience and engineering research funding is still useful. While the results
ofthis study cannot be generalized to the entire realm offederally funded academic
research because ofdata limitations, they can shed important light on a significant portion
ofthat realm.
The second source ofdata used in this study is a database ofacademic earmarks
compiled by the Chronicle ofHigher Education. This database which is searchable and
can be accessed on the Chronicle ofHigher Education's website provides a listing ofall
academic earmarks made to academic institutions during federal fiscal years 1990 to
2003. The database provides information on each earmark made from 1990 to 2003 by
institution, year, amount, and agency as well as a short description ofeach earmark
drawn from the actual appropriations language in which the earmark was mentioned.
(Chronicle ofHigher Education 2007)
All ofthe earmarks made to the institutions considered in this study were pulled
from the Chronicle ofHigher Education website and entered into a database. They were
looked at individually and coded as either a science and engineering earmark or a non
science and engineering earmark. This coding was done to take into account the
limitations ofthe National Science Foundation data and to match the earmark data with
the science and engineering obligations data in the National Science Foundation tables.
The vast majority ofearmarks were coded as science and engineering earmarks. Only
324 ofthe 8,422 earmarks considered were coded non-science and engineering earmarks.
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There were two reasons why an earmark might be coded as a non-science and
engineering earmark. The first reason was that it came from the appropriation for an
agency that does not report its science and engineering research obligations to the
National Science Foundation for inclusion in the National Science Foundation's annual
survey. Northern Arizona University's $4,500,000 earmark in the 199 1 appropriation of
the General Services Administration for the Southwest Forestry Science Complex is an
example ofan earmark coded a non-science and engineering earmark for this reason.
The General Services Administration, from which Northem Arizona received this
earmark, does not participate in the National Science Foundation annual survey. Even
though the Southwest Forestry Science Complex is clearly a science and engineering
obligation, this earmark would not be included in Northem Arizona's total science and
engineering obligations for 199 1. The earmark was therefore coded as a non-science and
engineering earmark. A list ofall the earmarks coded as non-science and engineering
earmarks because ofthe agency the earmark came from is provided in table 1.
The second reason an earmark might be coded as a non-science and engineering
earmark was because its purpose clearly was not a science and engineering purpose.
Department ofTransportation earmarks are good examples ofearmarks which were
coded non-science and engineering for this reason. The University ofArkansas at
Fayetteville received a $500,000 earmark in the 1999 appropriation for the Department of
Transportation "to help buy buses for the free, university operated transit system that
serves the campus and town" (Chronicle ofHigher Education 2007). This earmark was
coded as a non-science and engineering earmark because, even though the Department of
Transportation reports its science and engineering obligations to the National Science
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Foundation for inclusion in the annual survey, the purpose of this particular earmark did
not seem to be a science and engineering purpose. The University of Alabama's
$1,250,000 earmark in the 2000 Department of Transportation appropriation for a
"comprehensive research program in injury sciences", however, seems like a science and
engineering obligation of the Department of Transportation and thus was coded as such
(Chronicle of Higher Education 2007). A list of earmarks coded as non-science and
engineering earmarks because their purpose did not seem to be a science and engineering
purpose is provided in table 2.
One problem with the earmark data from the Chronicle ofHigher Education
database that had to be overcome was how to account for earmarks shared by multiple
institutions. The Chronicle reports the full value of a shared earmark for each institution
that receives a portion of the earmark and notes in the purpose notes that the earmark is
shared. An example of this is a $7,500,000 earmark in the National Aeronautical and
Space Administration 2001 appropriation which was to be shared by the University of
Alabama and 4 other universities. The earmark shows up in the Chronicle database for
the University of Alabama as $7,500,000 in the amount column. The purpose column,
however, reads "to be shared with 5 universities for infrastructure needs at the National
Space Science and Technology Center" (Chronicle of Higher Education 2007). There is
really no way to know exactly how the money was split between the 5 institutions sharing
the earmark. For this study's purposes, I needed to assign a specific value for each
earmark to a specific institution in order to utilize the data effectively. Therefore, several
decision rules had to be made to split shared earmarks among sharing institutions.
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In cases where the purpose notes stated that an earmark was shared by multiple
institutions and the number of institutions was specified as in the example above, I
assumed the institution for which I was trying to specify an amount was one of the
number of institutions specified. I divided the earmark amount total by two if the number
of institutions was not specified. When it was specified that the earmark would be shared
with a non-educational institution, I counted the non-educational institution as one of the
institutions the shared earmark needed to be divided by in order to assign a value. When
it was stated that the earmark was to be shared by organizations or institutions in the
plural, I assumed that meant the earmark would be shared by the institution I was trying
to assign a value for and at least two other institutions and therefore divided the amount
total by three. Earmarks assigned to University systems were applied to the totals of the
flagship member of that system unless the purpose notes clearly showed the earmark
would be used by another member of the system.
There is some imprecision in dividing shared earmarks among the sharing
institutions by utilizing these decision rules. As mentioned above, there is no precise way
to know exactly how shared funding was allocated between sharing institutions. When it
is specified that an earmark is to be shared but the number of institutions is unspecified,
there is also the chance that the assumptions utilized in my decision rules underestimate
the actual number of institutions sharing the earmark. The decision rules were
formulated to divide the earmarks as precisely as possible among sharing institutions.
The rules err towards underestimating sharing institutions and therefore towards
overstating the value of earmarks. This conscious decision to overestimate the value of
earmarks in this study was made because it is one of the study's contentions that
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earmarks operate at the margins of federal research funding. By overestimating their
value, even by a small amount, it is more likely that their effect on the distribution of
federal research funding will be detected and discerned.
The third source of data utilized in this study comes from the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching website (www.camegiefoundation.org).
The Carnegie Foundation has a classification system that groups higher education
institutions into categories based on certain characteristics. This study uses the Carnegie
classification system to limit the number of institutions examined. The study will focus
upon what the Carnegie classification system identifies as Doctorate-granting institutions
and Special Focus Institutions - Medical Schools and Medical Centers. (Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 2006)
Within the Doctorate-granting classification, 96 institutions are classified as
RUNH or research universities with very high research activity, 103 institutions are
classified as RU/H or research universities with a high level of research activity, and 84
institutions are classified as DRU or doctoral research universities. Duke University and
Florida State University are examples of the RUNH institutions. George Washington
University and Mississippi State University are examples of the RU/H institutions.
Depaul University and East Tennessee State University are examples of the DRU
institutions. (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 2006)
There are 57 Special Focus Institutions - Medical Schools and Medical Centers.
Baylor College of Medicine and the University of California San Francisco are examples
of the Special Focus Institutions - Medical Schools and Medical Centers. (Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 2006)
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A final step had be taken to make the set of institutions delineated by the Carnegie
Foundation classification system fit with the other two sources of data being used in the
study. For some institutions, like Cornell University, the National Science Foundation
aggregates the totals of all campuses of the institution into one total and reports in its
tables only the aggregated total for the entire institution. This makes it seem like
campuses of institutions, like Weill Cornell Medical College which is the medical
campus of Cornell University located in New York City (Cornell's main campus is
located in Ithaca, New York), have no total science and engineering obligation activity
when they are considered as separate independent institutions. The Carnegie Foundation
classification system lists 13 separate independent institutions which are aggregated with
a parent institution, of which they are a component, in the National Science Foundation
science and engineering obligations data.2 To deal with the data limitation the National
Science Foundation's aggregation imposes, these 13 institutions have been dropped from
the set of institutions considered in this study and their earmark totals and science and
engineering obligations totals have been aggregated with their parent institution in the
2 These institutions are: Indiana University-Purdue University-Indianapolis which has its totals aggregated
with Indiana University-Bloomington and Purdue University-Main Campus in the National Science
Foundation data, Louisiana State University-Health Sciences Center which is aggregated with Louisiana
State University in the NSF data, Oklahoma State University Center for Health Sciences which is
aggregated with Oklahoma State University in the NSF data, Pennsylvania State University-College of
Medicine which is aggregated with Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus in the NSF data, Rutgers
University-Newark which is aggregated with Rutgers University-New Brunswick in the NSF data, Texas
A&M University-Commerce which is aggregated with Texas A&M University in the NSF data, Texas
Tech University Health Sciences Center which is aggregated with Texas Tech University in the NSF data,
the University of Colorado at Denver and Health Sciences Center which is aggregated with the University
of Colorado at Boulder in the NSF data, the University of Connecticut School of Medicine and Dentistry
which is aggregated with the University of Connecticut in the NSF data, the University of Kansas Medical
Center which is aggregated with the University of Kansas Main Campus in the NSF data, the University of
Mississippi Medical Center which is aggregated with the University of Mississippi in the NSF data, the
University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center which is aggregated with the University of Oklahoma in
the NSF data, and Weill Cornell Medical College which is aggregated with Cornell University in the NSF
data.
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same way the National Science Foundation does. The 327 institutions included in this
study are listed in Table 3.
By limiting my focus to these 327 institutions, this study will be ignoring some
earmarking that goes to institutions outside of the study group. As noted elsewhere
earlier in this text, some community colleges and other non-doctoral granting institutions
receive earmarks from time to time. The purpose of this study, however, is to examine
the effect of earmarks on the distribution of federal research funding. Important to this
purpose is a careful examination of the interplay between peer-reviewed funding and
earmarking. By limiting the focus to Doctorate-granting institutions and Special Focus
Institutions - Medical Schools and Medical Centers practically all of the institutions most
likely to receive both peer-reviewed and earmarked funding will be included in the study.
. Figure 4 presents a line graph representation of the value of all earmarks, science
and engineering earmarks, and non-science and engineering earmarks awarded to the
institutions included in this study for each year data is available. Figure 5 presents a line
graph representation of the number institutions in this study receiving earmarks in each
year data is available broken down to show all earmarks, just science and engineering
earmarks, and just non-science and engineering earmarks. Figure 6 presents a line graph
representation of the number of earmarks awarded to institutions in this study for each
year data is available broken down by all earmarks, just science and engineering
earmarks, and just non-science and engineering earmarks.
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METHODS
This study will address four basic research questions about the effect ofearmarks
on the distribution offederal research funding. Basic Research Question I: Does
receiving earmarks improve the ability ofan institution to receive other types offederal
research funding?
Proponents ofearmarking have long maintained they are a necessary feature of
federal academic research funding because certain institutions are disadvantaged in the
peer review competitions which are held to award the vast majority offederal research
funds. For these proponents, earmarks are a method ofdistributing some federal research
funding through a method other than peer review to institutions which are not well suited
to gamer the funds by competing for them in a peer review process. Besides having the
effect ofspreading federal research funding to a wider array ofinstitutions than would
receive funding ifall awards were made through peer review, proponents have also
argued that the awarding ofearmarks enables institutions, which have traditionally not
garnered the most peer reviewed funds, to use the earmarks they receive to upgrade their
research infrastructure so that they can compete more effectively in future peer review
competitions. (Brainard 2001c, Cook 1998, Feller 2004, Rose 1986, Savage 1999)
This idea that receiving earmarks can increase an institution's ability to gamer
other forms ofresearch funding is important to explore because earmarking comprises a
very small percentage oftotal federal research funding. Most ofthe research funds the
federal government awards are awarded through peer review processes, so, ifan
institution is to increase its share offederal research funding significantly, at some point
its faculty will have to be able to compete more effectively in peer review competitions
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for funding. A strategy of relying solely on earmarks to catch up to the institutions which
gamer the most federal research funding in the end would not catch up a trailing
institution.
To assess whether earmarks have the effect of increasing an institution's ability to
compete for other federal research funds, two tables have been created. Table 4 presents
a listing of the 327 institutions in this study by how they rank in all earmarks they
received between 1992 and 2003. In subsequent columns the institution's rank in total
science and engineering obligations for 1992 and the institution's rank in total science
and engineering obligations for 2003 are presented. If receiving earmarks has a positive
effect on an institution's ability to gamer other forms of funding, it follows that the
institutions which received the most earmarked funding in the 1992 through 2003 period
should rank higher in total science and engineering funding in 2003, at the end of this
period, than they ranked in total science and engineering funding in 1992, the beginning
of the period. Table 5 duplicates Table 4 with the one exception being that it ranks
institutions by total science and engineering earmarks received from 1992 to 2003 rather
than by all earmarks received during the period.
It should be noted that receiving earmarks has some effect on total science and
engineering funding as science and engineering earmarks are counted in total science and
engineering figures. However, as noted above, while science and engineering earmarks
help boost total science and engineering funding figures, to make real progress in
improving rank, institutions will have had to become more successful during this period
in garnering funds from the larger pool of peer reviewed funding in order to show much
improvement relative to other institutions.
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This assessment ofwhether the institutions which have garnered the most
earmarks during a period have improved in how they rank in total obligations at the end
ofthe period has been done before but has never been done utilizing this period and these
data sources. Savage did a similar ranking comparison in his 1999 book and such
rankings comparisons have appeared at various times in the Chronicle ofHigher
Education's reporting on the earmark phenomenon.
This study advances another novel method for assessing whether receiving
earmarks improves an institution's ability to gamer other research funds. In columns G,
H, and I oftables 4 and 5, the percentage oftotal science and engineering obligations for
all institutions that each individual institution secured in 1992 and 2003 and the percent
change between the 1992 and 2003 figures are presented.
While federal academic research funding is in many important ways not
analogous to a market, the metaphor ofmarket share is a useful prism through which to
look at these percentages. Column G in tables 4 and 5 provides what would be the
market share for each individual institution ofthe total science and engineering
obligations ofall institutions for 1992 ifthe analogy ofthe market could be applied to
federal academic research funding. Column H provides what would be the market share
for 2003. Column I provides what would be the percentage ofmarket share gained or
lost for the 1992 through 2003 period.
It follows that, ifearmarks have the effect ofmaking institutions more able to win
other types offunding, the institutions which gamer the most earmarks during the 1992
through 2003 period would have a larger percentage oftotal science and engineering
obligations in 2003 than they did in 1992. These institutions should also experience
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positive percent changes between 1992 and 2003. How large these positive percent
changes are is a measure ofhow much ground an institution has gained. It would be
expected that the institutions which have garnered the most earmarks would gain the
most ground.
The measures reported in columns G, H, and I oftables 4 and 5 have not been
utilized in any other previous studies. I believe the percent change figure reported in
column I is perhaps a more accurate measure ofassessing whether earmarks have
improved an institution's total funding situation than looking solely at changes in the
institution's total funding ranking. A different amount offederal research funding is
awarded each year. The amount awarded has grown progressively during the period of
this study. Institutions could fall in their ranking relative to other institutions while still
winning a larger share ofthe total funds awarded. For these reasons, the percent change
figure in column I is probably the more accurate measure. However, both change in rank
and change in percentage oftotal science and engineering obligations are utilized in this
study.
Finally, a bivariate correlation has been run between the total earmark ranking for
each ofthe institutions for the entire period (listed in column A oftable 4) and the rank in
total science and engineering obligations for each ofthe institutions in 1992 at the
beginning ofthe study period (listed in column C oftable 4). A bivariate correlation has
also been run between the total earmark ranking for each ofthe institutions for the entire
period (listed in column A oftable 4) and the institutions rank in total science and
engineering obligations in 2003 at the end ofthe study period (listed in column E oftable
4). These correlations are reported in table 6 and have been run for the entire set of
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institutions, for the set of institutions ranked 1 to 20 in total earmark ranking for the
entire period (the column A figure), for the set of institutions ranked 1 to 50 in total
earmark ranking for the entire period (the column A figure), for the set of institutions
ranked 1 to 100 in total earmark ranking for the entire period (the column A figure), and
for the set of institutions ranked 101 to last in total earmark ranking for the entire period
(the column A figure).
The first column of table 6, which reports the correlation between total earmark
ranking for the entire period (column A in table 4) and total science and engineering
obligations ranking in 1992 at the beginning of the period (column C), can be viewed as a
baseline figure to which the second column of table 6, which reports the correlation
between total earmark ranking for the entire period (column A in table 4) and total
science and engineering obligations ranking in 2003 at the end of the period (column E),
can be compared. If receiving earmarks during the period has helped institutions receive
other forms of federal research funding and thereby improve their rank in total science
and engineering obligations at the end of the period over their ranking at the beginning, it
would be expected that the effect or slope numbers in the second column of table 6 would
be positive and higher than the effect or slope numbers in the first column of table 6
especially for the higher ranked groups considered. The slope or effect numbers tell us
that for every one move up in earmark rank there is a corresponding move in obligation
rank of the slope or effect number. Doing well by the measure of earmark ranking during
the period should drive the obligation ranking up more at the end of the period than it
does at the beginning of the period if receiving earmarks actually improves· the ability of
an institution to receive other types of federal research funding. The R-square values in
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parentheses are measures of the strength of the correlations reported in each of the
columns. The higher the R-square values the stronger the correlation and the more of the
effect explained by earmark rank.
One other bivariate correlation is reported in the third column of table 6. This
correlation is the correlation between total earmark ranking for each of the institutions for
the entire period (listed in column A of table 4) and the institutions change in rank in total
science and engineering obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 (listed in column J of
table 4). If receiving earmarks during the period has helped institutions receive other
forms of federal research funding and thereby improve their rank in total science and
engineering obligations at the end of the period over their ranking at the beginning, it
would be expected that the effect or slope numbers in the third column of table 6 would
be positive especially for the higher ranked groups considered and that the value of the
effect or slope number would be higher for the higher ranked groups considered. The
slope or effect numbers in this case tell us that for every one move up in earmark rank
there is a corresponding jump or slide of the slope or effect number in rank when 1992
obligation rank is compared to 2003 obligation rank. If doing well by the measure of
earmark ranking during the period drives obligation rankings up, the higher ranked
groups considered should experience the largest positive changes in ranking and in
general with each move up in earmark ranking there should be a positive change in
ranking. As with the other correlations reported in table 6, the R-square values in
parentheses in the third column are measures of the strength of the correlations reported
in the third column. The higher the R-square values the stronger the correlation and the
more of the effect explained by earmark rank.
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Table 7 reports the same correlations for the same groups of ranked institutions as
table 6 does using only science and engineering earmarks. Table 6 corresponds to table 4
in the same way table 7 corresponds to table 5. The data for the correlations reported in
table 6 come from table 4. The data for the correlations reported in table 7 come from
table 5. 3
Basic Research Question 2: How does the awarding ofearmarks affect the
geographical distribution offederal research funding? Since the 1960's, there has been

some concern that a large and disproportionate share of federal research funding awarded
in peer review competitions goes to a very few elite institutions located in the northeast
Atlantic and west coast regions of the United States. Earmarking has been extolled as a
means of combating the perceived disproportionate geographical concentration of
funding that results from the peer review process. Many Congressional and other leaders
have felt it important to distribute federal research funding widely throughout the country
because often where federal research money goes, economic development follows.
(Greenberg 1966)
There have been several efforts which preceded this study that have attempted to
look at the question of where federal research money goes. Savage addressed the
geographical question in his 1999 book and in some earlier studies. The geographical
distribution of earmarks and peer reviewed funding has been frequently discussed in the
Chronicle ofHigher Education's reporting on federal academic research funding. It is

3

The only difference between table 4 and table 5 is that table 4 reports earmark ranking for each institution
in the study for the entire study period in column A using all earmarks in its calculations while table 5
reports earmark ranking for each institution in the study for the entire study period in its column A using
only science and engineering earmarks in its calculations. All other columns in tables 4 and 5 report the
same totals.
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my belief, however, that earlier attempts to look at where federal research money ends up
have been seriously flawed. Every attempt I have come across has simply tabulated and
reported the amount of funding that has gone to a state or region. Such simple
tabulations are misleading. States have different population densities and different
numbers of research institutions within their boundaries. Simply saying that California
receives more federal research money than Alaska ignores the fact that California has
many more people that live within its borders and many more academic institutions than
Alaska. California should probably be expected to receive more federal research money
in the aggregate than Alaska because it has a larger need for funding.
This study looks at the geographical question by dividing the amount of federal
research money a state receives by the number of doctoral granting and specially focused
medical institutions a state has. It is my belief that the introduction of this control will
render a truer picture of the geographical distribution of federal research funds than a
picture based solely on the raw figures. There are, of course, other controls which could
have been used, but using the per institution control is the right choice for this study.
This study is about the distribution of federal research funds and the number of doctoral
granting and specially focused medical institutions in a state more closely relates to how
funds are likely to be distributed than other controls which could have been employed
like population and economic measures like gross domestic product.
The whole issue of which states get the most funding and whether a state gets its
fair share of funding is a complicated issue. To determine how much funding a state
receives one must add together how much funding the institutions within the state
receive. States are not only aggregators of institutions, in many ways institutions are
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aggregators of investigators. Investigator is the term for the individual faculty member
whose research is supported by a federal grant. Most federal research money is awarded
in the form ofproject grants made to specific investigators who just happen to work at
certain institutions. Many grants are so tied to individual investigators that investigators
funded by multi-year grants, who decide to leave their present institution for another
institution, take their grants with them. Earmarks are a little more tied to the institution
than grants but many still support very specific research efforts carried out by one or a
few faculty members.
The whole point ofthe peer review system is that awards are made based solely
on scientific merit without regard to geography and other factors. Any concentration of
funding in certain geographical areas is viewed by peer review advocates as simply an
accidental byproduct ofa system which does not take geography into account.
Members ofCongress, however, have thought that geographical distribution did
matter especially since they became aware that regional economic development may be a
byproduct ofstrong academic research programs at the institutions in their districts and
states. This keen interest about where the money ends up on the part ofthe members of
Congress necessitates that some attention be paid to the issue ofgeographical
distribution. Members ofCongress after all are the appropriators ofboth earmarked and
peer reviewed funding. Ifthey relate to things geographically, those in the academic
community must to some extent do so as well.
Another group with a keen interest about where funds end up is the college and
university presidents, trustees, and patrons ofinstitutions not located in the northeast
Atlantic or west coast regions ofthe United States where traditionally most federal
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research funding has gone. Since the end of World War II the higher education
community has expanded enormously. More citizens attend higher education institutions
now than did so in the early 1900's, and many more institutions exist than did so 50 years
ago. A good portion of the institutions young and old which are not located in the
northeast Atlantic and west coast regions still have aspirations of having vigorous
research enterprises. Institutions, which in a previous era were content to be teacher's
colleges and liberal arts schools, now aspire to be nationally prominent research
institutions.
In a previous era, these institutions might have been content to let just a few
prominent institutions in the northeast and on the west coast carry the research load and
receive the overwhelming majority of federal research funding. In today's climate,
institutional leaders cannot afford to take such a stance. It is understood that economic
development is dependent upon the creation of new knowledge and that regional
economic development often occurs around vital research universities. Governors, state
legislators, and members of Congress everywhere therefore expect the leaders of the
universities in their area to get into and do well in the research game so that their
constituents can enjoy better lives.
Our society is also more conscious of measures of prestige than it used to be.
Rightly or wrongly, research universities are often perceived of as more prestigious than
those institutions with a non-research mission. This has led many institutional leaders of
non-research institutions to try to expand their institution's activities and grow their
institution into a research institution. It seems like there is pressure on institutional
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leaders to constantly expand their institution's roles so that the institution can climb up to
the next notch in the Carnegie classification system.
There is also pressure on the institutional leaders ofresearch institutions to catch
up to those institutions ahead ofthem in various rankings. Federal research funding is an
important criterion by which institutions are ranked and measured. There are a lot of
college presidents at institutions, not situated in the northeast or on the west coast, who
are aspiring to elevate their institutions in the rankings and thereby enhance their
institutions perceived prestige. These presidents are likely to question a system of
funding which seems to distribute money disproportionately to a few institutions and
concentrate funding in a very few geographical areas. The question ofgeographically
where federal research money goes is pertinent to these presidents and their constituents
even though the aggregation involved in dealing with which states or regions get the most
money comes with an element ofdistortion.
To assess how the awarding ofearmarks affects the geographical distribution of
federal research funding, four color coded maps have been constructed. For each map the
various 50 states, the District ofColumbia, and Puerto Rico have been colored a different
shade ofblue depending upon which quintile the state, District, or territory ranked within
for the total study period. Figure 8 presents the results by quintile ofhow the various
states ranked in total science and engineering obligations per institution during the study
period. Figure 9 presents the results by quintile ofhow the various states ranked in total
peer reviewed funding per institution during the study period. Figure 1 0 presents the
results by quintile ofhow the various states ranked in total earmarks received per
institution during the study period. Figure 1 1 presents the results by quintile ofhow the
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various states ranked in science and engineering earmarks received per institution during
the study period.
To calculate for figure 8 which states fell within each quintile, the total science
and engineering obligations ofeach institution in this study which resides within a given
state for all years ofthe study ( 1 992 to 2003) were added together. This total for each
state was then divided by the number ofinstitutions in this study which reside within the
state. This provided a total for each state ofits total science and engineering obligations
per institution during the study period.
To calculate for figure 9 which states fell within each quintile, the total science
and engineering obligations ofeach institution in this study which resides within a given
state for all years ofthe study were added together. This total was then subtracted from
the total amount ofearmarks made to study institutions in the state during the same
period.4 Performing these additions and subtractions provided a figure for each state that
approximated the total amount ofpeer reviewed funding the state received during the
study period. This peer reviewed funding approximation was then divided by the number
of institutions in this study which reside in the state. This provided a total for each state
ofits total peer reviewed funding per institution during the study period.
To calculate for figure 10 which states fell within each quintile, all ofthe
earmarks received by each institution in this study within each state during all years of
the study were added together. This total for each state was then divided by the number
ofinstitutions within this study which reside within the state. This provided a total for
4

Subtracting the total amount of all earmarks and subtracting the total amount of only science and
engineering earmarks made no difference in the quintile rankings of figure 9. Since it made no difference,
only one map for peer reviewed funding was prepared rather than two maps - one subtracting out only
science and engineering earmarks and one subtracting out all earmarks.
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e�ch state ofthe total amount ofearmarked funding per institution received during the
study period.
To calculate for figure 11 which states fell within each quintile, all ofthe science
and engineering earmarks received by each institution in this study within each state
during all years ofthe study were added together. This total for each state was then
divided by the number ofinstitutions within this study which reside within the state. This
provided a total for each state ofthe total amount ofscience and engineering earmarked
funding per institution received during the study period.
Quintiles were used to color code the maps because they convey the best visual
and most accurate picture ofthe geographical distribution ofthe various types offunding
the maps depict. They convey the best visual because having roughly equal groupings in
the quintiles and using different shades ofthe same color sort ofshows into which parts
ofthe country funding is flowing and at what magnitude funds flow. From an accuracy
standpoint, rankings ofthis sort are more accurate to use than ranges based on the raw
numbers. During the early stages ofthe study period, both earmarked funding and total
science and engineering funding were at significantly lower levels than they were at the
end ofthe period. Towards the end ofthe period, there simply was more money in the
system than there was at the beginning. This fact could skew the results ifraw numbers,
rather than the broad category ofa quintile, were relied upon. Using the broader category
ofthe quintile also makes it less necessary to worry about the affect ofinflation on the
value ofthe dollar. Since there were 52 states when you count the District ofColumbia
and Puerto Rico, one quintile had to be larger than 10 states. Therefore, the lowest
quintile for all the maps contains 12 states.
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If the conventional wisdom that peer reviewed methods concentrate funding in the
northeast Atlantic <;1nd west coast regions holds true, the maps depicting total science and
engineering obligations and total peer reviewed funding should have a lot of darker blue
in the northeast and along the west coast. Similarly, if earmarks serve the equalizing
function of distributing federal research money to places where peer reviewed funding
does not; the maps depicting total earmarks and total science and engineering earmarks
should have the darker blues in the interior of the country and be lighter in the northeast
and on the west coast.
Basic Research Question 3: Are earmarks additive or do they come at the
expense ofpeer reviewed funding? For many within the higher education community,

earmarks would not be objectionable at all if they were an additive feature to federal
research funding - serving the same role as a cherry on top of a chocolate sundae. There
have been fears, however, within the higher education community as earmarks have
escalated that, at some point, earmarks would eat into money which could otherwise be
used for peer reviewed grants. It is very difficult to tell when an earmark might be
additive or when it might come at the expense of peer reviewed funding because the
appropriations process is not completely transparent. After an appropriation has
occurred, whether it be for earmarked or peer reviewed funding, one is left with the
challenge of trying to "prove the counterfactual" that absent a specific earmark more
would have been appropriated for peer review programs.
The methods used to address this question are therefore less sophisticated and
precise than the other methods utilized in this study. Table 8 presents the percentage of
total science and engineering obligations all earmarks comprise for each of the fiscal
1 12

years in the study period (1992 through 2003). Ifearmarks are beginning to eat into peer
reviewed funding as they rise, one would expect that on this global level the percentage
ofscience and engineering funding they comprise would be rising. 5
A short individual case study is also presented to examine the effects of
earmarking on the peer reviewed funding offered by one agency between fiscal year 1998
and 2005. The Fund for the Improvement ofPostsecondary Education saw the number of
earmarks in its budget appropriation increase from 2 in 1998 to 4 19 in 2005 and saw its
budget increase in the same period from $25,200,000 to $ 163,600,000. The FIPSE case
provides the opportunity to witness the effect ofgreatly increased earmarking activity on
peer reviewed funding within one program area. Such small case studies may be the only
method ofpeering into the appropriations process deep enough to actually discern
whether earmarks are additive or come at the expense ofpeer reviewed funding. One
case study, ofcourse, cannot be universalized to the entire appropriations process, but it
can provide some idea ofwhether on an individual program level earmarks are additive
or come at the expense ofpeer reviewed funding. Ifearmarks are additive, one would
expect that the addition ofearmarks to the FIPSE appropriation caused the overall FIPSE
appropriation to go up and that in effect a rising tide lifted all boats. Ifthe earmarks

5
Total earmarks are used in this comparison rather than just science and engineering earmarks because the
earmark figures are taken directly from Chronicle ofHigher Education reports and represent the total of
earmarks appropriated by Congress for each year for all institutions receiving earmarks in that fiscal year,
not just for the 327 institutions included in this study. The total science and engineering obligations totals
are also for the entire universe of institutions. The coding exercise done to segregate science and
engineering earmarks from non-science and engineering earmarks was only done for the 327 institutions
included in this study. Using total earmarks rather than just science and engineering earmarks of course
overstates the effect of earmarks some as the Chronicle total earmarks figure includes some non-science
and engineering earmarks. The total science and engineering obligations figure includes no non-science
and engineering obligations and thus would not include non-science and engineering earmarks. This just
makes the fact that the percentage total earmarks comprise of total science and engineering obligations is so
low all the more compelling because the effect of earmarks is overstated somewhat in the comparison.
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came at the expense of peer reviewed funding, one would expect, that even though the
overall appropriation went up each year, with each year earmarks took up a larger and
larger proportion of the FIPSE budget. The FIPSE case study will be in the form of a
narrative and will appear in the next chapter.
Basic research question 4: Is there much difference in the institutions which
garner the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most peer reviewed
funding? Proponents of earmarking have extolled earmarking as a means by which

emerging institutions can access some federal funding to use to catch up to more
established institutions. Earmarking has also been hailed for sending federal research
money to institutions and places where little money would otherwise go and for funding
projects important to members of Congress and their constituents back home but not
necessarily important to the national scientific community which makes decisions about
peer review funding. (Brainard 2001c, Cook 1998, Feller 2004, Rose 1986, Savage
1999) Each of these arguments assumes that earmarking has a redistributive effect and
that the set of institutions which gamer the most earmarks is quite different from the set
of institutions which gamer the most peer reviewed funds.
However, two factors would seem to indicate that, even if leaders in earmarking
and leaders in peer reviewed funding start off as two fairly discrete groups of institutions,
these groups will not be stable and over time may merge with each other and become
more closely correlated. First, if earmarks are effective in boosting an emerging
institution's capabilities to compete for peer reviewed funding, eventually that institution
is going to start to gamer more peer reviewed funds and not require earmarks to catch up.
Secondly, there are indications in the literature, especially in the Chronicle ofHigher
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Education's reporting on earmarking, that, as earmarking has become more established,
the policy debate within the higher education community about the efficacy of
earmarking has died down. The literature seems to indicate that virtually no institutions
or higher education associations are actively campaigning against earmarking at present
and that most institutions are now actively pursuing and accepting earmarks.
These two factors would seem to indicate that during the early years ofthis study,
when the policy debate about earmarks was most heated and when earmarking was a
fairly new practice, the group ofinstitutions which garnered the most earmarks would be
very different from the group ofinstitutions which garnered the most peer reviewed
funding. This would have to be the case ifearmarks served the redistributive function of
sending federal research money to institutions and places where it would not go ifpeer
review were solely relied upon. However, in the later years ofthe study, as the
institutions which benefited early on from earmarks increased their capabilities to receive
peer reviewed funding and the institutions which garnered the most peer reviewed
funding gave up their inhibitions about pursuing earmarks, the two groups ofinstitutions
would grow more similar and earmarking's redistributive effect would be muted.
To assess whether this has been the pattern, each ofthe 327 institutions were
ranked by the total amount ofearmarks and the total amount ofpeer reviewed funding
they received during each year ofthe study period. To calculate the amount ofpeer
reviewed funding an institution received during a given year, the amount ofearmarked
funding the institution received that year was subtracted from that institution's total
science and engineering obligations figure for that year. These calculations were
performed using both all earmarks and only science and engineering earmarks.
1 15

A bivariate correlation of the two rankings was then done to calculate the effect of
earmark ranking on peer reviewed ranking for each year of the study. Since earmark
ranking and peer reviewed ranking were used in calculating these correlations,
institutions which received no earmarks during the study period tied for last place.
Correlations using both all institutions and also dropping the institutions tied for last from
the model were calculated.
Figure 12 presents a line graph of the effect of earmark ranking on peer review
ranking using all earmarks for each year of the study. Figure 13 presents a line graph of
the effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using all earmarks but dropping the
institutions not receiving any earmarks from the model. Figure 14 presents a line graph
of the effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using only science and
engineering earmarks for each year of the study. Figure 15 presents a line graph of the
effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using only science and engineering
earmarks but dropping the institutions not receiving any earmarks from the model.
Table 9 uses all earmarks and presents the slope or effect of earmark ranking on
peer reviewed ranking and the R-square value, which is an assessment of how strong the
correlation is, for each study year for both the set of all institutions and the set of
institutions that excludes those institutions which received no earmarks. Table 10 uses
only science and engineering earmarks and presents the slope or effect of earmark
ranking on peer reviewed ranking and the R-square value for each study year for both the
set of all institutions and the set of institutions that excludes those institutions which
received no earmarks.
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The correlations reported in tables 9 and 10 and depicted in figures 12, 13, 14, and
15 are one part ofthe picture ofwhether the set ofinstitutions which does well at
earmarking does well at garnering peer reviewed funds also. The other two parts ofthe
picture which need to be taken into account are depicted in figures 2 and 7. Figure 2
shows the number ofinstitutions which have received earmarks in each year from 1990 to
2003. Figure 7 is a histogram which depicts the change in peer reviewed funding rank
between 1992 and 2003.
Figure 2 shows how many institutions are getting into the earmarking game.
Tables 9 and 10 and figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 show how earmark ranking and peer
reviewed ranking relate in each year ofthe study. Ifthe group ofinstitutions which does
the best at earmark ranking is becoming more similar with the group ofinstitutions that is
doing the best in receiving peer reviewed funds in latter years ofthe study period, it
would follow that, as figure 2 shows an increase in the number ofinstitutions getting into
the earmark game, the relationship between earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking
will at least remain stable ifnot increase in effect. The histogram in figure 7 would show
whether peer reviewed funding rankings are fairly stable or are moving around and
affecting the relationship. A relationship between earmark ranking and peer review
ranking that is at least stable would show that, as those institutions which do well at
garnering peer reviewed funding enter into the earmark game, the rewards they reap from
earmarking will be approximately commensurate with their peer reviewed ranking status.
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CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the data employed in this study and the methods used
in answering the study's four basic research questions. Data for this study has been
drawn from three basic sources. Science and engineering obligations data has been
drawn from tables accessible through the National Science Foundation's website
(www.nsf.gov). Earmark data has been drawn from a database maintained by the
Chronicle ofHigher Education and accessible through their website

(http://chronicle.com/stats/pork/). A classification system of institutions of higher
learning developed and maintained by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching was used to limit the number of institutions considered by the study.
To address Basic Research Question 1 : Does receiving earmarks improve the
ability of an institution to receive other types offederal research funding? , tables (tables

4 and 5) which display the change in total obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 and
the change in the percentage of the total obligations funding of all institutions in the study
between 1992 and 2003 were described in this chapter and constructed for the study.
Comparing the institutions ranked the highest in earmarks (both the total earmarks dealt
with in table 4 and science and engineering earmarks dealt with in table 5) for the period
is one way of discerning whether receiving earmarks improves the ability to win other
types of funding.
Bivariate correlations of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992
(table 6), of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 6), of science
and engineering earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 7), and of science
and engineering earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 7) were also
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described in the chapter and have been calculated. Comparing the correlation between
earmark rank for the entire period and obligation rank at the beginning of the study
period with the correlation between earmark rank for the entire period and obligation
rank at the end of the study period provides some indication of whether receiving
earmarks has built the capacity of institutions to gamer other types of funding.
A bivariate correlation of total earmark ranking for the entire period with change
in obligation rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 6) and of science and engineering
earmark ranking for the entire period with change in obligation rank between 1992 and
2003 (table 7) was also discussed and has been calculated. This correlation is helpful in
showing whether receiving earmarks helps an institution gamer other types of funding.
All correlations were calculated for all institutions as ranked by total earmarks
(table 6) and by science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period, for the
top 20 institutions in total earmarks (table 6) and science and engineering earmarks (table
7) for the study period, for the top 50 institutions in total earmarks (table 6) and science
and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period, for the top 100 institutions in
total earmarks (table 6) and science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study
period, and for institutions 101 through the last institution in total earmarks (table 6) and
science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period.
To address Basic Research Question 2: How does the awarding of earmarks
affect the geographical distribution of federal research funding?, color coded maps were

discussed and have been prepared displaying different shades of blue for the quintiles the
50 states Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia fall within when they are ranked by
several different measures. The measures used for the quintile rankings are total
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obligations received during the study period per institution in the study group, total peer
reviewed funding received during the study period per institution in the study group, total
earmarks received during the study period per institution in the study group, and total
science and engineering earmarks received during the study period per institution in the
study group.
To address Basic Research Question 3: Are earmarks additive or do they come at
the expense ofpeer reviewed funding?, a table presenting the percentage total earmarks

comprise of total science and engineering obligations for each year from 1990 through
2003 has been prepared. A short case study of earmarking activity in the Fund for the
Improvement of Postsecondary Education budget between 1998 and 2005 will also be
presented in the next chapter.
. To address Basic research question 4: Is there much difference in the institutions
which garner the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most peer
reviewed funding?, bivariate correlations of earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking

for each year of the study (table 9) and of science and engineering earmark ranking and
peer reviewed ranking for each year of the study (table 10) will be combined with
observations from figure 2 about the number of institutions pursuing earmarks each year
and from figure 7 about the stability of peer reviewed funding ranking over time to derive
a picture of whether there is much difference in the institutions which gamer the most
earmarked funding and those which receive the most peer reviewed funding.
In the next chapter, the four basic research questions discussed in this chapter will
be analyzed and the findings which can be derived from assessing these questions with
the methods discussed in this chapter will be presented.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will analyze the study's basic research questions by the methods
described in chapter 3 and present findings. The first basic research question, Does
receiving earmarks improve the ability of an institution to receive other types offederal
research funding?, will be anal�ed by creating two tables which display the change in

total obligatic:ms rank between 1992 and 2003 and the change in the percentage of the
total obligations funding of all institutions in the study between 1992 and 2003. Bivariate
correlations of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 6), of total
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 6), of science and engineering
earmark rank with total obligations·rank in 1992 (table 7), of science and engineering
earmark rank with·total obligations rank in 2003 (table 7), of total earmark ranking for
the entire period with change in obligation rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 6), and of
science and engineering earmark ranking for the entire period with change in obligation
rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 7) will also be run.
The second basic research question, How does the awarding ofearmarks affect
the geographical distribution offederal research funding?, will be analyzed by creating

color coded maps displaying how all of the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico rank by total obligations received during the study period per institution in the study
group, total peer reviewed funding received during the study period per institution in the
study group, total earmarks received during the study period per institution in the study
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group, and total science and engineering earmarks received during the study period per
institution in the study group.
The third basic research question, Are earmarks additive or do they come at the
expense ofpeer reviewed funding?, will be assessed by looking at a table presenting the
percentage total earmarks comprise of total science and engineering obligations for each
year from 1990 through 2003 and a short case study of earmarking activity in the Fund
for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education budget between 1998 and 2005.
Finally, the fourth basic research question, Is there much difference in the
institutions which garner the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most
peer reviewed funding?, will be analyzed by assessing the picture presented by a
combination of bivariate correlations of earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking for
each year of the study (table 9) and of science and engineering earmark ranking and peer
reviewed ranking for each year of the study (table 10) with observations from figure 2
about the number of institutions pursuing earmarks each year and from figure 7 about the
stability of peer reviewed funding ranking over time.
The chapter will conclude with a chapter summary.

BASIC RESEARCH QUESTION 1: DOES RECEIVING EARMARKS
IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF AN INSTITUTION TO RECEIVE OTHER TYPES OF
FEDERAL FUNDING?
Proponents of earmarking have long maintained they are a necessary feature of
federal academic research funding because certain institutions are disadvantaged in the
peer review competitions which are held to award the vast majority of federal research
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funds. For these proponents, earmarks are a method of distributing some federal research
funding through a method other than peer review to institutions which are not well suited
to gamer the funds by competing for them in a peer review process. Besides having the
effect of spreading federal research funding to a wider array of institutions than would
receive funding if all awards were made through peer review, proponents have also
argued that the awarding of earmarks enables institutions, which have traditionally not
garnered the most peer reviewed funds, to use the earmarks they receive to upgrade their
research infrastructure so that they can compete more effectively in future peer review
competitions. (Brainard 2001c, Cook 1998, Feller 2004, Rose 1986, Savage 1999)
This idea that receiving earmarks can increase an institution's ability to gamer
other forms of research funding is important to explore because earmarking comprises a
very small percentage of total federal research funding. Most of the research funds the
federal government awards are awarded through peer review processes, so, if an
institution is to increase its share of federal research funding significantly, at some point
its faculty will have to be able to compete more effectively in peer review competitions
for funding. A strategy of relying solely on earmarks to catch up to the institutions which
gamer the most federal research funding in the end would not catch up a trailing
institution.
To assess whether earmarks have the effect of increasing an institution's ability to
compete for other federal research funds, two tables have been created. Table 4 presents
a listing of the 327 institutions in this study by how they rank in all earmarks they
received between 1992 and 2003. In subsequent columns the institution's rank in total
science and engineering obligations for 1992 and the institution's rank in total science
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and engineering obligations for 2003 are presented. Ifreceiving earmarks has a positive
effect on an institution's ability to gamer other forms offunding, it follows that the
institutions which received the most earmarked funding in the 1992 through 2003 period
should rank higher in total science and engineering funding in 2003, at the end ofthis
period, than they ranked in total science and engineering funding in 1992, the beginning
ofthe period. Column J reports the change in rank for each institution between 1992 and
2003. Columns G, H, and I report the percentage oftotal science and engineering
obligations for all institutions that each individual institution secured in 1992 and 2003
and the percent change between the 1992 and 2003 figures. Table 5 duplicates Table 4
with the one exception being that it ranks institutions by total science and engineering
earmarks received from 1992 to 2003 rather than by all earmarks received during the
period.
A careful look at table 4 shows that in general receiving earmarks does not seem
to aid institutions in their efforts to receive other types offederal funding. Ofthe top 20
recipients ofall earmarks during this study period, only 4 jumped more than 5 places in
rank when their ranking in total science and engineering obligations in 1992 was
compared to their ranking in total science and engineering obligations in 2003. 7 ofthe
top 20 recipients ofall earmarks actually went down more than 5 places when their
science and engineering obligations rankings for 1992 and 2003 were compared. 9 ofthe
top 20 institutions maintained a ranking in 2003 within 5 places ofwhere their ranking
was in 1992.
The picture is slightly different when an institution's percentage ofthe total
science and engineering obligations ofall institutions in 1992 is compared to the same
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percentage calculated for 2003. Of the top 20 recipients of all earmarks during this study
period, 6 institutions gain more than 10 percentage points when the 1992 percentage is
compared to the 2003 percentage. 7 institutions lose more than 10 percentage points
when the figures are compared. 7 institutions have positive or negative percentage
changes of less than 10 percentage points between 1992 and 2003.
When the top 50 recipients of all earmarks during this study period are
considered, 11 institutions move forward in rank more than 5 places when their rank in
total science and engineering obligations for 1992 is compared to the same ranking for
2003, 22 institutions move backwards in rank more than 5 places, and 17 institutions
maintain a rank in 2003 within 5 places of their 1992 ranking. 14 of the top 50 recipients
of all earmarks during this study period increase by more than 10 percentage points their
percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions when the
percentages for 1992 and 2003 are compared, 21 of the top 50 have decreases of more
than 10 percentage points, and 15 have percentage changes to the positive or negative of
less than 10 percentage points.
Of the top 100 recipients of all earmarks during this study period, 29 move
forward in rank more than 5 places, 40 move backwards in rank more than 5 places, and
31 maintain a rank in 2003 within 5 places of their 1992 ranking. 35 have percent gains
of more than 10 percent, 4 1 have percent losses of more than 10 percent, and 24 have
percent changes to the positive or negative of less than 10 percentage points.
If receiving earmarks helps an institution increase its research capacity to the
point that the institution can compete more effectively for peer-reviewed funding, the
expectation would be that the institutions which gamer the most earmarks during a period
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of time would move up in the rankings of institutions by total science and engineering
obligations and gain a larger percentage of the total science and engineering obligations
of all institutions by the end of the period. Clearly, this is not what is happening when
the results presented in Table 4 are analyzed. Most of the institutions which gamer the
most earmarks do not improve their ranking. They either remain very close to their
ranking at the beginning of the period or move backwards in the rankings. The
institutions which gamer the most earmarks for the most part do not gain a larger
percentage of total science and engineering obligations either. They generally lose
percentage points when the end of the period is compared to the beginning or maintain a
percentage very close to their percentage at the beginning of the period.
Still, some institutions do make the gains in rank and percentage which would be
expected if earmarks enhance an institution's ability to secure other types of funding. 2
of the top 20 (The University of South Florida and The University of Mississippi), 6 of
the top 50 (The University of South Florida, The University of Mississippi, the Medical
University of South Carolina, Montana State University-Bozeman, Oregon Health &
Science University, and Texas Tech University), and 17 of the top 100 recipients of all
earmarks improved their total science and engineering rank by more than 14 places and
increased their percentage of the total and science and engineering obligations of all
institutions by more than 50 percent during this study period. While there are perhaps
multiple factors which enabled these institutions to improve their ranking and percentage,
one stark factor which sticks out is the fact that 5 of the 6 improving institutions in the
top 50 have medical schools. Of the 6, only Montana State University-Bozeman does not
have a medial school. Savage pointed out in his 1999 book that earmarks for biomedical
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purposes may be more productive than earmarks for other purposes because there is a
great deal more federal research money available for biomedical research than for any
other purpose (Savage 1999). Having a medical school was also a significant variable in
the model of earmarking de Figueiredo and Silverman created in their 2002 study (de
Figueiredo and Silverman 2002).
A quick look at the earmarks of the 6 institutions in the top 50 which experienced
dramatic gains in rank and percentage shows that the University of South Florida
received 66 earmarks during the study period of which 26 were clearly for biomedical
purposes. The University of Mississippi received 103 earmarks during the study period
of which 10 were clearly for biomedical purposes. The Medical University of South
Carolina received 24 earmarks during the study period all of which were for biomedical
purposes. Montana State University-Bozeman received 129 earmarks during the study
period of which 6 were clearly for biomedical purposes. Oregon Health & Science
University received 18 earmarks all of which were for biomedical purposes. Finally,
Texas Tech University received 58 earmarks of which 13 were clearly for biomedical
purposes. The literature and these results suggest that earmarks for biomedical purposes
may enhance an institution's ability to secure other types of federal funding, but further
study into the role having a medical school and the role earmarks for biomedical research
play in the federal funding of academic research is necessary to determine whether this is
actually the case.
Of the top 20 recipients of all earmarks during the study period, only 2 (the
University of Alabama and West Virginia University) experience dramatic losses of rank
by total science and engineering obligations and percentage of the total science and
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engineering obligations of all institutions. Both institutions lose 46 places in rank and
over 50 percentage points. There are no other institutions in the top 50 or top 100
recipients of earmarks during the study period which experience l_osses of both more than
20 places and 50 percentage points. It is difficult to come up with a rationale for why
these two institutions experienced such losses in rank and percentage. The University of
Alabama does not have a medical school, but West Virginia University does. Further
research into the factors which may have caused these institutions to experience such
dramatic losses in rank and percentage is required.
In the entire study group of 327 institutions, 50 institutions increase their ranking
by total science and engineering obligations by more than 10 and their percentage of the
total and science and engineering obligations of all institutions by more than 50
percentage points during the study period. 17 institutions lose at least 16 places in rank
and 50 percentage points. There is less significance in the rank and percentage gained
and lost by institutions towards the bottom of the table because institutions have received
less earmarked money during the study period and less federal research money in general.
Earmarks thus explain less about the gains and losses of institutions the closer one gets to
the bottom of the table. Also, since in most cases there is less money in play towards the
bottom of the table, small changes in total science and engineering obligations can trigger
fairly large changes in rank and percentage. One grant, or simply an unusually good
year, can cause large fluctuations in rank and percentage for the institutions at the bottom
of the table.
Table 5 presents the same findings as table 4 with the exception that only science
and engineering earmarks are used in calculating the earmark ranking reported in column
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A. Removing non-science and engineering earmarks from consideration reshuffles the
deck somewhat, but all ofthe top 20 recipients ofall earmarks listed in column A oftable
4 remain in the top 20 recipients ofscience and engineering earmarks listed in column A
oftable 5. The top 20 institutions in table 5 are in a slightly different rank order than in
table 4. The University ofAlabama is number 3 in table 5 and number 4 in table 4. West
Virginia University is number 4 in table 5 and number 5 in table 4. Loma Linda
University is number 5 in table 5 and number 3 in table 4. Pennsylvania State
University-Main Campus is number 9 in table 5 and number 11 in table 4. Georgetown
University is number 10 in table 5 and number 9 in table 4. The University ofMissouri
Columbia is number 12 in table 5 and number 13 in table 4. Texas A & M University is
number 13 in table 5 and number 10 in table 4. The University ofMississippi is number
11 in table 5 and number 12 in table 4. These minor fluctuations in rank order between
table 5 and 4 continue to occur as one descends down the column A rankings ofeach
table. However, no institution's column A rank changes more than a few places when
both tables are compared, and there is no difference in the figures reported for each
institution in columns C through J ofeach table.
The exercise ofidentifying and segregating non-science and engineering earmarks
from all earmarks lends little explanatory power to the issues addressed by both table 4
and table 5. Table 5, the table which utilizes a ranking ofinstitutions by science and
engineering earmarks only, is probably the more accurate ofthe two tables because the
elimination of non-science and engineering earmarks from the calculations used to rank
institutions makes the earmark ranking more closely match up with the National Science
Foundation obligation data which is limited to science and engineering obligations only.
129

The use ofboth ranking by total science and engineering obligations and an
institution's percentage ofthe total science and engineering obligations ofall institutions
also lent very little explanatory power to these issues. There were no instances in the
entire study where rank order went up more than 5 places and percentage went down
more than 10 percentage points and no instances where the reverse occurred either.
There were only 35 instances in the entire study where rank order went up or down more
than 5 places while percentage did not change by at least 10 percentage points or where
rank order stayed within 5 places and percentage changed more than 10 percentage
points. For these cases, in which one factor remained rather constant while the other
factor differed from 1992 to 2003 past the range set to indicate significant change had
occurred (5 places for rank and 10 percentage points for percentage), it is interesting to
look at which factor (rank or percentage) exceeds the range. In 12 instances in the whole
study, rank did not change more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage
went up more than 10 percentage points. In 9 instances in the whole study, rank did not
change more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage went down more than
10 percentage points. In 2 instances in the whole study, rank went up more than 5 places
between 1992 and 2003 while percentage remained within 10 percentage points. In 12
instances in the whole study, rank went down more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003
while percentage remained within 10 percentage points.
Looking only at the top 100 recipients ofall earmarks, in 6 cases rank did not
change more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage went up more than 10
percentage points. In 2 ofthese 6 cases, difference ofrank is at 5 places, right at the edge
ofwhere the boundary is set for determining whether little change or significant change
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in rank order had occurred, while the change in percentage is well outside the 10
percentage point boundary set to mark significant change in percentage.6 In 1 of these 6
cases, difference ofrank is at 1 place to the positive, well within the boundary set for
determining whether little change or significant change in rank order had occurred, while
the change in percentage is at 11.04 percent to the positive, just outside the 10 percentage
point boundary set to mark significant change in percentage. 7
In 3 cases within the top 100, rank did not change more than 5 places between
1992 and 2003 but percentage went down more than 10 percentage points. In 1 ofthese 3
cases, there is a 2 place decrease in rank between 1992 and 2003, which is well within the
boundary set for determining whether little change or significant change in rank order
had occurred, while the change in percentage is 14.05 percent to the negative, well
outside the 10 percentage point boundary set to mark significant change in percentage. 8
In 1 ofthese 3 cases, there is no change in rank between 1992 and 2003 while the change
in percentage is 17.44 percent to the negative, well outside the 10 percentage point
boundary set to mark significant change in percentage. 9 In 1 ofthese 3 cases, there is a 5
place decrease in rank between 1992 and 2003, right at the edge ofwhere the boundary is
6

The University of Alaska Fairbanks ranked 1 02 in total science and engineering obligations in 1992 and
97 in total science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced a 1 7.34 percent gain in its
percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1 992 and 2003.
North Dakota State University-Main Campus ranked 141 in total science and engineering obligations in
1 992 and 136 in total science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced a 1 5 .9 1 percent gain in
its percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1 992 and 2003 .
7
The University of Idaho ranked 1 3 1 in total science and engineering obligations in 1 992 and 130 in total
science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced an 1 1 .04 percent gain in its percentage of the
total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1 992 and 2003.
8
The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ranked 24 in total science and engineering obligations in
1992 and 26 in total science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced a 14.05 percent loss in its
fercentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1 992 and 2003.
Johns Hopkins University ranked 1 in total science and engineering obligations in 1 992 and 1 in total
science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced a 1 7.44 percent loss in its percentage of the
total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1 992 and 2003.
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set for determining whether little change or significant change in rank order had occurred,
while the change in percentage is 17.39 percent to the negative, well outside the 10
percentage point boundary set to mark significant change in percentage. 1 0 These three
cases are interesting because the institutions involved (the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Rochester) are all
ranked fairly high in the total science and engineering obligations rankings. Looking at
these 3 cases shows that, while the ranking by total science and engineering obligations
of these highly ranked institutions changes little between 1992 and 2003, they are losing
significant ground in their percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of
all institutions during the same period of time.
There are 2 cases within top 100 in which rank fell more than 5 places between
1992 and 2003 while percentage did not change more than 10 percentage points. Both of
these cases are close calls. Rutgers University experienced a 6 place decrease in rank
between 1992 and 2003 moving from 52 in rank to 58. This is just at the edge of the 5
place boundary set for determining whether little change or significant change in rank
order had occurred. During this same period of time Rutgers experienced a 6. 79 percent
loss in its percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions.
This percent loss is towards the midpoint of the 10 percentage point boundary set to mark
significant change in percentage. The University of Iowa experienced a 7 place decrease
in rank between 1992 and 2003 moving from 34 to 41. During this same period Iowa
experienced an 8.4 7 percent loss in its percentage of the total science and engineering
10

The University of Rochester ranked 25 in total science and engineering obligations in 1 992 and 30 in
total science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced a 17 .39 percent loss in its percentage of
the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1 992 and 2003.
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obligations ofall institutions. This percent loss is towards the top ofthe 10 percentage
point boundary set to mark significant change in percentage.
Looking only at the top 50 recipients ofearmarks, in 3 cases rank did not change
more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage went up more than 10
percentage points. 1 1 In 1 case rank did not change more than 5 places between 1992 and
2003 but percentage went down more than 10 percentage points. 1 2 In 2 cases rank went
down more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage change stayed within 10
percentage points. 1 3 These 6 cases are the only cases within the top 50 in which
significant change occurs to one factor (ranking or percentage) while the other factor
remains rather constant within the zone in which marginal but not significant change can
be observed.
Looking only at the top 20 recipients ofearmarks, in 2 cases rank did not change
more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage went up more than 10
percentage points. 14 There are no other cases in the top 20 in which significant change
occurs to one factor (ranking or percentage) while the other factor remains rather constant
within the zone in which marginal but not significant change can be observed.
In addition to this basic analysis oftables 4 and 5, a bivariate correlation has been
run between the total earmark ranking for each ofthe institutions for the entire period
11

These cases are the University of Alaska Fairbanks and North Dakota State-Main Campus cases which
have been discussed earlier and Loma Linda University. Loma Linda University ranked 147 in total
science and engineering obligations in 1 992 and 146 in total science and engineering obligations in 2003 .
Loma Linda University experienced a 20.54 percent gain in its percentage of the total science and
engineering obligations of all institutions between 1 992 and 2003 .
12
The case referred to here is the case of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign which has been
discussed earlier.
1 3 The cases referred to here are the cases of Rutgers University and the University of Iowa which have
been discussed earlier.
14
The cases referred to here are the cases of Loma Linda University and the University of Alaska Fairbanks
which have been discussed earlier.

133

(listed in column A of table 4) and the rank in total science and engineering obligations
for each of the institutions in 1992 at the beginning of the study period (listed in column
C of table 4). A bivariate correlation has also been run between the total earmark ranking
for each of the institutions for the entire period (listed in column A of table 4) and the
institutions rank in total science and engineering obligations in 2003 at the end of the
study period (listed in column E of table 4). These correlations are reported in table 6
and have been run for the entire set of institutions, for the set of institutions ranked 1 to
20 in total earmark ranking for the entire period (the column A figure), for the set of
institutions ranked 1 to 50 in total earmark ranking for the entire period (the column A
figure), for the set of institutions ranked 1 to 100 in total earmark ranking for the entire
period (the column A figure), and for the set of institutions ranked 101 to last in total
earmark ranking for the entire period (the column A figure).
The first column of table 6, which reports the correlation between total earmark
ranking for the entire period (column A in table 4) and total science and engineering
obligations ranking in 1992 (column C), can be viewed as a baseline figure to which the
second column of table 6, which reports the correlation between total earmark ranking for
the entire period (column A in table 4) and total science and engineering obligations
ranking in 2003 (column E), can be compared. If receiving earmarks during the period
has helped institutions receive other forms of federal research funding and thereby
improve their rank in total science and engineering obligations at the end of the period
over their ranking at the beginning, it would be expected that the effect or slope numbers
in the second column of table 6 would be positive and higher than the effect or slope
numbers in the first column of table 6 especially for the higher ranked groups considered.
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The slope or effect numbers tell us that for every one move up in earmark rank there is a
corresponding move in obligation rank ofthe slope or effect number. Doing well by the
measure ofearmark ranking during the period should drive the obligation ranking up
more at the end ofthe period than it does at the beginning ofthe period ifreceiving
earmarks actually improves the ability ofan institution to receive other types offederal
research funding. The R-square values in parentheses are measures ofthe strength ofthe
correlations reported in each ofthe columns. The higher the R-square values the stronger
the correlation and the more ofthe effect explained by earmark rank.
Looking at the correlations reported in table 6, the effect or slope figures when all
institutions are considered are very close to the same amount when the figure for the
1992 and 2003 correlation are compared. The R-square value when all institutions are
considered is also rather large indicating that a good portion ofthe effect is explained by
earmark rank. This would seem to indicate that when all institutions are considered the
relationship between total earmark ranking and obligations ranking is rather consistent
whether the beginning ofthe study period or the end ofthe study period is considered.
This supports the fundamental analysis oftable 4 which showed that relatively few ofthe
327 institutions in the study experienced significant changes in obligation rank when their
1992 obligation rank was compared to their 2003 obligation rank.
Looking at the correlations for the top 20 institutions in total earmark rank for the
entire period reported in table 6, the effect or slope figure for the 2003 correlation is
negative and somewhat lower than the baseline effect or slope figure from the 1992
correlation. The R-square values for these correlations, however, are very low indicating
that the correlations are weak and little ofthe effect is explained by earmark rank. Little
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can be surmised from comparing these correlations, but the indication would be that there
is little evidence that doing well in receiving earmarks during the study period will drive
up an institution's obligation rank at the end of the period. In fact the evidence would
suggest there would be little change in obligation ranking, and, if there was change, it
might be negative. This too would support the earlier analysis of how the top 20
institutions changed in obligation rank when their rank at beginning of the period was
compared to their rank at the end of the period. Few institutions experienced much
positive change in rank. Most stayed close to the same in rank or lost rank.
When the correlations are done for the top 50 institutions in total earmark rank for
the entire period, the slope or effect figure again remains fairly consistent when the 1992
correlation is compared to the 2003 correlation. Both slope or effect figures, however,
are negative. The R-square values are a little higher for these two correlations than they
were when the top 20 were considered, but they are still low. These correlations, like
those for the top 20, thus should be taken less seriously because they are weak and
earmark rank explains little of the effect. However, they would seem to indicate that, if
there is an effect to be gained from doing well at earmarking over the period, it is
certainly not a positive effect. This too tends to support the preliminary analysis of how
the top 50 institutions changed in obligation rank when their rank at beginning of the
period was compared to their rank at the end of the period. Very few institutions went up
in rank significantly. Most institutions stayed close to the same in rank or went down.
When the correlations are done for the top 100 institutions in total earmark rank
for the entire period, the slope or effect figure again remains fairly consistent when the
1992 correlation is compared to the 2003 correlation. The slope or effect figures here are
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positive, and the 2003 figure is a little over a tenth ofa rank lower than the 1992 figure.
The R-square values are lower than they were for the top 50 correlations but not quite as
low as they were for the top 20 correlations. They are still low enough that we should
view these correlations with suspicion because they are weak and earmark rank explains
little ofthe effect. Again, however, ifthere is any effect to be gained from doing well at
earmarking over the period, the effect is less at the end ofthe period than the baseline
figure derived from running the correlation ofearmark rank on the beginning ofthe
period obligation rank. This too supports the earlier analysis ofhow the top 100
institutions changed in obligation rank when their rank at beginning ofthe period was
compared to their rank at the end ofthe period. Again, very few institutions went up in
rank significantly. Most institutions stayed close to the same in rank or went down.
The two correlations run for those institutions ranked 101 to last in total earmark
rank for the entire period are quite interesting. The slope or effect numbers ofthe 1992
correlation and the 2003 correlation are quite similar within .05 ofeach other. The 2003
number is the lower ofthe two numbers. These slope or effect numbers are the largest of
any ofthe slope or effect numbers for any ofthe correlations. The R-square numbers
also return to significance indicating that the correlations at the bottom ofthe table are
relatively strong and earmark rank explains a good portion ofthe effect. This shows that
there is a lot of consistency and stability at the bottom ofthe table and that it is the
bottom ofthe table which is stabilizing the correlations when all institutions are
considered. This makes sense as there are quite a few institutions which are tied for last
in ranking at the bottom ofthe table.
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One other bivariate correlation is reported in the third column of table 6. This
correlation is the correlation between total earmark ranking for each of the institutions for
the entire period (listed in column A of table 4) and the institutions change in rank in total
science and engineering obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 (listed in column J of
table 4). If receiving earmarks during the period has helped institutions receive other
forms of federal research funding and thereby improve their rank in total science and
engineering obligations at the end of the period over their ranking at the beginning, it
would be expected that the effect or slope numbers in the third column of table 6 would
be positive especially when the higher ranked groups are considered and that the value of
the effect or slope number would be higher for the higher ranked groups considered. The
slope or effect numbers in this case tell us that for every one move up in earmark rank
there is a corresponding jump or slide of the slope or effect number in rank when 1992
obligation rank is compared to 2003 obligation rank. If doing well by the measure of
earmark ranking during the period drives obligation rankings up, the higher ranked
groups considered should experience the largest positive changes in ranking and in
general with each move up in earmark ranking there should be a positive change in
ranking. As with the other correlations reported in table 6, the R-square values in
parentheses in the third column are measures of the strength of the correlations reported
in the third column. The higher the R-square values the stronger the correlation and the
more of the effect explained by earmark rank.
The slope or effect numbers in the third column are all positive and the higher
ranked groups have the higher number except for the top 50 group which actually has the
lowest number of all of the correlations run. The R-square totals for all of the
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correlations are very low, however, indicating these correlations are rather weak and
earmark rank explains little of the effect. These correlations give some indication that
there is a general positive effect of earmarking on change in rank, but it is very small and
not statistically significant.
Table 7 reports the same correlations for the same groups of ranked institutions as
table 6 does using only science and engineering earmarks. Table 6 corresponds to table 4
in the same way table 7 corresponds to table 5. The data for the correlations reported in
table 6 come from table 4. The data for the correlations reported in table 7 come from
table 5. 1 5 The numbers reported in table 7 are very similar to the numbers reported in
table 6, again showing that segregating science and engineering earmarks from non
science and engineering earmarks changes earmark ranking very little. The conclusions
reached in the analysis of table 6 also apply to table 7.
Both an analysis of tables 4 and 5 and of the correlations reported in tables 6 and
7 indicate that receiving earmarks does not have a general effect of improving an
institution's ability to receive other types of funding. An analysis of the tables shows that
most of the institutions which gamer the most earmarks do not improve their total science
and engineering obligations ranking. They either remain very close to their ranking at the
beginning of the period or move backwards in the rankings. The institutions which
gamer the most earmarks for the most part do not gain a larger percentage of total science
and engineering obligations either. They generally lose percentage points when the end
15 The only difference between table 4 and table 5 is that table 4 reports earmark ranking for each

institution in the study for the entire study period in column A using all earmarks in its calculations while
table 5 reports earmark ranking for each institution in the study for the entire study period in its column A
using only science and engineering earmarks in its calculations. All other columns in tables 4 and 5 report
the same totals.
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of the period is compared to the beginning or maintain a percentage very close to their
percentage at the beginning of the period.
The comparison of the correlations run between ranking by total earmarks
received for the period and science and engineering obligations rank at the beginning of
the period and between ranking by total earmarks received for the period and science and
engineering obligations rank at the end of the period lends support to the trends observed
in the analysis of the tables. Analysis of the correlation between ranking by total
earmarks received for the period and change in science and engineering obligations rank
shows that there is a general positive effect of earmarking on change in rank, but it is
very small and not statistically significant.

BASIC RESEARCH QUESTION 2: HOW DOES THE AWARDING OF
EARMARKS AFFECT THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL
RESEARCH FUNDING?
Since the 1960's, there has been some concern that a large and disproportionate
share of federal research funding awarded in peer review competitions goes to a very few
elite institutions located in the northeast Atlantic and west coast regions of the United
States. Earmarking has been extolled as a means of combating the perceived
disproportionate geographical concentration of funding that results from the peer review
process. Many Congressional and other leaders have felt it important to distribute federal
research funding widely throughout the country because often where federal research
money goes, economic development follows. (Greenberg 1966)
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This study looks at the geographical question by dividing the amount of federal
research money a state receives by the number of doctoral granting and specially focused
medical institutions a state has. It is my belief that the introduction of this control will
render a truer picture of the geographical distribution of federal research funds than a
picture based solely on the raw figures. To assess how the awarding of earmarks affects
the geographical distribution of federal research funding, four color coded maps have
been constructed. For each map the various 50 states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico have been colored a different shade of blue depending upon which quintile
the state, District, or territory ranked within for the total study period. 1 6 Figure 8 presents
the results by quintile of how the various states ranked in total science and engineering
obligations per institution during the study period. Figure 9 presents the results by
quintile of how the various states ranked in total peer reviewed funding per institution
during the study period. Figure 10 presents the results by quintile of how the various
states ranked in total earmarks received per institution during the study period. Figure 11
presents the results by quintile of how the various states ranked in science and
engineering earmarks received per institution during the study period.
A careful look at the map in figure 8 shows that the geographical distribution of
total science and engineering obligations from 1992 to 2003 fits the expected pattern
(more funds flowing to the west coast and northeast) somewhat but that there are some
16

Totals for each funding type are aggregated for the entire study period because there are significant year
to year fluctuations in funding which are related only to the idiosyncratic history of the particular funding
cycle a particular year represents. Each year is only a snapshot of one year of funding and a large earmark
or grant within that one year of funding, which may not be repeated in previous or future years, can cause
the states to move around in rank for just that year. This is particularly true for the earmark maps because
there is less funding involved and less stability from year to year in funding. Aggregating all years over the
entire length of the study has the effect of smoothing out year to year fluctuations so that a true trend in the
distribution of funding over a period of time for each of the various types of funding can be discerned.
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notable differences. Washington and California on the west coast are both in the highest
quintile ranking first and ninth respectively. Maryland, Massachusetts, and Connecticut
in the northeast Atlantic, ranking second, fifth, and eighth respectively, are also colored
with the darkest blue representing the highest quintile. Taking the fourth quintile into
account, the northeastern states of Pennsylvania, Vermont, and New York are also
colored with the next darkest shade of blue which represents the fourth quintile of
states. 1 7 There is plenty of blue on both the west coast and in the northeast Atlantic.
However, there are a number of interlopers. Sticking out sharply in the western
interior part of the map in the darkest blue of the highest quintile are New Mexico and
Colorado ranked 10 and 6 respectively. In the midwest, Wisconsin, ranked 4, is colored
with the darkest blue. North Carolina, certainly an eastern state but generally considered
part of the south, is also colored with the darkest blue of the highest quintile. 1 8 Perhaps
most surprising is the darkest shade of blue Hawaii bears as the third ranked state in the
highest quintile.
Moving into the fourth quintile, Indiana, Iowa and Michigan join their
midwestern brethren; Utah joins New Mexico and Colorado in the western interior;
Alabama and Georgia bring some color to the southeastern part of the map; and Alaska
joins Hawaii as one of the more surprising states included in the top two quintiles. 1 9
Oregon, Rhode Island, and New Jersey, in the third quintile; New Hampshire and the
District of Columbia, in the second quintile; and Maine and Delaware, in the lowest
17

These states are ranked 12, 1 6, and 19 respectively in the total science and engineering obligations
rankings reported in figure 8.
18
North Carolina ranks 6 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8.
19
Indiana is ranked 1 8, Iowa is ranked 12, Michigan is ranked 1 1 , Utah is ranked 14, Alabama is ranked
15, Georgia is ranked 1 8, and Alaska is ranked 17 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings
reported in figure 8.
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quintile, do not share the colorful character oftheir west coast and northeastern
neighbors. 20
The picture presented by figure 9, which depicts the distribution ofpeer reviewed
funding, is very similar to the picture presented by figure 8. Perhaps the starkest visual
difference between figure 9 and figure 8 is that Mississippi slides from a ranking of 40 in
figure 8's rankings to 45 in figure 9's rankings and thus slides from the second quintile in
figure 8 to the lowest quintile in figure 9. Mississippi's slide consolidates most ofthe
white that signifies the lowest quintile into a block ofconnected states located in the
northwestern and southwestern interior ofthe map. Only Kansas, in the second quintile
in both figures, and Nebraska, in the third quintile in both figures, breaks off the
northwestern block ofstates from the white states ofOklahoma, Arkansas, and
Mississippi in the southwestern interior portion ofthe map. 2 1 Mississippi's color change
makes the lighter colors in figure 9 seem consolidated in the interior ofthe country. Only
West Virginia, Delaware, and Puerto Rico's white in figure 9 are somewhat separated
from this concentration ofa lack ofcolor in the middle portion ofthe map. 22

20

Oregon is ranked 29, Rhode Island is ranked 24, New Jersey is ranked 26, New Hampshire is ranked 37,
the District of Columbia is ranked 33, Maine is ranked 43, and Delaware is ranked 45 in the total science
and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8.
21
Kansas is ranked 32 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 33
in the total peer-reviewed funding rankings reported in figure 9. Nebraska is ranked 27 in the total science
and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 29 in the total peer-reviewed funding
rankings reported in figure 9. Arkansas is ranked 46 in the total science and engineering obligations
rankings reported in figure 8 and 43 in the total peer-reviewed funding rankings reported in figure 9.
Mississippi is ranked 40 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and
45 in the total peer-reviewed funding rankings reported in figure 9. Oklahoma is ranked 44 in the total
science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 42 in the total peer-reviewed rankings
reported in figure 9.
22
West Virginia is ranked 47 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. Delaware is ranked
4 1 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. Puerto Rico is ranked 52 in the total peer
reviewed rankings reported in figure 9.
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There are some other minor changes between figure 8 and figure 9. Pennsylvania
and New Mexico swap quintiles in figure 9 with Pennsylvania donning the darker blue of
the highest quintile in figure 9 and New Mexico lightening its color to the slightly lighter
blue of the fourth quintile in figure 9.23 Texas moves into the fourth quintile in figure 9
while Alaska slides to the third. 24 Maine gains color by moving into the second quintile
in figure 9 while Mississippi loses what little color it has by sliding to the lowest
quintile. 25
The effect of earmarks in bolstering a state's ranking in total obligations is really
seen when figure 9 is compared to figure 8. Hawaii falls 6 places from 3 in figure 8 to 9
in figure 9. Alaska has a similar fall from 17 in figure 8 to 24 in figure 9. Mississippi
falls 5 places from 40 in figure 8 to 45 in figure 9. Hawaii's fall does not change its color
in the two figures as it remains in the highest quintile in both figures. Alaska's and
Mississippi's falls, however, causes them to move to the next lower quintile in figure 9
and thus display a lighter color than they did in figure 8.
The picture presented by figure 10 in general is much different than the pictures
presented by figures 8 and 9. There are a few institutions which occupy positions in the
top quintiles of all 3 figures and thus display darker coloration on all 3 maps. Hawaii and

23

Pennsylvania is ranked 1 1 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8
and 1 0 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. New Mexico is ranked 1 0 in the total
science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 12 in the total peer-reviewed rankings
reported in figure 9.
24
Texas is ranked 21 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 20 in
the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. Alaska is ranked 1 7 in the total science and
engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 24 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in
figure 9.
25
Maine is ranked 43 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 40
in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. Mississippi is ranked 40 in the total science and
engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 45 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in
figure 9.
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Washington both rank in the highest quintiles ofall 3 figures and thus display the darkest
blue coloration on all 3 maps. 26 New Mexico ranks in the highest quintile offigures 8
and 10 and in the fourth quintile in figure 9.27 Iowa ranks in the fourth quintile offigures
8, 9, and 10. 28 Alabama ranks in the fourth quintiles offigures 8 and 9 and in the highest
quintile offigure 10.29 Pennsylvania ranks in the fourth quintiles offigures 8 and 10 and
in the highest quintile offigure 9. 30 These states have institutions which are doing well at
securing both earmarked and peer-reviewed funding.
There are a number ofstates, however, which rank in the lower quintiles of
figures 8 and 9 but show the darker colors ofthe higher quintiles on the map presented in
figure 10. West Virginia, Montana, and North Dakota all show the white ofthe lowest
quintile on the maps presented in figures 8 and 9 and the darkest blue ofthe highest
quintile on figure l O's map. 3 1 Mississippi ranks in the second quintile offigure 8, the

26

Hawaii is ranked 3 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 9
in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 1 in the total earmark rankings reported
in figure 10. Washington is ranked 1 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in
figure 8, ranked 1 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 7 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 10.
27
New Mexico is ranked 10 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8,
ranked 12 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 5 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 1 0.
28
Iowa is ranked 12 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked
1 3 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 1 2 in the total earmark rankings
reported in figure 10.
29
Alabama is ranked 1 5 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8,
ranked 1 6 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 3 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 1 0.
30
Pennsylvania is ranked 1 1 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8,
ranked 10 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 16 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 10.
31
West Virginia is ranked 4 1 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8,
ranked 47 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 4 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 1 0. Montana is ranked 42 in the total science and engineering obligations
rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 44 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked
1 0 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. North Dakota is ranked 47 in the total science and
engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 49 in the total peer-reviewed rankings
reported in figure 9, and ranked 9 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10.
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lowest quintile of figure 9, and shows the darkest blue of the highest quintile of figure
10. 32 Nevada shows the white of the lowest quintile on the maps presented in figures 8
and 9 but ranks in fourth quintile of figure 10's rankings. 33 Maine gradually gains more
color as it moves from the lowest quintile in figure 8, to the second quintile in figure 9,
and the fourth quintile in figure 10. 34 Idaho is white in figures 8 and 9 but ranks in the
third quintile in figure 10. 35 New Hampshire ranks in the second quintile of figures 8 and
9 and in the highest quintile of figure 10. 36 South Carolina, Louisiana, the District of
Columbia, and Florida all rank in the second quintile of figures 8 and 9 and in the fourth
quintile of figure 10. 37
On the other end of things, several institutions which show the darker colors on
the maps of figures 8 and 9 are noticeably lighter on figure l O's map. California and
Colorado are both colored in the darkest blue of the highest quintile on figures S's and 9's
32

Mississippi is ranked 40 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8,
ranked 45 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 6 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 10.
33
Nevada is ranked 48 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked
48 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 14 in the total earmark rankings
reported in figure 10.
34
Maine is ranked 43 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked
40 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 20 in the total earmark rankings
reported in figure 10.
35
Idaho is ranked 50 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in fi gure 8, ranked
50 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 22 in the total earmark rankings
reported in figure 10.
36
New Hampshire· is ranked 37 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure
8, ranked 39 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 8 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 10.
3 7 South Carolina is ranked 34 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in fi
gure 8,
ranked 37 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 1 1 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 10. Louisiana is ranked 35 in the total science and engineering obligations
rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 36 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked
13 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure I 0. The District of Columbia is ranked 33 in the total
science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 35 in the total peer-reviewed
rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 16 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. Florida is
ranked 39 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 38 in the
total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 1 8 in the total earmark rankings reported in
figure 10.
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maps but appear in the white of the lowest quintile on figure l O's map. 38 Connecticut,
North Carolina, and Massachusetts are all the darkest of blue of the highest quintile in
figures 8 and 9 but appear in the lightest shade of blue of the second quintile in fi gure
10. 39 New York shows up in the fourth quintile on figures 8 and 9's maps but appears in
the white of the lowest quintile on figure l O 's map.40 Maryland and Wisconsin appear in
the darkest blue of the highest quintile on figure 8 and 9's maps but appear in figure l O's
third quintile.4 1
The picture presented by figure 11 depicting the distribution of science and
engineering earmarks is very close to the picture presented by figure 10 of the
distribution of all earmarks. In fact, only 6 states in figure 11 are in different quintiles
than they appear in figure 10. Maryland and Wisconsin shift two places in rank each and
appear in the second quintile in figure 11 rather than the third quintile in which they
appear in figure 10.42 Rhode Island and Oklahoma both move up two places in rank and
38

California is ranked 9 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8,
ranked 8 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in fi gure 9, and ranked 42 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 1 0. Colorado is ranked 6 in the total science and engineering obligations
rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 5 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked
44 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10.
39
Connecticut is ranked 8 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8,
ranked 7 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 38 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 1 0. North Carolina is ranked 7 in the total science and engineering obligations
rankings reported in fi gure 8, ranked 6 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked
40 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 1 0. Massachusetts is ranked 5 in the total science and
engineering obligations rankings reported in fi gure 8, ranked 4 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported
in figure 9, and ranked 36 in the total earmark rankings reported in fi gure 1 0.
40
New York is ranked 1 9 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8,
ranked 17 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in fi gure 9, and ranked 46 in the total earmark
rankings reported in figure 1 0.
41
Maryland is ranked 2 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8,
ranked 2 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 29 in the total earmark
rankings reported in fi gure 10. Wisconsin is ranked 4 in the total science and engineering obligations
rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 3 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked
30 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10.
42
Maryland shifts from 29 in the rankings reported in fi gure 10 to 31 in the rankings reported in figure 1 1 .
Wisconsin shifts from 30 in the rankings reported in fi gure 10 to 32 in the rankings reported in figure 1 1 .
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appear in the third quintile of figure 1 1 rather than the second quintile in which they
appear in figure 10.43 Montana shifts a place in rank from 10 in figure 10 to 11 in figure
11 and drops from the highest quintile in figure 10 to the slightly lighter blue of the
fourth quintile in figure 11. South Carolina benefits from Montana's drop moving up
from a ranking of 11 in the rankings reported in figure 10 to 10 in the rankings reported
in figure 11 and taking on the darkest shade of blue of the highest quintile in figure 11
rather than the slightly lighter shade of blue of the fourth quintile it displays in figure 10.
There are 14 other states which shift one place in rank, 8 other states which shift two
places in rank, 2 states which shift three places in rank, and 2 states which shift four
places in rank without moving to a different quintile.
The exercise of segregating non-science and engineering earmarks from science
and engineering earmarks changes little about the picture of the geographic distribution
of earmarked funding the maps in figures 9 and 10 present. As noted earlier, only one
map was prepared to display the geographic distribution of peer reviewed funding (the
map in figure 9) because using all earmarks and just science and engineering earmarks in
calculating peer reviewed ranking produced no differences in rank.
In general, it appears that earmarked funding is, for the most part with a few
exceptions, distributed to a different set of states than peer reviewed funding. As such,
earmarked funding has a redistributive effect on the distribution of federal research
funding allowing the institutions in states which do not fare as well in securing peer
reviewed funding to receive some funds which would not otherwise come their way.
43

Rhode Island moves up from 32 in the rankings reported in figure 10 to 30 in the rankings reported in
figure 1 1 . Oklahoma moves up from 3 1 in the rankings reported in fi gure 1 0 to 29 in the rankings reported
in figure 1 1 .
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However, the amount ofearmarked funding distributed is so low in comparison to the
amount ofpeer reviewed funding distributed that states which rank high in the receipt of
earmarked funding do not generally see much ofa jump in their total science and
engineering obligations ranking. Earmarking seems to operate at the margins. It sends
money to places it would not ordinarily go but has little effect in the general overall
geographic distribution offederal research funds.

BASIC RESEARCH QUESTION 3: ARE EARMARKS ADDITIVE OR DO
THEY COME AT THE EXPENSE OF PEER REVIEWED FUNDING?
For many within the higher education community, earmarks would not be
objectionable at all ifthey were an additive feature to federal research funding - serving
the same role as a cherry on top ofa chocolate sundae. There have been fears, however,
within the higher education community as earmarks have escalated that, at some point,
earmarks would eat into money which could otherwise be used for peer reviewed grants.
It is very difficult to tell when an earmark might be additive and when it might come at
the expense ofpeer reviewed funding because the appropriations process is not
completely transparent. After an appropriation has occurred, whether it be for earmarked
or peer reviewed funding, one is left with the challenge oftrying to "prove the
counterfactual" that absent a specific earmark more would have been appropriated for
peer review programs.
A careful look at table 8 shows that, while total earmarks have progressively gone
up between 1992 and 2003, total science and engineering obligations have generally risen
at a similar pace. There has been some fluctuation in the percentage total earmarks have
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comprised of total science engineering funding between 1992 and 2003, but total
earmarks have never comprised more than 7.55 percent of total science and engineering
obligations and have comprised as little as 2.06 percent. In the middle of the study period
examined by this study, total science and engineering obligations were actually growing
faster than total earmarks and the percentage total earmarks comprised of total science
and engineering obligations was dropping. Since a low in 1996 of 2.06 percent, the
percentage of total science and engineering obligations total earmarks comprise has
progressively risen each year to the high for the study period of 7.55 percent in 2003.
Earmarks thus have been growing at a more rapid pace than science and engineering
obligations towards the end of the study period but still comprise a relatively small
percentage of total science and engineering obligations. This analysis would seem to
indicate that, at least on the global level, earmarks are not eating significantly into peer
reviewed funding and are an additive feature of the federal research funding landscape.
The case could be different within specific programs. The Fund for the
Improvement of Postsecondary Education, a program of the Department of Education,
saw the number of earmarks in its budget appropriation increase from 2 in 1998 to 419 in
2005 and saw its budget increase in the same period from $25,200,000 to $163,600,000.
Prior to fiscal year 1998, FIPSE had been a very competitive peer reviewed grant
program which awarded grants for excellent innovation in higher education. FIPSE
grants were considered to be quite prestigious and were highly sought. (Field 2005a)
In fiscal year 1999, FIPSE's budget was doubled from $25.2 million to $50
million but $27.6 million of the increase was for earmarks. FIPSE ended up canceling its
grant competition in fiscal year 1999, despite the fact over 1 700 applications for grants
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had been reviewed, because the funds thought available for the competition were found to
have been earmarked in report language accompanying FIPSE's 1999 appropriation.
(Cordes 1998c, Healy 1999)
The cancellation ofthe grants competition prompted a standoff between staff at
the Department ofEducation and members ofCongress. Secretary ofEducation Richard
Riley and Senator Arlen Specter ofPennsylvania met in late 1999 to discuss the FIPSE
funding situation. They agreed that, for the next year's grants competition, Congress
would set the categories for grants, but FIPSE staff would determine the process to select
grant recipients. (Brainard 1999a)
The FIPSE staff thought some ofthe categories Congress chose in implementing
this compromise were not on the cutting edge ofinnovation and were designed to help
institutions in a member's district or state win funds in the competition. Examples of
categories not thought to be on the cutting edge included the conversion oflibrary
catalogues to electronic formats and the preparation ofstudents for jobs in the tourism
industry. Before Congress began to assert control over where FIPSE money went,
institutions winning competitive FIPSE grants continued supporting 78 percent ofthe
projects funded by FIPSE grants once the grant ended, 94 percent ofFIPSE funded
projects had been copied in whole or in part, and grant recipients often won other private
grants and awards for their FIPSE funded projects. (Brainard 1999a)
In implementing the grants competition part ofthe Specter/Riley compromise,
FIPSE staff awarded grants to only 1 ofthe 11 institutions Congress had specified as
favored institutions in appropriation's language and ignored 3 ofthe categories Congress
had created for the grants competition. This led to an end ofthe compromise. Congress
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stopped naming categories, and FIPSE reverted to a competition in which proposals
could be submitted on any subject. Specter and other members ofCongress maintained
that they had encroached onto FIPSE staff turfand become directive about where FIPSE
money should go because worthy institutions were being passed over in the grants
competition and were contacting their members ofCongress for help. There were only
657 applications in the 1 999 competition for 2000 funding as compared to 1,744 the
previous year. (Brainard 1999c)
In the fiscal year 2000 funding cycle, the FIPSE appropriation went up to $77
million. $46.5 million ofthe appropriation was designated for earmarks and $30.6
million was designated for the grants competition. Concern was expressed by FIPSE
staff and concerned members ofthe higher education community that the earmarks in the
FIPSE appropriation were diminishing the prestige ofwinning a FIPSE grant. Many of
the earmarks in the FIPSE appropriation were for public policy institutes and centers
named after former Senators and Representatives. (Brainard 1999f)
In the fiscal year 2001 funding cycle, $115.5 million was earmarked for projects
at 137 institutions and the competitive grants program was funded at $31.2 million.
These totals were increases over the $46.5 million earmarked for projects at 51
institutions and the $30.6 million for the competitive grants program allocated in the
fiscal year 2000 appropriation. (Brainard 2001a)
By fiscal year 2005, the Department ofEducation had cancelled the FIPSE grants
competition because earmarking was taking up most ofthe FIPSE appropriation.
FIPSE's appropriation in 2005 was $163.6 million. 4 19 earmarks totaling $146.2 million
were in the fiscal year 2005 appropriation bill. Grants continued from previous fiscal
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years took up the remaining 2005 money which was appropriated. Earmarks in the
FIPSE appropriation grew from 2 in 1998 to 419 in 2005 with 16 being made in 1999, 51
in 2000, 136 in 2001, 272 in 2002, 306 in 2003, and 328 in 2004. Earmarks comprised
89 percent of FIPSE's overall budget in 2005. (Field 2005a) Mimi Tangum of the
American Association of State Colleges and Universities commented in 2005 that the
elimination of the entire FIPSE competitive grants program was troubling but what she
found really troubling about the FIPSE situation was that some members of Congress
considered competitive peer review a less effective way to allocate federal money than
earmarking (Tangum 2005).
Looking at earmarking on the global level seems to indicate that earmarks operate
at the margins of federal research funding and have not detracted significantly from the
vast majority of funding which is awarded in peer reviewed competitions. The FIPSE
case, however, would seem to suggest that, on the individual program level at least in this
case, earmarking may very well have come at the expense of competitive peer review.
The case also suggests that once earmarking starts in a program area it may progress to
the point that it consumes a larger and larger degree of a program's resources. Further
case studies are required to demonstrate whether the trends noticed in the FIPSE case
apply in other individual program situations.

153

BASIC RESEARCH QUESTION 4 : IS THERE MUCH DIFFERENCE IN THE
INSTITUITONS WHICH GARNER THE MOST EARMARKED FUNDING AND
THOSE WHICH RECEIVE THE MOST PEER REVIEWED FUNDING?
Proponents of earmarking have extolled earmarking as a means by which
emerging institutions can access some federal funding to use to catch up to more
established institutions. Earmarking has also been hailed for sending federal research
money to institutions and places where little money would otherwise go and for funding
projects important to members of Congress and their constituents back home but not
necessarily important to the national scientific community which makes decisions about
peer review funding. (Brainard 2001c, Cook 1998, Feller 2004, Rose 1986, Savage
1999) Each of these arguments assumes that earmarking has a redistributive effect and
that the set of institutions which gamer the most earmarks is quite different from the set
of institutions which gamer the most peer reviewed funds.
However, two factors would seem to indicate that, even if leaders in earmarking
and leaders in peer reviewed funding start off as two fairly discrete groups of institutions,
these groups will not be stable and over time may merge with each other and become
more closely correlated. First, if earmarks are effective in boosting an emerging
institution's capabilities to compete for peer reviewed funding, eventually that institution
is going to start to gamer more peer reviewed funds and not require earmarks to catch up.
Secondly, there are indications in the literature, especially in the Chronicle ofHigher
Education's reporting on earmarking, that, as earmarking has become more established,
the policy debate within the higher education community about the efficacy of
earmarking has died down. The literature seems to indicate that virtually no institutions
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or higher education associations are actively campaigning against earmarking at present
and that most institutions are now actively pursuing and accepting earmarks.
These two factors would seem to indicate that during the early years of this study,
when the policy debate about earmarks was most heated and when earmarking was a
fairly new practice, the group of institutions which garnered the most earmarks would be
very different from the group of institutions which garnered the most peer reviewed
funding. This would have to be the case if earmarks served the redistributive function of
sending federal research money to institutions and places where it would not go if peer
review were solely relied upon. However, in the later years of the study, as the
institutions which benefited early on from earmarks increased their capabilities to receive
peer reviewed funding and the institutions which garnered the most peer reviewed
funding gave up their inhibitions about pursuing earmarks, the two groups of institutions
would grow more similar and earmarking's redistributive effect would be muted.
To assess whether this has been the pattern, each of the 327 institutions were
ranked by the total amount of earmarks and the total amount of peer reviewed funding
they received during each year of the study period. To calculate the amount of peer
reviewed funding an institution received during a given year, the amount of earmarked
funding the institution received that year was subtracted from that institution's total
science and engineering obligations figure for that year. These calculations were
performed using both all earmarks and only science and engineering earmarks.
A bivariate correlation of the two rankings was then done to calculate the effect of
earmark ranking on peer reviewed ranking for each year of the study. Since earmark
ranking and peer reviewed ranking were used in calculating these correlations,
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institutions which received no earmarks during the study period tied for last place.
Correlations using both all institutions and also dropping the institutions tied for last from
the model were calculated.
Figure 12 presents a line graph of the effect of earmark ranking on peer review
ranking using all earmarks for each year of the study. Figure 13 presents a line graph of
the effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using all earmarks but dropping the
institutions not receiving any earmarks from the model. Figure 14 presents a line graph
of the effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using only science and
engineering earmarks for each year of the study. Figure 15 presents a line graph of the
effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using only science and engineering
earmarks but dropping the institutions not receiving any earmarks from the model.
Table 9 uses all earmarks and presents the slope or effect of earmark ranking on
peer reviewed ranking and the R-square value, which is an assessment of how strong the
correlation is, for each study year for both the set of all institutions and the set of
institutions that excludes those institutions which received no earmarks. Table 10 uses
only science and engineering earmarks and presents the slope or effect of earmark
ranking on peer reviewed ranking and the R-square value for each study year for both the
set of all institutions and the set of institutions that excludes those institutions which
received no earmarks.
The correlations reported in tables 9 and 10 and depicted in figures 1 2, 1 3, 14, and
15 are one part of the picture of whether the set of institutions which does well at
earmarking does well at garnering peer reviewed funds also. The other two parts of the
picture which need to be taken into account are depicted in figures 2 and 7. Figure 2
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shows the number of institutions which have received earmarks in each year from 1990 to
2003. Figure 7 is a histogram which depicts the change in peer reviewed funding rank
between 1992 and 2003.
Figure 2 shows how many institutions are getting into the earmarking game.
Tables 9 and 10 and figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 show how earmark ranking and peer
reviewed ranking relate in each year of the study. If the group of institutions which does
the best at earmark ranking is becoming more similar with the group of institutions that is
doing the best in receiving peer reviewed funds in latter years of the study period, it
would follow that, as figure 2 shows an increase in the number of institutions getting into
the earmark game, the relationship between earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking
will at least remain stable if not increase in effect. The histogram in figure 7 would show
whether peer reviewed funding rankings are fairly stable or are moving around and
affecting the relationship. A relationship between earmark ranking and peer review
ranking that is at least stable would show that, as those institutions which do well at
garnering peer reviewed funding enter into the earmark game, the rewards they reap from
earmarking will be approximately commensurate with their peer reviewed ranking status.
Looking at figure 2, it is evident that the number of institutions receiving
earmarks on an annual basis has skyrocketed in the period from 1990 through 2003. The
number of institutions receiving earmarks has grown from 117 in 1990 to 716 in 2003.
The growth has been rather steady throughout the period with a slight dip in the middle of
the period and a crescendo towards the end of the period. It is clear there are more
institutions playing the earmark game at the end of this period than there were at the
beginning.
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The graphs in figures 12 and 13 and the correlations reported in table 9 show that
the slope or effect oftotal earmark ranking on peer reviewed funding ranking is
remarkably constant throughout the period from 1992 through 2003. The graph in figure
12 visually depicts this with an almost flat horizontal line drawn across the page. The
slope or effect values reported for each year in table 9 when all institutions are included
in the calculations range from a high of0.7 18 in 1993 to a low of0.676 in 1998. There is
a less than .05 difference between the high and low figures reported for the set of
correlations including all institutions. The R-square values when all institutions are
included are also rather high, all over .4 and approaching .5. This indicates that the
correlation in table 9 between total earmark ranking and peer-reviewed ranking is strong
and that a great deal ofthe effect is explained by total earmark rank.
There is more variation in slope or effect when the institutions receiving no
earmarks and tied with the last rank are excluded from the correlation calculations. The
graph in figure 13 shows an effect that jumps around some but still stays between 0.4 and
0.65. The slope or effect values reported for each year in table 9 when institutions not
receiving earmarks are excluded in the calculations range from a high of0.621 in 2003 to
a low of0.401 in 1993. The difference between the high and low figures reported in
table 9 for the set ofcorrelations excluding institutions receiving no earmarks is .22,
larger than the difference when all institutions are included but still a relatively small
difference.
The R-square values are lower for the set ofcorrelations excluding non-recipient
institutions than they are for the set ofcorrelations including all institutions. They too
jump around like the slope or effect values. For some years, they indicate rather weak
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correlations and for others moderately strong correlations. At their highest point of
0.3528 they approach significance. All ofthe R-square values for the set ofcorrelations
run excluding non-recipient institutions are lower than the lowest R-square value in the
set ofcorrelations run with all institutions. This indicates that the correlations for the
non-recipient group are weaker than the correlations reported for the group which
includes all institutions and that earmark ranking explains less ofthe effect when non
recipient institutions are eliminated from the calculations.
Even with the jumping around ofslope or effect values and R-square values in the
correlations reported excluding non-recipient institutions, both sets ofcorrelations, the set
which includes all institutions and the set excluding non-recipients ofearmarks, present a
rather stable ifnot static picture ofthe relationship between earmark ranking and peer
reviewed ranking. The histogram in figure 7 shows that rank change in peer reviewed
funding rank groups around 0. This gives strong indication that the peer reviewed
funding ranking part ofthe correlations run in table 9 is very stable and not moving
around very much. The combination ofknowing that one variable in the table 9
correlations is stable and that the relationship between both variables in the correlation is
itselfvery stable over time means that as earmarking activity increases with each passing
year, the rewards institutions reap from earmarking will be approximately commensurate
with their peer reviewed ranking status. Ifthe slope or effect values had grown over time
rather than remaining stable, the combination ofmore institutions receiving earmarks,
stability in peer reviewed ranking status, and an increasing effect would mean that as
earmarking activity increased with each passing year, the rewards institutions reaped
from earmarking would be amplified above their peer reviewed ranking status. The
159

stability of the slope or effect values in these correlations over time and the stability of
peer reviewed funding rankings shows that a rising tide of earmark activity over the last
part of the 1990's and first part of the 2000's is most likely preferentially lifting the boats
of those who do the best at receiving peer reviewed funding.
Table 10 reports the same correlations for the same groups as table 9 does using
only science and engineering earmarks. The numbers reported in table 10 are very
similar to the numbers reported in table 9, again showing that segregating science and
engineering earmarks from non-science and engineering earmarks changes earmark
ranking or peer-reviewed ranking very little. The similarity between the numbers is
underscored by the graphs presented in figures 14 and 15. These graphs visually depict
almost identically the same patterns displayed in figures 12 and 13 which graphed the
correlations reported in table 9. The conclusions reached in the analysis of table 9 thus
also apply to table 10.
This section has produced an important finding. The combination of rising
earmark activity, documented by the large increase in the number of institutions receiving
earmarks on an annual basis in recent years depicted in figure 2, a very stable if not static
relationship between earmark ranking and peer reviewed funding ranking from 1992 to
2003, as shown by the bivariate correlations run in tables 9 and 10, and a great deal of
stability in peer reviewed funding ranking, as depicted in the histogram of figure 7, mean
that the difference between the institutions doing the best at receiving earmarks and the
institutions doing the best at receiving peer reviewed funding is lessening. This finding
casts considerable doubt over whether academic earmarking in the future will serve a
redistributive function and ameliorate the perceived inequities of the peer reviewed
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funding system. As earmarking activity increases, the same usual suspects, the
institutions which gamer the most peer reviewed funding, are likely to benefit the most
from pursuing earmarks.
This finding runs somewhat contrary to the finding made earlier in this chapter
. that during the study period earmarking had served somewhat of a redistributive function
by sending funding to some states which would not otherwise receive much federal
research funding. It will be interesting see moving forward whether this form of
geographic redistribution continues to occur as the usual suspects play their advantaged
hand in the earmarking game.
This finding is also interesting when coupled with one of the findings of de
Figueiredo and Silverman in their 2002 study. De Figueiredo and Silverman, using fiscal
year 1997 to fiscal year 1999 data, found that the institutions which could benefit the
most from lobbying for earmarks actually underlobby. De Figueiredo and Silverman
used lobbying expense as their measure of lobbying activity and developed a model
which predicted the returns to lobbying. (de Figueiredo and Silverman 2002) As the
secret gets out that there are riches to be had from playing the earmarking game, one
wonders if those advantaged in the game will continue to underplay their hand. Some
would say the secret is already out. The data in figure 2 would seem to confirm this.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has analyzed the study's basic research questions by the methods
described in chapter 3 and presented findings. The first basic research question, Does
receiving earmarks improve the ability ofan institution to receive other types offederal
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research funding?, was analyzed by creating two tables which display the change in total

obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 and the change in the percentage of the total
obligations funding of all institutions in the study between 1992 and 2003. Bivariate
correlations of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 6), of total
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 6), of science and engineering
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 7), of science and engineering
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 7), of total earmark ranking for
the entire period with change in obligation rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 6), and of
science and engineering earmark ranking for the entire period with change in obligation
rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 7) were also run.
Both an analysis of tables 4 and 5 and of the correlations reported in tables 6 and
7 indicate that receiving earmarks does not have a general effect of improving an
institution's ability to receive other types of funding. An analysis of the tables shows that
most of the institutions which gamer the most earmarks do not improve their total science
and engineering obligations ranking. They either remain very close to their ranking at the
beginning of the period or move backwards in the rankings. The institutions which
gamer the most earmarks for the most part do not gain a larger percentage of total science
and engineering obligations either. They generally lose percentage points when the end
of the period is compared to the beginning or maintain a percentage very close to their
percentage at the beginning of the period.
The comparison of the correlations run between ranking by total earmarks
received for the period and science and engineering obligations rank at the beginning of
the period and between ranking by total earmarks received for the period and science and
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engineering obligations rank at the end ofthe period lends support to the trends observed
in the analysis ofthe tables. Analysis ofthe correlation between ranking by total
earmarks received for the period and change in science and engineering obligations rank
shows that there is a general positive effect ofearmarking on change in rank, but it is
very small and not statistically significant.
The second basic research question, How does the awarding of earmarks affect
the geographical distribution offederal research funding?, was analyzed by creating
color coded maps displaying how all ofthe states, the District ofColumbia, and Puerto
Rico rank by total obligations received during the study period per institution in the study
group, total peer reviewed funding received during the study period per institution in the
study group, total earmarks received during the study period per institution in the study
group, and total science and engineering earmarks received during the study period per
institution in the study group. Analyzing these maps showed that in general, it appears
that earmarked funding is, for the most part with a few exceptions, distributed to a
different set ofstates than peer reviewed funding. As such, earmarked funding has a
redistributive effect on the distribution offederal research funding allowing the
institutions in states which do not fare as well in securing peer reviewed funding to
receive some funds which would not otherwise come their way. However, the amount of
earmarked funding distributed is so low in comparison to the amount ofpeer reviewed
funding distributed that states which rank high in the receipt ofearmarked funding do not
generally see much ofa jump in their total science and engineering obligations ranking.
Earmarking seems to operate at the margins. It sends money to places it would not
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ordinarily go but has little effect in the general overall geographic distribution of federal
research funds.
The third basic research question, Are earmarks additive or do they come at the
expense ofpeer reviewedfunding?, was assessed by looking at a table presenting the

percentage total earmarks comprise of total science and engineering obligations for each
year from 1990 through 2003 and a short case study of earmarking activity in the Fund
for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education budget between 1998 and 2005.
Looking at earmarking on the global level seems to indicate that earmarks operate at the
margins of federal research funding and have not detracted significantly from the vast
majority of funding which is awarded in peer reviewed competitions. The FIPSE case,
however, would seem to suggest that, on the individual program level at least in this case,
earmarking may very well have come at the expense of competitive peer review. The
case also suggests that once earmarking starts in a program area it may progress to the
point that it consumes a larger and larger degree of a program's resources. Studying the
FIPSE case pointed out that further case studies are required to demonstrate whether the
trends noticed in the FIPSE case apply in other individual program situations.
The fourth basic research question, Is there much difference in the institutions
which garner the most earmarkedfunding and those which receive the most peer
reviewedfunding?, was analyzed by assessing the picture presented by a combination of

bivariate correlations of earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking for each year of the
study (table 9) and of science and engineering earmark ranking and peer reviewed
ranking for each year of the study (table 10) with observations from figure 2 about the
number of institutions pursuing earmarks each year and from figure 7 about the stability
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ofpeer reviewed funding ranking over time. This section produced the important finding
that the combination ofrising earmark activity, documented by the large increase in the
number ofinstitutions receiving earmarks on an annual basis in recent years depicted in
figure 2, a very stable ifnot static relationship between earmark ranking and peer
reviewed funding ranking from 1992 to 2003, as shown by the bivariate correlations run
in tables 9 and 10, and a great deal ofstability in peer reviewed funding ranking, as
depicted in the histogram offigure 7, mean that the difference between the institutions
doing the best at receiving earmarks and the institutions doing the best at receiving peer
reviewed funding is lessening. This finding casts considerable doubt over whether
academic earmarking in the future will serve a redistributive function and ameliorate the
perceived inequities ofthe peer reviewed funding system. As earmarking activity
increases, the same usual suspects, the institutions which gamer the most peer reviewed
funding, are likely to benefit the most from pursuing earmarks.
The next chapter will address the conclusions ofthis study and offer some
recommendations for further study.
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CHAPTER S
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

INTRODUCTION
This concluding chapter provides a study summary before offering some
concluding thoughts and recommendations for further study. The study's major findings
are summarized in the final section following the study summary and some implications
ofthese findings are discussed.
STUDY SUMMARY
Chapter 1 ofthis study introduced the study's topic and research questions. The
topic ofthis study is the emergence of academic earmarking and its effect on the
distribution offederal research funds. The study examines four principal questions about
the distribution offederal research funds. First among these questions is does receiving
earmarks improve the ability ofan institution to receive other types offederal research
funds. Second, how does the awarding ofearmarks affect the geographical distribution
offederal research funding? Third, are academic earmarks additive or do they come at
the expense ofpeer reviewed funding? Finally, the study looks at the important question
of whether there is much difference, particularly now that both academic earmarking and
peer review funding methods seem firmly established, in the institutions that secure the
most funding from academic earmarking and the institutions that secure the most funding
in peer reviewed competitions.
Chapter 1 also defined academic earmarking and discussed the appropriations
process in which earmarks are made. Academic earmarks are appropriations Congress
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makes directly to academic institutions in the appropriations bills for the various units of
the federal government or specifies in non-binding report language accompanying these
appropriations bills. They are creatures of the appropriations process and are generally
added to appropriations bills when those bills are "marked up" by appropriations
subcommittee chairmen in the markup phase of the appropriations process.
Finally, chapter 1 discussed the importance of studying academic earmarking and
the scholarly literature produced thus far which addresses academic earmarking. It is
important to study academic earmarking's effect on the distribution of federal research
funding because the federal government's investment in academic research has paid large
dividends for American society and has the potential to pay even larger dividends in the
future. The method by which federal research funds are allocated and how they are
distributed could dramatically affect potential breakthroughs in medicine and science
which could transform the future. The chapter discussed eight studies which have
addressed issues related to academic earmarking. This study builds upon these earlier
studies and attempts to elucidate the policy effects of academic earmarking by addressing
the study research questions.
Chapter 2 chronicled the rise of academic earmarking. It discussed the early years
of academic earmarking from 1983 to about 1990. In the early years of academic
earmarking, prominent institutions pioneered the practice but concerns about the efficacy
of academic earmarking and its effect on peer reviewed funding were heard in the
academic community. There were also concerns about whether Congress was creating
contingent liability for itself by starting to fund projects that would continue to need
funding in future years and about whether earmarks were being used for the purposes for
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which they were being awarded. At the end ofthis early era, the results from academic
earmarking were mixed with some accounts ofwaste and scandal balanced by some
notable success stories.
The trends in academic earmarking from 1990 to 2003 were also discussed. The
period from 1990 to 2003 saw academic earmarking really come into its own and grow to
$2.012 billion by the end ofthe period. There was a dip in the middle ofthe period
which for the most part corresponded with a change in the political party which
controlled a majority in both Houses ofCongress. However, there were two fiscal years,
prior to this change ofpower and the low point ofthe dip in fiscal year 1 996, in which
academic earmarking was going down somewhat seemingly in response to fiscal
pressures and the negative light being shined on it by Congressional hearings. After the
change ofpower in Congress, academic earmarking hit its low point in the dip in fiscal
year 1 996 and then rebounded steadily in fiscal years 1 997 and 1998 before reaching new
heights in fiscal year 1 999 and continuing to rise until the end ofthis period in 2003.
During this period oftime when earmarks grew so significantly, some major
programs which utilize peer reviewed competitions to award their funding also saw
significant increases in their budgets. The National Institutes ofHealth, which is the
largest federal source ofpeer-reviewed competitive grants to individual investigators for
research, saw its budget double between 1 998 and 2003. The National Science
Foundation, second only to the NIH in federal grant making, also saw increases in its
budget during this period.
The chapter also briefly discussed more recent trends in academic earmarking
since 2003. Academic earmarking in recent years has occurred within a tighter funding
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environment. This tighter funding environment has also affected the budgets of the
National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation which enjoyed increases in
the more flush funding times of the late 1990's and early part of the 2000's. Scandals
involving members of Congress and lobbyists have caused academic earmarks and all
earmarks to be viewed with more scrutiny. As this study was being completed, both
Houses of Congress were considering various regulations which would affect academic
earmarks such as limits on the number of earmarks a member of Congress can request
and disclosure of the name of the member sponsoring an earmark and some justification
for why an earmark should be granted.
The arguments proponents and opponents of academic earmarking have made
against and in support of academic earmarking were also examined in the chapter. There
are many motivations for members of the House and Senate to earmark but greatest
among these motivations is the motivation to further their reelection prospects by
noticeably bringing federal resources to their districts and states. Members of the House
and Senate also earmark to enact what they feel is good policy and sometimes use
earmarks to entice other members into voting for policies for which they might not
otherwise vote.
Those within academia have many motivations to seek earmarks. Their greatest
motivations, however, are economic as there are more scientists than ever before and less
money available per scientist. The lack of facilities money available has also motivated
academic leaders to seek earmarks for their institution's facilities needs.
Those for academic earmarks have insisted that they remedy geographical and
institutional inequities of the peer review process and send money where it would
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otherwise not go. They believe that Congress has powers ofreview at least as good as
committees ofacademic experts and is more accountable to citizens than the experts who
serve on peer review committees, that the geographic dispersal offederal research
funding is desirable, and that earmarks help meet national needs in targeted ways.
Those against the practice ofacademic earmarking believe in the superiority of
the scientific method and the peer review process. They believe that bypassing peer
review leads to erosion in the quality ofresearch, that earmarking takes away funds
which could otherwise be awarded in peer reviewed competitions, and that peer reviewed
competitions for grants promote the best science while earmarking lacks effective quality
control. While those against earmarking have often espoused competitive set aside
programs as the best means to combat any geographical or institutional inequities the
peer reviewed system may reinforce, set aside programs have never been funded at a high
enough level to affect distributional inequities.
Chapter 2 detailed efforts by the higher education associations to fight the practice
ofacademic earmarking. The AAU led the charge against academic earmarking early on
with NASULGC and ACE in prominent supporting roles. In the mid- 1980's, the AAU
passed a resolution calling for AAU member institutions to observe a moratorium on
seeking earmark funding. The moratorium leaked from the beginning but was dealt a
mortal blow when the University ofPennsylvania, which had been for the moratorium in
AAU deliberations, sought an earmark for facilities in 1988. From the beginning the
AAU's and the other associations' efforts at opposing the practice of earmarking were
hampered by the associations' willingness to debate the difference between good and bad
earmarks; by the associations' support of historical preferential funding for Historically
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Black Colleges and Universities, Galludet University for the Deaf, and Native American
schools; and by the associations' beliefthat non-competitive sole source contracts
awarded to university-managed Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
and University Affiliated Research Centers should not be challenged. In the 1990's, the
AAU, NASULGC, and the other associations generally pursued a strategy of
accommodation with regard to the practice ofearmarking. In 2001, the AAU resumed its
opposition to academic earmarking when the amount and number ofearmarks spiked
significantly. By 2001 most AAU member institutions were receiving earmarks.
NASULGC and the other associations did not join the AAU when it resumed hostilities
in 2001.
Efforts by individual members ofCongress and the President to fight the practice
ofacademic earmarking were also detailed. While there have been many individual
members ofthe House and Senate who have crusaded with some effect against the
practice ofacademic earmarking, their efforts have failed to stymie what has generally
been an unabated trend ofannual increases in the amount and number ofearmarks
awarded and in the number ofinstitutions receiving earmarks. �alifomia Representative
George Brown's efforts stand out as perhaps the only member's efforts which seemed to
make a difference in the overall trend. The hearings on earmarking he held ofthe House
Science, Space, and Technology Committee in the mid- 1990's seemed to have had an
effect. When coupled with the fiscal constraints ofa tight funding environment, the
negative light cast on earmarking by these hearings seemed to deter other member's
enthusiasm for earmarking and may have played a role in a decrease in the amount of
earmarks funded in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. This decrease was followed by a
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substantial decrease in the amount ofearmarks in fiscal year 1996 after the Republicans
had taken control ofboth Houses ofCongress. These lows, however, were short lived as
earmarking began its ascent anew in fiscal year 1997.
Other than Brown, other crusaders have made a difference in some instances and
won certain battles but have had little effect on the overall trend. Notable among these
crusaders are Representative William Natcher ofKentucky, who as chair ofthe House
appropriations sub-committee which handled the Labor-Health and Human Services
Education appropriation in the early-1990's was successful in keeping earmarks out of
his bill, and Senator Sam Nunn ofGeorgia, who was successful in a few key battles
regarding earmarks to the Department ofDefense appropriation. In recent years,
members ofCongress in both Houses opposing the practice ofearmarking have been on
the dissident fringe oftheir parties and clearly in the minority.
Presidential efforts at cutting earmarks through budget rescissions have usually
run into opposition in Congress. A few such efforts have led Congress to rescind a few
earmarks but have also prompted reprisals towards other funding objectives from angered
Congressional patrons. Clinton's use ofthe line item veto was successful in excising a
few earmarks from appropriations bills while the President had use ofthis power, but the
line item veto was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court on June
25, 1998. In general, Presidential efforts to fight the practice ofearmarking have had
little effect and less effect than efforts against earmarking undertaken by members of
Congress. This is largely because earmarking is a creature ofthe appropriations process
and, as such, is more fully under the control ofCongress than it is ofthe President.
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Finally, chapter 2 discussed the role ofpaid lobbyists and the reporting of
lobbying expenses. Paid lobbyists, particularly Gerald Cassidy and Kenneth Schlossberg,
have played an important role in the birth and development ofacademic earmarking.
Efforts to require that colleges and universities report their lobbying expenses, however,
have met with a mixed result as different interpretations ofthe laws passed and what they
actually require have led to less than uniform compliance across the entire universe of
higher education institutions and associations.
Chapter 3 discussed the data employed in this study and the methods used in
answering the study's four basic research questions. Data for this study has been drawn
from three basic sources. Science and engineering obligations data has been drawn from
tables accessible through the National Science Foundation's website (www.nsf.gov).
Earmark data has been drawn from a database maintained by the Chronicle ofHigher
Education and accessible through their website (http://chronicle.com/stats/pork/). A
classification system ofinstitutions ofhigher learning developed and maintained by the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement ofTeaching was used to limit the number of
institutions considered by the study.
To address Basic Research Question 1 : Does receiving earmarks improve the
ability ofan institution to receive other types offederal research funding?, tables (tables
4 and 5) which display the change in total obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 and
the change in the percentage ofthe total obligations funding ofall institutions in the study
between 1992 and 2003 were described in chapter 3 and constructed for the study.
Comparing the institutions ranked the highest in earmarks (both the total earmarks dealt
with in table 4 and science and engineering earmarks dealt with in table 5) for the period
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is one way ofdiscerning whether receiving earmarks improves the ability to win other
types offunding.
Bivariate correlations oftotal earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992
(table 6), oftotal earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 6), ofscience
and engineering earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 7), and ofscience
and engineering earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 7) were also
described in the chapter and were calculated. Comparing the correlation between
earmark rank for the entire period and obligation rank at the beginning ofthe study
period with the correlation between earmark rank for the entire period and obligation
rank at the end ofthe study period provides some indication ofwhether receiving
earmarks has built the capacity ofinstitutions to gamer other types of funding.
A bivariate correlation oftotal earmark ranking for the entire period with change
in obligation rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 6) and ofscience and engineering
earmark ranking for the entire period with change in obligation rank between 1992 and
2003 (table 7) was also discussed and calculated. This correlation is helpful in showing
whether receiving earmarks helps an institution gamer other types offunding.
All correlations were calculated for all institutions as ranked by total earmarks
(table 6) and by science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period, for the
top 20 institutions in total earmarks (table 6) and science and engineering earmarks (table
7) for the study period, for the top 50 institutions in total earmarks (table 6) and science
and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period, for the top 100 institutions in
total earmarks (table 6) and science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study
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period, and for institutions 1 0 1 through the last institution in total earmarks (table 6) and
science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period.
To address Basic Research Question 2: How does the awarding of earmarks
affect the geographical distribution offederal research funding?, color coded maps were
discussed in Chapter 3 and were prepared displaying different shades of blue for the
quintiles the 50 states Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia fall within when they are
ranked by several different measures. The measures used for the quintile rankings are
total obligations received during the study period per institution in the study group, total
peer reviewed funding received during the study period per institution in the study group,
total earmarks received during the study period per institution in the study group, and
total science and engineering earmarks received during the study period per institution in
the study group.
To address Basic Research Question 3: Are earmarks additive or do they come at
the expense ofpeer reviewedfunding?, a table presenting the percentage total earmarks
comprise of total science and engineering obligations for each year from 1 990 through
2003 was discussed in chapter 3 and prepared. A short case study of earmarking activity
in the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education budget between 1 998 and
2005 was also discussed in chapter 3 and presented in chapter 4.
To address Basic research question 4: Is there much difference in the institutions
which garner the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most peer
reviewed funding?, chapter 3 discussed how bivariate correlations of earmark ranking and
peer reviewed ranking for each year of the study (table 9) and of science and engineering
earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking for each year of the study (table 1 0) could be
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combined with observations from figure 2 about the number of institutions pursuing
earmarks each year and from figure 7 about the stability of peer reviewed funding
ranking over time to derive a picture of whether there is much difference in the
institutions which gamer the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most
peer reviewed funding.
Chapter 4 analyzed the study's basic research questions by the methods described
in chapter 3 and presented findings. The first basic research question, Does receiving
earmarks improve the ability ofan institution to receive other types offederal research
funding?, was analyzed by creating two tables which display the change in total

obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 and the change in the percentage of the total
obligations funding of all institutions in the study between 1992 and 2003. Bivariate
correlations of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 6), of total
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 6), of science and engineering
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 7), of science and engineering
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 7), of total earmark ranking for
the entire period with change in obligation rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 6), and of
science and engineering earmark ranking for the entire period with change in obligation
rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 7) were also run.
Both an analysis of tables 4 and 5 and of the correlations reported in tables 6 and
7 indicated that receiving earmarks does not have a general effect of improving an
institution's ability to receive other types of funding. An analysis of the tables shows that
most of the institutions which gamer the most earmarks do not improve their total science
and engineering obligations ranking. They either remain very close to their ranking at the
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beginning of the period or move backwards in the rankings. The institutions which
gamer the most earmarks for the most part do not gain a larger percentage of total science
and engineering obligations either. They generally lose percentage points when the end
of the period is compared to the beginning or maintain a percentage very close to their
percentage at the beginning of the period.
The comparison of the correlations run between ranking by total earmarks
received for the period and science and engineering obligations rank at the beginning of
the period and between ranking by total earmarks received for the period and science and
engineering obligations rank at the end of the period lent support to the trends observed
in the analysis of the tables. Analysis of the correlation between ranking by total
earmarks received for the period and change in science and engineering obligations rank
showed that there is a general positive effect of earmarking on change in rank, but it is
very small and not statistically significant.
The second basic research question, How does the awarding ofearmarks affect
the geographical distribution offederal research funding?, was analyzed by creating

color coded maps displaying how all of the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico rank by total obligations received during the study period per institution in the study
group, total peer reviewed funding received during the study period per institution in the
study group, total earmarks received during the study period per institution in the study
group, and total science and engineering earmarks received during the study period per
institution in the study group. Analyzing these maps showed that in general, it appears
that earmarked funding is, for the most part with a few exceptions, distributed to a
different set of states than peer reviewed funding. As such, earmarked funding has a
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redistributive effect on the distribution of federal research funding allowing the
institutions in states which do not fare as well in securing peer reviewed funding to
receive some funds which would not otherwise come their way. However, the amount of
earmarked funding distributed is so low in comparison to the amount of peer reviewed
funding distributed that states which rank high in the receipt of earmarked funding do not
generally see much of a jump in their total science and engineering obligations ranking.
Earmarking seems to operate at the margins. It sends money to places it would not
ordinarily go but has little effect in the general overall geographic distribution of federal
research funds.
The third basic research question, Are earmarks additive or do they come at the
expense ofpeer reviewed funding?, was assessed by looking at a table presenting the

percentage total earmarks comprise of total science and engineering obligations for each
year from 1990 through 2003 and a short case study of earmarking activity in the Fund
for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education budget between 1998 and 2005.
Looking at earmarking on the global level seemed to indicate that earmarks operate at the
margins of federal research funding and have not detracted significantly from the vast
majority of funding which is awarded in peer reviewed competitions. The FIPSE case,
however, seemed to suggest that, on the individual program level at least in this case,
earmarking may very well have come at the expense of competitive peer review. The
case also suggested that once earmarking starts in a program area it may progress to the
point that it consumes a larger and larger degree of a program's resources. Studying the
FIPSE case pointed out that further case studies are required to demonstrate whether the
trends noticed in the FIPSE case apply in other individual program situations.
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The fourth basic research question, Is there much difference in the institutions
which gamer the most earmarkedfunding and those which receive the most peer
reviewedfunding?, was analyzed by assessing the picture presented by a combination of
bivariate correlations of earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking for each year of the
study (table 9) and of science and engineering earmark ranking and peer reviewed
ranking for each year of the study (table 10) with observations from figure 2 about the
number of institutions pursuing earmarks each year and from figure 7 about the stability
of peer reviewed funding ranking over time. This section produced an important finding.
First, earmark activity is rising. This is documented by the large increase in the number
of institutions receiving earmarks on an annual basis in recent years depicted in figure 2.
Second, there is a very stable if not static relationship between earmark ranking and peer
reviewed funding ranking from 1992 to 2003. This is shown by the bivariate correlations
run in tables 9 and 10. Finally, there is a great deal of stability in peer reviewed funding
ranking. This stability is depicted in the histogram of figure 7. The combination of these
factors demonstrates that the difference between the institutions doing the best at
receiving earmarks and the institutions doing the best at receiving peer reviewed funding
is lessening. This finding casts considerable doubt over whether academic earmarking in
the future will serve a redistributive function and ameliorate the perceived inequities of
the peer reviewed funding system. As earmarking activity increases, the same usual
suspects, the institutions which gamer the most peer reviewed funding, are likely to
benefit the most from pursuing earmarks.
This chapter, chapter 5, presents conclusions and recommendations for further
study.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Prior to this study the major work on academic earmarking was James Savage's
Funding Science in America: Congress, Universities, and the Politics ofthe Academic
Pork Barrel. Savage did much to describe the young phenomenon of academic
earmarking. This study has drawn heavily from his work in its discussion of the history
of the higher education associations' fight against earmarking, the rationales of both
proponents and opponents of earmarking, and the history of efforts by individual
members of the House and Senate to fight the rise of earmarking.
Savage posed three main questions at the beginning of his study. He asked does
earmarking remedy the biases of the peer reviewed system of awarding funding or simply
create its own favorites. Does earmarking improve the ability of the institutions receiving
earmarks to compete for peer reviewed research grants? Do earmarks undermine a
system based on merit (the peer reviewed system) or remedy the inequities of a biased
process? He also discussed peer reviewed funding as a dominant policy regime in the
Kuhnian tradition - a paradigm of sorts with cultural and normative facets supporting its
continuance - and earmarking as a small revolution challenging the dominant paradigm.
In the end, he concluded that earmarks do little to remedy perceived biases and do
not aid institutions much in their efforts to compete more effectively in peer reviewed
grants competitions. He found that the incentives for earmarking - the desire of college
and university presidents for money and the desire of members of the House and Senate
for credit for bringing money back to their districts and states - were quite powerful and,
when considered, made it quite understandable why earmarking had begun and persisted.
He also found that earmarking had remained a "small revolution" against the dominant
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policy regime of peer review because, at the time of his study, it had yet to challenge peer
reviewed funding in an institutionalized, routinized, regular way. Savage found
earmarking to be somewhat of an anomaly, and the higher education community's
opposition to earmarking ineffective because higher education leaders were quick to
oppose earmarking except when they needed an earmark for some campus project or
program.
This study has built on Savage's attempts to assess the equity and effectiveness
issues concerned with academic earmarking. Savage attempted to assess equity in
funding by state, institution, and region. He, himself, pointed out in his study that the
only way to achieve true equity would be to insure equal funding for all. This study has
dealt with the issue of equity with different and hopefully improved methods. The
introduction of a per-institution control in the formulation of the maps created in this
study is probably the most notable among these improvements.
Savage also dealt with the issue of effectiveness. He looked at whether the
institutions and states receiving the most earmarks improved their rank in receiving peer
reviewed funding in much the same way as this study has in its analysis of basic research
question 1. This study, however, supplemented the analysis of which institutions
changed rank with three bivariate correlations that confirmed the trends noted from
examining tables 4 and 5.
Finally, Savage deserves the credit for first discussing productive and non
productive earmarks. Savage defined a productive earmark as an earmark which built an
institutions capacity to secure peer reviewed funding, and a non-productive earmark as an
earmark which did not have such a leveraging effect. Savage noted that earmarks for
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biomedical research were more likely to be productive than earmarks for other purposes
like agriculture because there are more peer reviewed funds for biomedical research than
for other areas. This study's analysis would seem to confirm Savage's earlier inferences
on productive and non-productive earmarks.
Savage was unable to discern whether earmarks really come out of peer reviewed
funding. This study takes a stab at this question with its analysis of basic research
question 3.
This has been a study about the emergence of academic earmarking and its effect
on the distribution of federal research funds. The study has given a narrative account of
the relatively short history of academic earmarking and addressed four basic research
questions about the effect of academic earmarking on the distribution of federal research
funds. There are six major findings of the study:
1.

Receiving earmarks generally does not improve the ability of
institutions to receive other types of federal funding although in a few
instances it does;

2.

Earmarking has had somewhat of a redistributive effect on the
geographical distribution of federal research funding by sending some
funding to places where it would otherwise not go;

3.

Earmarked funding is such a small part of total federal research funding
that it makes little difference in the overall general geographical
distribution of federal research funds;

4.

When peer reviewed and total funding levels per state are figured on a
per institution basis there are some notable exceptions to the long held
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belief that peer reviewed funding goes mostly to institutions in the
northeast Atlantic and west coast regions of the United States;
5.

In general earmarks appear to be an additive feature of the federal
research funding scheme although within individual programs
earmarking activity may consume funds which historically have been
and could otherwise be awarded in peer reviewed competitions;

6.

With earmarking and peer reviewed funding both now firmly
established as different but acceptable forms of awarding federal
research funding, the difference between the institutions doing the best
at receiving earmarks and the institutions doing the best at receiving
peer reviewed funding is lessening and a rising tide of earmarking
activity is most likely preferentially lifting the boats of those
institutions which do the best at receiving peer reviewed funding.

These findings begin to paint a picture of how earmarks affect the general
distribution of federal research funding. There are further related issues which need to be
explored. It would be interesting to know whether the institutions, which did not accept
earmarks in the early years of earmarking's history but began to actively pursue and
accept earmarks in more recent years, experienced changes in leadership before they
changed their policy on accepting earmarks. More formal modeling of earmarking,
similar to the modeling de Figueiredo and Silverman did in their 2002 study, needs to be
done so that we can better understand the factors which influence whether an institution
receives an earmark and how institutions can best pursue strategies for securing
earmarks. Further cases, like the FIPSE case discussed in Chapter 4, need to be explored
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so that we can understand how earmarking within an individual program area affects peer
reviewed funding. There is much need for research on what earmarks are actually used
for as the anecdotal evidence is that the federal government exercises little control over
how they are spent once they are awarded.
The role medical schools, and possibly engineering schools, play in whether an
institution's earmarking activity builds its capacity to compete more effectively for the
large sums offederal research money awarded for biomedical and other basic science
research in the peer reviewed competitions ofthe NIH, NSF, and other agencies needs to
be explored. Exploring this area will inform strategies University Presidents employ in
pursuing earmarks and help them make decisions about whether they value more
earmarks which build an institution's capacity to secure other forms offunding or
earmarks which fund activities for which there is no other form offunding.
Finally, earmarking needs to be looked at through the lens ofdistributive theory.44
There is a rich amount ofresearch on distributive theory to which studies of earmarking
could contribute. The role earmarks play as the sweetener, which makes palatable a
system ofdistributing federal research funding based largely on peer review and not
under the direct control ofmembers ofCongress to members who greatly value their
power to distribute federal funding to their districts and states, is one issue under the

Distributive theory is an area of Congressional studies with two main tenets. Its first tenet is the electoral
connection thesis which holds that members of Congress actively seek to send federal funding home to
their districts and states because they feel like doing so brings credit to them and aids in their efforts to get
reelected. Its second main tenet is that universalistic coalitions approaching 100 percent tend to occur
when Congress considers how to distribute federal funding because, even though minimum winning
coalitions would insure that members could secure a larger portion of the funding to be distributed, there is
uncertainty about whether a member could secure and sustain his place in a minimum winning coalition
over time. The second tenet basically holds that members cut each other in on the deals made about the
distribution of resources to reduce uncertainty and insure that they will get a piece of the pie for their
district.
44
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banner ofdistributive theory which needs to be explored. The use ofearmarks in
logrolling across committees to enact the legislative will ofpowerful members of
Congress, and the question ofwhether the tendency towards universalism in distributive
decisions over time breaks down the influence members ofthe Senate and House
Appropriations Committees exercise over earmarking decisions are two other issues
related to distributive theory which merit further study.
Finally, there are normative issues related to academic earmarking which, while
not appropriate parts ofobjective academic studies, nevertheless need to be fully debated
within academic and governmental circles. A major reason why there has been such a
wide divergence ofopinion about whether academic earmarking is a threat or remedy is
that peer reviewed funding and academic earmarking have different sets ofvalues
associated with them. Peer reviewed funding is a creature ofthe academic world. It is
imbued with the same sorts ofvalues associated with academic freedom - a freedom of
inquiry and a freedom ofscholars to pursue their thoughts where they might lead without
the government or religion or any other co�vention restricting or dictating the course of
thought.
Academic earmarking, on the other hand, is a creature ofthe political world. It is
more in line with the base instincts ofpeople to look out for themselves and their own
interests. It is also more in line with our form ofconstitutional government and the
prerogatives granted to our legislative leaders. It is Congress's prerogative to determine
how federal money should be spent, and it is somewhat presumptive on the part of
academics to think that Congress should completely delegate to them the authority to
determine how all federal research money will be spent.
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The clash between these two value sets is probably irresolvable. Academic
leaders will probably always think they know best the direction science should take and
look condescendingly down on earmarking as a process ruled by lay opinion and based
on personal influence and charm. Lawmakers will probably always think they were
elected for a purpose, that in representing their constituents they have valuable
knowledge about how money should be spent, and, furthermore, that it is their
constitutional duty to decide how federal money is spent because they are the only people
accountable to the voters for their decisions. The hard edges of these two value based
policy positions are far apart, but some good public discourse, that acknowledges that
different people come at this subject from very different vantage points, could perhaps
bring about some consensus about which method of funding, peer reviewed funding or
earmarking, is the most appropriate in certain circumstances. The debate about which is
the better method may never be decided, but issues like how much earmarking is the right
amount of earmarking in a system in which both forms of funding are utilized could
possibly be decided.
Hopefully this study and others which pursue the questions outlined for further
study discussed earlier in this section will bring light to such a debate. Studies addressing
academic earmarking have the potential to assist college and university presidents in
determining which earmarks are of the most value to their institution. Such studies can
inform members of Congress and policy makers whether the current system of research
funding is actually producing the policy results they wish for it to produce. Finally,
studies of this sort can demystify the research funding process to the point that citizens
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can better judge whether the scientists distributing peer reviewed funding and the
members ofCongress distributing earmarks are spending their tax money effectively.
It is my opinion that more thought needs to be put in on the part ofall ofthe
players in the research funding process. We have a system offederal research funding
which is a system which has been created almost by happenstance. There are many
myths associated with the system which need to be exorcised. The system has without
doubt produced incredible results, and it has mostly relied on the peer review process in
allocating funds. Peer review can rightly be said to have produced, particularly when one
considers other systems ofresearch funding like those employed by the formerly
communist countries ofRussia and eastern Europe. The freedom we have given to
scientists to chart the course ofscience is the tradeoff for the prosperous and
technologically advanced society we all enjoy, and there is little evidence, besides a few
isolated scandals, that scientists have misused the freedom our system has given them.
Earmarks, however, may be the price we have to pay for a system which for the
most part grants and honors the academic freedom values associated with peer reviewed
funding. Having a relatively small amount ofthe federal research funding pie allocated
by our elected representatives insures that our representatives are not asleep at the wheel
and remain cognizant ofthe local needs ofthe people they represent. Our nation has
always been suspicious ofgovernment by experts. Having a little bit oflay wisdom
applied to even a technical area like science and engineering funding probably produces
better outcomes because it forces scientists to take into account public concerns.
Ifwe are going to have a system that includes earmarking, college and university
presidents need to put more thought into the programs and projects for which they are
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going to seek earmarks and lawmakers need to impose some quality control. I looked at
8,422 specific earmarks made between 1992 and 2003 in order to code them as science
and engineering earmarks or non-science and engineering earmarks in the course of
carrying out this study. It appeared to me that in many instances college and university
presidents were going to Congress simply to get some money rather than to secure
funding which could really advance their institution, help it serve its mission better, and
ultimately better the lives of the citizens of their state or region. I am not trying to say
that college and university presidents should only pursue earmarks which are what
Savage would call productive earmarks - those earmarks which can be leveraged to
secure other funding. If presidents pursued only such earmarks, they would only pursue
earmarks for biomedical and hard science purposes. I recognize that non-productive
earmarks - those which cannot be leveraged - may also be valuable to an institution. It is
hard to raise money from other sources for bus depots and sewage treatment plants.
Presidents bent on moving up in the US News and World Report and other rankings,
however, would be wise to pursue the productive type of earmark. My point is not to try
to determine which type of earmark is most valuable for an institution at some given
point in time but just to say that I do not believe institutional leaders are asking
themselves often enough such questions. I am harping on college and university
presidents because the lobbying literature indicates members of Congress depend upon
these institutional leaders for cues about how much money to send to an institution and
for what to send it. It is the members of Congress, however, who appropriate federal
funds. Ultimately, if college and university presidents are not going to be concerned
about quality control in academic earmarking, Congress must be.
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While the policy debate ofthe 1980's died down some in the late 1990's and early
parts ofthe 2000 's, earmarking is an issue likely to come back to the forefront
particularly in times like the present where deficit spending, the costs ofwar, and the
rebuilding costs ofnatural disasters are likely to cause scarcities in the discretionary
funding available to fund things like education and academic research. The debate over
which is the better form offunding - earmarks or peer reviewed - is likely to be
continued in the near future when we may very well struggle as a nation to keep any
momentum going at all in what has been a very effective partnership between the federal
government and higher education in funding the creation ofnew knowledge and
innovation. There were concerns expressed in the early years ofthe policy debate over
earmarking about whether higher education diminishes its status as a privileged and
valued commodity in our society and becomes just another special interest when it
lobbies Congress directly for earmarked funding (Cordes 1986, Parsons 2005). The
higher education community may not have the luxury in the coming funding environment
to debate whether it can afford to sit on the sidelines and preserve its special status.
Higher education may have to get into the fray to preserve any sort offunding for
research at all. Ifthis is the case, the practice higher education leaders have had in
lobbying members ofCongress for earmarks over the last 30 years may prove to be quite
useful.
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Source: National Science Foundation 2007.
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Total Peer Renewed Funding. 1992-2003.

Figure 9: Map of total peer-reviewed funding averaged over the number of institutions in the state, by each US state and territory.
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007.
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Iotal Earmarks, 1992 - 2003.

Figure 10: Map of total earmarks averaged over the number of institutions in the state, by each US state and territory.
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007.
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Total Eanaarks, 1992 - 2003.

Figure 1 1 : Map of total science and engineering earmarks averaged over the number of institutions in the state, by each US state and territory.
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007.
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Figure 12: Line graph of the effect of all earmarks on peer-reviewed rankings, by year.
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007.
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Figure 13: Line graph of the effect of all earmarks on peer-reviewed rankings, by year, with institutions not receiving earmarks
dropped from the model.
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007.
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Figure 14: Line graph of the effect of science and engineering earmarks on peer-reviewed rankings, by year.
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007.
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Figure 15: Line graph of the effect of science and engineering earmarks on peer-reviewed rankings, by year, with institutions not
receiving earmarks dropped from the model.
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007.

Table I : Earmarks not included in "Science and Engineering" categorization due to
agency non-reporting.
Institution

Year

American University

2003 District of Columbia appropriation
$50,000
for its Women & Politics Institute's annual National Education for
Women's Leadership program

Arizona State University

1998
General Services Administration
managing acquisitions

$ 1 ,000,000

Arizona State University

1999 General Services Administration
pilot project in digital learning technologies

$2,000,000

Boston College

1995 National Archives and Records Administration
Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., Library

$2,000,000

Boston College

1997
United States Information Agency
Center for Irish Management

$ 1 ,000,000

Boston College

2003
State
$275,000
for its Irish Institute, which operates educational- and cultural-exchange
programs focused on achieving a lasting peace in Ireland

Brandeis University

1991
General Services Administration
to construct the National Center for Complex Systems

College of William and Mary

$250,000
2003 Homeland Security
for the Virginia Institute of Marine Science to establish a prototype
observation system in the lower Chesapeake Bay

Carnegie Mellon University

$21 2,500
2001
Institute of Museum and Library Services
To be shared with a nonprofit organization, to work with the National
Aviary to develop and use interactive mobile robots in support of
distance learning

Clark University

$750,000
1992
Small Business Administration
for a shared incubator facility and a science and business center

Clemson University

1995
Small Business Administration
$500,000
South Carolina Small Business Development Center Network

Columbia University

199 1
General Services Administration
for the Center for Disease Prevention

Columbia University

$250,000
2003
General Services Administration
To be shared with three universities and a nonprofit corporation, to
develop software relating to financial transactions

Earmarking Agency
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Earmark Amount

$4,000,000

$ 1 ,000,000

Table 1: Continued
Institution

Year

Dartmouth College

$ 1 8,000,000
2003 Homeland Security
for the college's Institute for Security Technology Studies to develop
ways to counter cybercrimes and cyberterrorism

Dartmouth College

2003
Small Business Administration
$993,500
To be shared with a federal agency, for efforts to develop minority-run
businesses

DePaul University

2003 Library of Congress
$600,000
to train schoolteachers to use the library's online information resources
in the classroom

East Tennessee State University

1 993 Veterans Affairs
for relocating the university's medical school

East Tennessee State University

1 994 Veterans Affairs
$ 1 ,750,000
for relocating the university's medical school and renovating buildings
at the medical center

East Tennessee State University

1995 Veterans Affairs
$3,000,000
relocate university's medical school and renovate buildings at the
- -medical center

East Tennessee State University

1996 Veterans Affairs
$2,000,000
relocate the university's medical school and renovate buildings

East Tennessee State University

1997 Veterans Affairs
$7,750,000
relocate the university's medical school and renovate buildings at the
medical center

Florida International University

2000 Federal Emergency Management Agency
windstorm demonstration project

Florida International University

2002 Treasury
$2,000,000
for research on transfer pricing, the practice of companies' moving
income outside the United States to put profits out of the reach of the
Internal Revenue Service

George Mason University

$ 1 ,000,000
2002
Small Business Administration
for a program to develop information-technology businesses

George Mason University

2003 Homeland Security
.
$ 1 ,250,000
To be shared with two universities and other local organizations, to
establish the Response to Emergencies and Disasters Institute, which
will provide terrorism prevention and response training for multiple
types of first responders, including law en

George Washington University

$2,780,000
1 993
District of Columbia appropriation
reimbursement for the cost of uncompensated care at its trauma center

Earmarking Agency
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Earmark Amount

$ 1 ,400,000

$2,500,000

Table 1 : Continued
Institution

Year

Earmarking Agency

George Washington University

1996
United States Information Agency
$ 1 ,375,000
Central and Eastern European Student Exchange Fellowship program

George Washington University

$ 1 ,000,000
1 999
District of Columbia appropriation
to help the Children's National Medical Center to construct new
community-based clinics in low-income or underserved neighborhoods

George Washington University

$250,000
2002
District of Columbia appropriation
to enroll more District of Columbia government employees in programs
to improve municipal management

George Washington University

$250,000
2003
District of Columbia appropriation
To be shared with the University of New Orleans, to help the District of
Columbia with city security and emergency preparedness

George Washington University

$ 1 ,250,000
2003
Homeland Security
To be shared with two universities and other local organizations, to
establish the Response to Emergencies and Disasters Institute, which
will provide terrorism prevention and response training for multiple
types of first responders, including law en

George Washington University

$50,000
2003
Institute of Museum and Library Services
for its collection of Eleanor Roosevelt's papers and related program
development

Georgetown University

$2,780,000
1 993
District of Columbia appropriation
reimbursement for the cost of uncompensated care at its trauma center

Georgetown University

1 996
United States Information Agency
$ 1 ,375,000
Central and Eastern European Student Exchange Fellowship program

Georgetown University

1 999
District of Columbia appropriation
$3,000,000
demonstration project on coordinating health care under Medicare

Howard University

$2,780,000
1 993
District of Columbia appropriation
reimbursement for the cost of uncompensated care at its trauma center

Indiana State University

$ 1 ,500,000
1 992
Small Business Administration
Center for Interdisciplinary Science Research and Education

Indiana State University

1993
Small Business Administration
$ 1 ,395,000
Center for Interdisciplinary Science Research and Education

Indiana State University

1 997
Small Business Administration
build a training center for small-business development
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Earmark Amount

$ 1 ,000,000

Table 1 : Continued
Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

Institution

Year

Iowa State University

1990 General Services Administration
to establish a Supercomputer Access Center

$5,000,000

Iowa State University

General Services Administration
199 1
Midwest Supercomputer Access Center

$2,200,000

Iowa State University

$2,583, 1 00
2003
Small Business Administration
to develop a biologics facility in the university's research park that
would study the conversion of bioengineered crops into
pharmaceuticals and nutraceuticals

Kent State University

$2,000,000
2003
Institute of Museum and Library Services
for an Institute for Library and Information Literacy Education

Loma Linda University

$30,000,000
1999 Federal Emergency Management Agency
pilot project to retrofit the medical-center building to withstand
earthquakes

Loma Linda University

1999 Veterans Affairs
research osteoporosis and wounds affecting bone

Loma Linda University

$6,000,000
2000 Federal Emergency Management Agency
demonstration project to retrofit a building at the university's medical
center to withstand earthquakes

Louisiana State University

$2,250,000
2002 District of Columbia appropriation
for a project to test ways to safely immobilize and treat contaminated
sediments at the bottom of the Anacostia River, in Washington, D.C.

Louisiana State University

$2,250,000
2002 District of Columbia appropriation
for a project to test ways to safely immobilize and treat contaminated
sediments at the bottom of the Anacostia River, in Washington, D.C.

Louisiana State University

$ 1 ,000,000
2003 District of Columbia appropriation
for a project to test ways to safely immobilize and treat contaminated
sediments at the bottom of the Anacostia River, in Washington, D.C.

Loyola University Chicago

2003 Library of Congress
$600,000
to train schoolteachers to use the library's online information resources
in the classroom

Loyola University Chicago

$600,000
2003
Library of Congress
to train schoolteachers to use the library's online information resources
in the classroom

Mass. Institute of Technology

1994 Bureau of Mines
center on respirable dust

224

$3,000,000

$ 1 , 100,000

Table 1: Continued
Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

Institution

Year

Michigan State University

1993
White House Office of S&T Policy
$ 1,000,000
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network

Michigan Technological Univ

$5,000,000
1990 General Services Administration
to build a center for applied metallurgical, minerals, and materials
research

Michigan Technological Univ

$ 1 ,750,000
199 1
General Services Administration
for construction of a center for applied metallurgical, minerals, and
materials research

Michigan Technological Univ

1994 Bureau of Mines
center on respirable dust

$ 1,100,000

Mississippi State University

2003
Small Business Administration
for the MAF/Tiger database project

$ 1,987,000

Mississippi State University

2003
Small Business Administration
for the MAF/Tiger database project

$ 1,987,000

Montana State University

1995 Small Business Administration
develop a center to assist small businesses

Montana State University

$2,500,000
1996 Treasury
Northern Plains and Rockies Center for the Study of Western
Hemispheric Trade in Montana

Montana State University

$2,000,000
2003
Small Business Administration
for the Microdevice Fabrication Facility, which will work to create
materials through nanofabrication, the manipulation of matter at the
atomic scale

Montana State University

2003
Small Business Administration
$2,000,000
for the Microdevice Fabrication Facility, which will work to create
materials through nanofabrication, the manipulation of matter at the
atomic scale

New Mexico State University

1994 United States Information Agency
U.S./Mexico Conflict Resolution Center

$993,000

New Mexico State University

1995
United States Information Agency
United States-Mexico Conflict Resolution Center

$400,000

New Mexico State University

$ 100,000
1996 United States Information Agency
educational and cultural exchange program on United States-Mexico
conflict resolution
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$250,000

Table 1: Continued
Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

Institution

Year

New Mexico State University

1997 United States Information Agency
$ 100,000
educational and cultural exchange program on United States-Mexico
conflict resolution

New York University

$250,000
2003
General Services Administration
To be shared with three universities and a nonprofit corporation, to
develop software relating to financial transactions

New York University

2003 Homeland Security
$7,000,000
for counterterrorism programs at the Center on Catastrophe
Preparedness and Response, including training public-health
professionals and research in biomedical science and environmental
health

North Dakota State University

1995
Small Business Administration
center to assist small businesses

North Dakota State University

2000 General Services Administration
$275,000
to develop a facility to store geographic and geo-physical information
to promote the efficient use of natural resources

North Dakota State University

2000 Treasury
United States-Canada trade research

$725,000

North Dakota State University

2000 Treasury
United States-Canada trade research

$725,000

North Dakota State University

2002 Office of National Drug Control Policy
$2,000,000
for neuroimaging technology for research on substance abuse

North Dakota State University

2003
General Services Administration
$300,000
to establish for federal agencies an archive of electronic data that are
important to the Upper Great Plains, such as the relationship between
weather data and crop yields

North Dakota State University

$750,000
2003 Homeland Security
for the Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies to study the
bilateral trade of agricultural commodities and products under the
Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement, to help policy makers better gauge the
impact of trade-policy decisions on agriculture

Northern Arizona University

199 1
General Services Administration
Southwest Forestry Science Complex

Oklahoma State University

2002
Small Business Administration
for a center for international-trade development

$ 100,000

Oregon State University

1 993
Agency not listed
research on using wood

$897,458
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$250,000

$4,500,000

Table 1 : Continued
Institution

Year

Earmarking Agency

Pennsylvania State University

1994 Bureau of Mines
national center on mine-land reclamation

Pennsylvania State University

1994 Bureau of Mines
center on respirable dust

Polytechnic University

$ 1 ,000,000
1993
White House Office of S&T Policy
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network

Polytechnic University

2002
Small Business Administration
$400,000
to create the National Center for e-Commerce, which will train students
and help businesses in using the Web

Polytechnic University

2003
General Services Administration
$250,000
To be shared with three universities and a nonprofit corporation, to
develop software relating to financial transactions

Portland State University

$993,500
2003
Small Business Administration
for the Northwest Center for Engineering, Science, and Technology

Rutgers University at NewBruns

1990 Federal Communications Commission
$30,000
as a fee in return for which the FCC was to subscribe to the university's
Wireless Information Network Laboratory

Rutgers University at NewBruns

1992 Federal Communications Commission
to support research at the Wireless Information Laboratory

Rutgers University at NewBruns

1994 Federal Communications Commission
$30,000
for a subscription to the university's wireless information network

Rutgers University at NewBruns

$250,000
2003
Institute of Museum and Library Services
to catalog, organize, and preserve collections at the Carey Library

South Carolina State University

$500,000
1 995
Small Business Administration
South Carolina Small Business Development Center Network

Southern Illinois University

1994 Bureau of Mines
national center on mine-land reclamation

Southern Illinois University

$200,000
2003 Library of Congress
to develop a permanent commemoration of the Lewis and Clark
Expedition at the Customs House Museum, in Cairo, Ill.
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Earmark Amount

$662,500
$ 1 , 100,000

$30,000

$662,500

Table 1 : Continued
Earmark Amount

Institution

Year

Southern Illinois University

$ 1 ,200,000
2003 Library of Congress
to train schoolteachers to use the library's online information resources
in the classroom

SUNY Buffalo

$750,000
1995
Small Business Administration
demonstration to help small companies with technical improvement of
products

SUNY Buffalo

1998
Small Business Administration
SUNY Institute for Entrepreneurship

SUNY Buffalo

$ 1 ,500,000
1999
Small Business Administration
to operate an institute for small businesses and for work-force
development

SUNY Buffalo

2000 Small Business Administration
$ 1 ,000,000
to develop a facility and operate the Institute for Entrepreneurship for
small businesses and for work-force development

Syracuse University

1995
Small Business Administration
$750,000
demonstration to help small companies with technical improvement of
products

Temple University

$250,000
2000 Institute of Museum and Library Services
to support enhanced use of technology in delivering library services

Temple University

2001 Institute of Museum and Library Services
$5 10,000
to digitize resources in the library's urban-history and African
American collections

Texas A&M at College Station

1991
General Services Administration
$ 1 ,000,000
Institute for National Drug Abatement Research at the Engineering
Experiment Station

Texas A&M at College Station

199 5 Customs
Center for the Study of Western Hemispheric Trade

Texas A&M at College Station

2000
Veterans Affairs
$5,750,000
to renovate and construct a cardiovascular institute at the Olin E.
Teague Veterans' Center Integrated Clinical Facility, which is a
teaching hospital for the university's College of Medicine

Texas Tech University

200 1
Institute of Museum and Library Services
for the Virtual Vietnam Archive Project

Texas Tech University

2002 Institute of Museum and Library Services
$500,000
for the Vietnam Archive Center to create digital records of its
collection

Earmarking Agency
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$ 1 ,500,000

$5,000,000

$46 1 ,000

Table 1: Continued
Institution

Year

Texas Tech University

2003 Institute of Museum and Library Services
to digitize its Vietnam Archive Center

$400,000

Tufts University

1992
Small Business Administration
shared incubator facility and a science and business center

$750,000

Tufts University

1992
Small Business Administration
$ 1 ,500,000
to establish the New England Regional Biotechnology Transfer Center

Tulane University

200 1
Institute of Museum and Library Services
$680,000
for the AMISTAD Research Center to expand electronic
communications, educational programs, and community outreach

University of Alabama at Tusc.

$ 100,000
1999 Veterans Affairs
representing the value of land donated to the university for a children's
center

University of Arizona

1994 Office of Personnel Management
health promotion and disease prevention

University of Arizona

2000
State
for an unspecified purpose

University of Arizona

2003 Treasury
$500,000
for a trust fund to support the operations of the Native Nations Institute
for Leadership, Management, and Policy, which works to support
American Indian nations

University of Arkansas at Fay.

1994 Small Business Administration
small-business incubator

$ 1 ,000,000

University of Arkansas at Fay.

1995
Small Business Administration
Genesis Small Business Incubator Facility

$ 1 ,000,000

University of Arkansas at Fay.

1998
Small Business Administration
Genesis Small Business Incubator Facility

$ 1 ,000,000

University of California at Davis

1 992 Agency not listed
grape-importing facility

$ 1 ,609,000

Earmarking Agency

University of Colorado at Boulder 1998 General Services Administration
project on digital medical education
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Earmark Amount

$62,500
$250,000

$ 1 ,000,000

Table 1 : Continued
Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

Institution

Year

University of Colorado HSC

2003 General Services Administration
for the digital telehealth program

University of Georgia

$ 1 ,000,000
General Services Administration
199 1
Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law

University of Hawaii-Manoa

1990 General Services Administration
strategic-materials-research facility

University of Hawaii-Manoa

1992 Bureau of Mines
Marine Minerals Technology Center

$592,500

University of Hawaii-Mano a

1994 Bureau of Mines
center on marine-minerals technology

$537,500

University of Hawaii-Manoa

1994 Bureau of Mines
center on marine-minerals technology

$537,500

University of Hawaii-Manoa

$250,000
2003
General Services Administration
to help prepare for the celebration, in 2009, of the 50th anniversary of
Hawaii's statehood

University of Idaho

199 1
Bureau of Mines
to continue water-contamination research

$500,000

University of Idaho

1995
Small Business Administration
center to assist small businesses

$250,000

University of Idaho

1999 Institute of Museum and Library Services
Digital Geospatial and Numerical Data Library

$750,000

University of Idaho

$700,000
2001
Institute of Museum and Library Services
for the Institute for the Historic Study of Jazz, to catalog, digitize, and
develop an online database and to preserve archival material

University of Idaho

2002 Institute of Museum and Library Services
$750,000
for the Institute for the Historic Study of Jazz to catalog, digitize, and
develop an online database and to preserve archival material

University of ldaho

2003
Institute of Museum and Library Services
for digital archiving
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$300,000

$ 1 ,000,000

$400,000

Table 1: Continued
Institution

Year

University of Iowa

1999 Small Business Administration
Environmental Compliance Project

$ 1 ,000,000

University of Kansas

1993
Small Business Administration
small-business incubator program

$500,000

University of Kentucky

1992
Small Business Administration
$4,500,000
to assist in the construction of the Advanced Science and Technology
Commercialization Center

University of Kentucky

$4, 1 85,000
1993
Small Business Administration
Advanced Science and Technology Commercialization Center

University of Kentucky

1996 United States Information Agency
$ 1 ,375,000
Central and Eastern European Student Exchange Fellowship program

University of Maine at Orono

$ 1 ,000,000
2003
Homeland Security
for the university's Advanced Engineered Wood Composites Center to
test engineered wood composites at Coast Guard facilities

Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

$ 1 ,000,000
University of Maryland at ColPrk 1993 White House Office of S&T Policy
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network
University of Mass at Amherst

1991
Small Business Administration
Center for Manufacturing Productivity

$500,000

University of Mass at Amherst

1993
Small Business Administration
Center for Manufacturing Productivity

$465,000

University of Mass at Amherst

1993
Small Business Administration
$465,000
for a demonstration project to help small businesses comply with the
Clean Air Act

University of Med & Dent of NJ

1 996 Veterans Affairs
equipment at the Low Vision Center in Ophthalmology

University of Miami

1992 United States Information Agency .
$5,000,000
Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between North and
South

University of Miami

1995
United States Information Agency
North / South Center
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$500,000

$4,000,000

Table 1: Continued
Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

Institution

Year

University of Miami

1996 United States Information Agency
operating the North-South Center

$2,000,000

University of Miami

1997 United States Information Agency
North-South Center

$ 1 ,495,000

University of Miami

1999 United States Information Agency
North-South Center

$ 1,750,000

University of Miami

$750,000
2000 Institute of Museum and Library Services
to consolidate and preserve archives and special collections at
University's Library in Coral Gables, Fla.

University of Miami

State
2003
for its Dante B. Fascell North-South Center

University of Michigan

$ 1 ,000,000
1993 White House Office of S&T Policy
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network

University of Minnesota-TC

1994 Bureau of Mines
center on respirable dust

University of Mississippi

1990 Bureau of Mines
Marine Minerals Technology Center

$600,000

University of Mississippi

1992 Bureau of Mines
Marine Minerals Technology Center

$592,500

University of Mississippi

1994 Bureau of Mines
center on marine-minerals technology

$537,500

University of Mississippi

$350,000
2002 Institute of Museum and Library Services
for digitization at the National Library of the Accounting Profession

University of Mississippi

2002 Institute of Museum and Library Services
$850,000
for educational and preservation programs at Rowan Oak, the home of
William Faulkner

University of Missouri at Col.

$400,000
1999 Federal Emergency Management Agency
pilot program on training to respond to hazardous-materials accidents
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$500,000

$ 1 ,100,000

Table 1 : Continued
Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

Institution

Year

University of Missouri at Col.

1999 Veterans Affairs
$3,000,000
to renovate space in a Veterans Health Administration hospital that will
be leased to the university for medical research

University of Missouri at Col.

$2,000,000
2000 Veterans Affairs
to renovate space for research activities in a Veterans Health
Administration hospital that is affiliated with the university's School of
Medicine

University of Montana

$ 100,000
199 1
Small Business Administration
for a planning study for a Value-Added Wood Products Development,
Marketing, and Small Business Institute program

University of Montana

1995 Small Business Administration
to develop a center to assist small businesses

University of Montana

1996 United States Information Agency
Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs

$ 1 ,800,000

University of Montana

1997
United States Information Agency
Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs

$ 1 ,800,000

University of Montana

$2,200,000
1999 United States Information Agency
Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program, which the university manages

University of Montana

$2,200,000
2000 State
for the Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program, which makes awards to
government officials for work and study in Japan and which the
university manages

University of Montana

Small Business Administration
2002
for a resource center on economic development

$250,000

$300,000

$4,500,000
University of Nebraska at Lincoln 199.1
General Services Administration
George W. Beadle Center for Genetic and Biomaterials Research
University of Nebraska Med Ctr

1990 General Services Administration
$5,000,000
to expand the Eppley Institute for Research in Cancer and Allied
Diseases

University of Nevada at LV

$ 198,700
2003
Small Business Administration
for the Program for International Education and Training, which
educates businesses about communicating effectively with people from
other cultures

University of Nevada at Reno

199 1
Federal Emergency Management Agency
earthquake-engineering center
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$750,000

Table 1: Continued
Institution

Year

Earmarking Agency

University of Nevada at Reno

1992 Federal Emergency Management Center
to build a laboratory for earthquake research

University of New Orleans

$250,000
2003
District of Columbia appropriation
To be shared with George Washington University, to help the District
of Columbia with city security and emergency preparedness

University of North Dakota

1994 Bureau of Mines
national center on mine-land reclamation

$662,500

University of North Dakota

1994 Bureau of Mines
national center on mine-land reclamation

$662,500

University of North Dakota

2003
General Services Administration
$ 1 ,750,000
for the Government Services Rural Outreach Initiative to help rural
citizens, particularly the elderly and Native Americans on remote
reservations, to contact and transact business with government agencies
more easily and efficiently

University of Oregon

2002 Institute of Museum and Library Services
for the Museum of Natural History

University of Rochester

1995
Small Business Administration
$750,000
demonstration to help small companies with technical improvement of
products

University of South Car at Col.

$500,000
1995
Small Business Administration
South Carolina Small Business Development Center Network

University of South Dakota

1995
Small Business Administration
develop a center to assist small businesses

University of South Florida

2000 Federal Emergency Management Agency
$ 1,000,000
for windows and seawalls to ma¥ the university's St. Peterburg
campus more resistant to a hurricane

University of Texas at Austin

1991
General Services Administration
for unspecified new construction

$ 1 ,750,000

University of Texas at Austin

1 995 Customs
Center for the Study of Western Hemispheric Trade

$5,000,000

University of Texas at El Paso

1 990 General Services Administration
$4,1 52,000
to study and facilitate the development, transfer, and installation of
strategic-materials technologies among American industries
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Earmark Amount

$2,500,000

$50,000

$250,000

Table 1: Continued
Institution

Year

University of Vermont

200 1
Institute of Museum and Library Services
for the Perkins Geology Museum to digitize its collection

University of West Florida

2002
Small Business Administration
$ 1 ,000,000
for a business incubator that helps companies establish a presence on
the Internet

University of Wyoming

1 99 5
Small Business Administration
develop a center to assist small businesses

Utah State University

$ 1 ,000,000
1 993
White House Office of S&T Policy
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network

Utah State University

$ 1 ,000,000
1993
White House Office of S&T Policy
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network

Washington State University

199 1
None listed
animal-disease-biotechnology facility

Washington State University

1993
Small Business Administration
to help build a business-incubator facility

West Virginia University

Veterans Affairs
1 993
demonstration project at Ruby Memorial Hospital

West Virginia University

1994 Bureau of Mines
national center on mine-land reclamation

West Virginia University

1994 Bureau of Mines
center on respirable dust

West Virginia University

1995
Veterans Affairs
demonstration project involving Ruby Memorial Hospital

West Virginia Unive�sity

Yeshiva University

Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

$400,000

$250,000

$ 1 ,2 1 0,000
$500,000
$ 1 ,000,000
$662,500
$ 1 , 1 00,000
$762,500

2002
Veterans Affairs
$2,000,000
· for a project that provides health care to veterans through Ruby
Memorial Hospital, one of the university's teaching hospitals
1 999
National Archives and Records Administration
Center for Jewish History

So urce: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007.
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$ 1 ,500,000

Table 2: Earmarks not included in "Science and Engineering" categorization due to
earmark purpose.
Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

Institution

Year

Barry University

200 1
Housing and Urban Development
for an intercultural community center

Colorado School of Mines

1 999
Health and Human Services
to augment activities

$ 1 ,000,000

Colorado State University

Defense
1993
for programs of major importance to the department

$5,000,000

Columbia University

2003
Education
$ 1 73,863
To be shared with Hostos Community College of the City University of
New York, for a distance-learning program to train minority students in
foreign policy

Florida A&M University

1 999
Interior
Black Archives

$ 1 ,000,000

Florida A&M University

2000
Interior
for a new building for storing archives

$2,800,000

Florida International University

2003
Housing and Urban Development
$405,000
for the College of Law to build facilities for a student legal clinic

Fordham University

1998
Transportation
parking facility partly open to the public

$632,500

Fordham University

1 999
Transportation
parking facility

$862,500

Fordham University

2000
Transportation
$ 1 ,090,000
for a parking facility, a small part of which will be available to the
public

Fordham University

200 1
Transportation
$ 1 , 1 3 1 , 134
for a parking facility, a small part of which will be available to the
public

Fordham University

2002
Transportation
for a parking facility

$ 1 ,092,500

Fordham University

2003
Transportation
for a parking facility

$ 1 ,085,399

Georgetown University

$ 1 ,000,000
1990
Defense
for care provided to a military dependent at the university hospital
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$930,000

Table 2: Continued
Institution

Year

Earmarking Agency

Georgetown University

Defense
1 993
for programs of major importance to the department

Howard University

1 995
Education
law-school clinic

Idaho State University

2003
Housing and Urban Development
$324,000
to build the L.E. and Thelma E. Stephens Performing Arts Center

Illinois Institute of Technology

Defense
1 993
for programs of major importance to the department

Illinois State University

$99,350
2003
Education
to provide special-education devices, equipment, and materials for
Peoria District No. 1 1 7

Illinois State University

$1 00,000
2003
Education
to provide special-education materials, equipment, and technological
devices for Peoria District No. 1 50

Earmark Amount

Indiana University at Bloomington 1 990
Agriculture
to study the feasibility of federal support for new facilities

$ 1 0,000,000
$4,500,000

$5,000,000

$ 1 50,000

$340,000
Indiana University at Bloomington 200 1
Education
for Project TEAM, a program that helps students from
underrepresented minority groups prepare to become teachers
Indiana University at Bloomington 2002
Education
$675,000
for Project TEAM, a program that helps students from
underrepresented minority groups prepare to become teachers
Indiana University at Bloomington 2002
Transportation
for the campus bus service to purchase buses

$ 1 ,000,000

Jackson State University

$250,000
2002
Housing and Urban Development
for renovations to the Center for the Study of the 20th Century African
American

Johns Hopkins University

$ 1 5,000,000
1993
Defense
for research, development, and other programs; Congress instructed the
department to conduct a merit review of the earmark and to award as
much of the amount that was set aside for the programs as appropriate

Kent State University

Labor
200 1
for job training at the Ohio Employee Ownership Center

Long Island University system

200 1
Housing and Urban Development
to restore the Tilles Center for the Performing Arts
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$298,000
$ 1 , 1 1 0,000

Table 2: Continued
Institution

Year

Earmarking Agency

Louisiana State University

1993 Defense
for programs of major importance to the department

Louisiana State University HSC

2003
Transportation
$250,000
for an intermodal parking facility for the university's School of
Medicine in Shreveport

Medical C of Ohio

1993 Defense
for programs of major importance to the department

Mississippi State University

2001
Transportation
for a bus service expansion plan

Morgan State University

$ 1 ,600,000
1999 NASA
renovations and environmental remediation at the university's multi
purpose facility

New Mexico State University

$250,000
2001
Transportation
To be shared with a municipal agency, to purchase two buses to serve
the university

New Mexico State University

2002
Justice
for an after-school program for at risk youth

New Mexico State University

2002 Transportation
$500,000
for the City of Las Cruces to provide bus service to the university's
campus

North Carolina State University

2003 Transportation
for a new transportation center

North Dakota State University

1990 Agriculture
for operating an international-trade center at Fargo

$500,000

North Dakota State University

1990 Agriculture
for operating an international-trade center at Fargo

$500,000

Northeastern University

1993 Defense
for programs of major importance to the department

Northern Illinois University

2000 Education
$ 1 ,500,000
for the Lake County Multi-University Center, which offers courses and
degrees from each of the member colleges

Northwestern University

2000 Health and Human Services
for a construction project
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Earmark Amount

$4,000,000

$ 1 ,000,000
$ 100,000

$750,000

$2,000,000

$9,000,000

$3,398,000

Table 2: Continued
Institution

Year

Earmarking Agency

Ohio University

200 1
Transportation
to lengthen the runway at the university's airport

Oklahoma State University

2003
Transportation
$3 ,000,000
to build a multimodal transportation facility that will include a parking
garage, a bus station, and spaces for bicycles

Oregon University System

$ 1 ,000,000
2000
Education
for improving educational programs and services for Native American
students

Southern Illinois University

$ 1 ,500,000
2000
Education
for the Lake County Multi-University Center, which offers courses and
degrees from each of the member colleges

Southern Illinois University

200 1
Transportation
for safety improvements at the university's airport

Stanford University

1 999
Housing and Urban Development
to renovate a performing-arts facility

Stevens Institute of Technology

$472,906
2003
Education
for innovative educational opportunities for its undergraduate and
graduate students

Texas A&M at College Station

1999
Transportation
.
$ 1 ,250,000
to relocate the railroad line that runs through the campus and the towns
of College Station and Bryant

Texas A&M at College Station

2000
Transportation
$2,370,000
to relocate the railroad line that runs through the campus and the towns
of College Station and Bryan

Texas A&M at College Station

$2,458,987
200 1
Transportation
To be shared with a state agency, to relocate the railroad line that runs
through the campus and the towns of College Station and Bryan

Texas A&M at College Station

2002
Transportation
$ 1 ,425,000
To be shared with a state agency, to relocate the railroad line that runs
through the campus and the towns of College Station and Bryan, Tex.

Texas A&M at College Station

2003
Transportation
$2,359,563
To be shared with a state agency, to relocate the railroad line that runs
through the campus and the towns of College Station and Bryan, Tex.

Texas A&M at Kingsville

2002
Housing and Urban Development
to build the Kingsville Center for Young Children
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Earmark Amount
$ 1 ,000,000

$ 1 ,584,000
$300,000

$ 100,000

Table 2: Continued
Institution

Year

Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

Texas Tech University

2002 Transportation
for the university's bus service

$ 1,000,000

Texas Tech University

2003
Transportation
for the university's bus service

$ 1,850,000

University of Alabama

200 1
Housing and Urban Development
to renovate the Gorgas House, a residence built in 1 829

$1 ,000,000

University of Alaska at Fairbanks 1999 Housing and Urban Development
$2,500,000
toward the cost of a new wing for the university's museum
$2,500,000
University of Alaska at Fairbanks 1999 Housing and Urban Development
toward the cost of a new wing for the university's museum
University of Alaska at Fairbanks 2000
Housing and Urban Development
for the university's museum

$3,500,000

University of Alaska at Fairbanks 2000 Housing and Urban Development
for the university's museum

$3,500,000

University of Alaska at Fairbanks 2001
Labor
$ 1 ,250,000
To be shared with nonprofit organizations in western Alaska, to
conduct job-training programs
University of Arkansas

$500,000
1999 Transportation
to help buy buses for the free, university-operated transit system that
serves the campus and town

University of Arkansas

2000 Transportation
$500,000
to help buy buses for the free, university-operated transit system that
serves the campus and town

University of California at Davis

2000 Transportation
$625,000
for a maintenance facility for Unitrans, a student-run bus service

University of California at Davis

2001
Transportation
for Unitrans, a student-run public bus service

University of California at Davis

$900,000
2002 Transportation
for the City of Davis to provide bus service to the university's campus

University of Connecticut

1992 Energy
for an unspecified purpose

University of Georgia

$ 1 50,000
1990 Agriculture
to study the feasibility of federal support for constructing new facilities
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$1 ,000,000

$400,000

Table 2: Continued
Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

Institution

Year

University of Hartford

2002 Housing and Urban Development
for the Hartt School of Music's new performing-arts center

University of Hartford

$397,400
2003
Education
for equipment for its Hartt School's new Performing Arts Center

University ofHawaii-Manoa

$750,000
1990 Education
for the Gifted and Talented Program under the Native Hawaiian
Education Act

University ofHawaii-Manoa

$750,000
1 990 Education
for the Gifted and Talented Program under the Native Hawaiian
Education Act

University ofHawaii-Manoa

1996 Commerce
Hawaii Stock Management Plan

$700,000

University o( Hawaii-Manoa

1996 Commerce
Hawaii Stock Management Plan

$700,000

University ofHawaii-Manoa

1997 Commerce
Hawaii Stock-Management plan

$500,000

University ofHawaii-Manoa

1997 Commerce
Hawaii Stock-Management plan

$500,000

University of Illinois at Chicago

2000 Education
$ 1 ,500,000
for the Lake County Multi-University Center, which offers courses and
degrees from each of the member colleges

University of Illinois at Spmgfld

$ 1 ,500,000
2000 Education
for the Lake County Multi-University Center, which offers courses and
degrees from each of the member colleges

University of Illinois at Urb-Chm 2000 Agriculture
for unspecified research

$75,000

$900,000

University of Kentucky

$750,000
2001
Justice
for the College of Law for teleconferencing equipment to train
prosecutors

University of Louisville

$ 1 ,500,000
1999 Transportation
for buses, to be owned by a local transit authority, to shuttle students
between the campus and their jobs at a local employer

$500,000
University of Maryland at ColPrk 2000 Housing and Urban Development
to renovate the James McGregor Bums Academy of Leadership
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Table 2: Continued
Institution

Year

Earmarking Agency

Earmark Amount

University of Maryland at ColPrk 2003
Education
$496,750
for personnel, graduate-student stipends, and other expenses at its
Maryland Institute for Minority Achievement and Urban Education
University of Miami

Defense
1 993
for programs of major importance to the department

$2,000,000

University of Minnesota at TC

Defense
1993
for programs of major importance to the department

$2,000,000

University of Montana

Justice
2000
to create a juvenile after-school program

$ 1 ,000,000

University of Nevada at Reno

2000
Justice
$ 1 ,000,000
for the National Judicial College: training state, local, and tribal judges

University of Nevada at Reno

2001
Justice
$3,000,000
for the National Council of Juvenile and Family Courts, which provides
continuing education in family and juvenile law

University of Nevada at Reno

$750,000
2002
Justice
for the National Judicial College, which provides continuing education
for judges

University of Nevada at Reno

$ 1 ,425,000
2003
Justice
for the National Council of Juvenile and Family Courts to continue
training people involved in the juvenile-court system

University of Nevada at Reno

2003
Justice
$ 1 ,500,000
to provide education and training to judges through its National Judicial
College, focusing particularly on judicial proficiency, competence,
skills, and productivity

University of New Mexico

Interior
1994
summer institute at the American Indian Law Center

U NC at Chapel Hill

1 998
buses

U NC at Chapel Hill

$ 1 ,200,000
1999
Education
site on the World-Wide Web that pertains to professional development
and that is maintained by the university

University of North Dakota

$ 1 ,250,000
2000 Defense
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains helicopter pilots

University of North Dakota

$ 1 ,250,000
2000
Defense
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains helicopter pilots

Transportation
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$200,000
$ 1 ,000,000

Table 2: Continued
Institution

Year

University of North Dakota

200 1
Defense
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains pilots

$ 1 ,250,000

University of North Dakota

200 1
Defense
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains pilots

$ 1 ,250,000

University of North Dakota

Defense
2002
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains pilots

$ 1 ,000,000

University of North Dakota

2002
Defense
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains pilots

$ 1 ,000,000

University of North Dakota

$ 1 ,000,000
2003
Defense
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains helicopter pilots in
conjunction with the Reserve Officer Training Corps

University of North Dakota

$ 1 ,000,000
2003
Defense
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains helicopter pilots in
conjunction with the Reserve Officer Training Corps

University of North Dakota

$ 1 50,000
2003
Justice
for its Native Americans Into Law program, which seeks to recruit and
retain American Indian law students

University of Pennsylvania

Defense
1 993
for programs of major importance to the department

University of Puerto Rico

$750,000
2000
Education
for expansion of the "Hispanic Education Linkages Program" in New
York City

University of Puerto Rico

2000
Housing and Urban Development
for the renovation of the university's theater

University of Rhode Island

$ 1 50,000
1 990
Agriculture
to study the feasibility of federal support for constructing new facilities

University of Rhode Island

200 1
Education
for the 200 1 World Scholar-Athlete Games

$800,000

University of Rhode Island

Education
2003
to support the Scholar-Athlete Games

$794,800

University of Rhode Island

Education
2003
to support the Scholar-Athlete Games

$794,800

Earmarking Agency
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Earmark Amount

$7,500,000

$250,000

Table 2: Continued
Institution

Year

University of Saint Thomas

$ 1 5,000,000
1993 Defense
for research, development, and other programs; Congress instructed the
department to conduct a merit review of the earmark and to award as
much of the amount that was set aside for the programs as it deemed
appropriate

University of South Dakota

2002
Interior
to preserve the Old Women's Gym and an armory

University of South Florida

1993 Defense
for programs of major importance to the department

$2,000,000

University of South Florida

2002 Defense
to establish a Reserve Officer Training Corps program

$ 1 ,100,000

University of South Florida

2003 Education
$99,350
for the Tampa Bay Consortium for the Development of Educational
Leaders

University of Utah

$3,000,000
2002
Transportation
for a project to extend a light-rail line through the university's campus
to its medical center

University of Utah

$ 12,000,000
2003
Transportation
for a project to extend a light-rail line through the university's campus
to its medical center

University of Wisconsin at Madn

1993 Defense
$ 1 5,000,000
for research, development, and other programs; Congress instructed the
department to conduct a merit review of the earmark and to award as
much of the amount that was set aside for the programs as it deemed
appropriate

Utah State University

1990 Agriculture
$ 150,000
to study the feasibility of federal support for constructing new facilities

Utah State University

1990 Agriculture
$ 150,000
to study the feasibility of federal support for constructing new facilities

Virginia Tech

1994 Interior
to start an Appalachian university consortium

Washington State University

$ 150,000
1990 Agriculture
to study the feasibility of federal support for constructing new facilities

Washington State University

1993

Earmarking Agency

Housing and Urban Development

affordable-housing program
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Earmark Amount

$365,000

$250,000

$200,000

Table 2: Continued
Institution

Year

Earmarking Agency

Wayne State University

1 999 Housing and Urban Development
to renovate a theater

West Virginia Sch of Ost Med

$900,000
2000 Housing and Urban Development
to construct a multi-use museum and cultural-education center

West Virginia University

1999 Transportation
$4,000,000
to modernize the elevated transitway that serves the campus

Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007.
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Earmark Amount

$ 100,000

Table 3: List of institutions in this study.
State

Institution Name

Alabama

Auburn University Main Campus
Samford University
University of Alabama at Birmingham
University of Alabama in Huntsville
University of Alabama

Alaska

University of Alaska Fairbanks

Arizona

Arizona State University at the Tempe Campus
Midwestern University
Northcentral University
Northern Arizona University
University of Arizona
University of Phoenix-Online Campus

Arkansas

University of Arkansas at Little Rock
University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences
University of Arkansas Main Campus

California

Alliant International University-San Diego
Argosy University-Orange Campus
Azusa Pacific University
Biola University
California Institute of Integral Studies
California Institute of Technology
City of Hope Graduate School of Biological Science
Claremont Graduate University
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

California

Fielding Graduate University
Golden Gate University-San Francisco
Loma Linda University
Pacifica Graduate Institute
Pepperdine University
San Diego State University
Stanford University
The Scripps Research Institute
University of California-Berkeley
University of California-Davis
University of California-Irvine
University of California-Los Angeles
University of California-Riverside
University of California-San Diego
University of California-San Francisco
University of California-Santa Barbara
University of California-Santa Cruz
University of La Verne
University of San Diego
University of San Francisco
University of Southern California
University of the Pacific
Western University of Health Sciences
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

Colorado

Colorado School of Mines
Colorado State University
University of Colorado All Campuses
University of Denver
University of Northern Colorado

Connecticut

University of Bridgeport
University of Connecticut
University of Hartford
Yale University

Delaware

University of Delaware
Wilmington College

District of Columbia

American University
Catholic University of America
George Washington University
Georgetown University
Howard University

Florida

Argosy University-Sarasota Campus
Barry University
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University
Florida Atlantic University-Boca Raton
Florida Institute of Technology-Melbourne
Florida International University
Florida State University
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

Florida

Nova Southeastern University
University of Central Florida
University of Florida
University of Miami
University of South Florida
University of West Florida

Georgia

Clark Atlanta University
Emory University
Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus
Georgia Southern University
Georgia State University
Medical College of Georgia
Morehouse School of Medicine
University of Georgia

Hawaii

University of Hawaii at Manoa

Idaho

Idaho State University
University of Idaho

Illinois

DePaul University
Illinois Institute of Technology
Illinois State University
Loyola University Chicago
Midwestern University
Northern Illinois University
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Table 3 : Continued.
State

Institution Name

Illinois

Northwestern University
Rosalind Franklin University of Medicine and Science
Rush University
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Trinity International University
University of Chicago
University of Illinois at Chicago
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Indiana

Ball State University
Indiana State University
Indiana University-Bloomington
Purdue University-Main Campus
University of Notre Dame

Iowa

Des Moines University-Osteopathic Medical Center
Iowa State University
University of Iowa

Kansas

Kansas State University
University of Kansas All Campuses
Wichita State University

Kentucky

Spalding University
University of Kentucky
University of Louisville

Louisiana

Louisiana State University & A&M & Hebert Laws Center
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

Louisiana

Louisiana Tech University
Tulane University of Louisiana
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
University of New Orleans

Maine

University of Maine

Maryland

Johns Hopkins University
Morgan State University
University of Maryland-Baltimore
University of Maryland-Baltimore County
University of Maryland-College Park

Massachusetts

Boston College
Boston University
Brandeis University
Clark University
Harvard University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Northeastern University
Tufts University
University of Massachusetts Medical School-Worcester
University of Massachusetts-Amherst
University of Massachusetts-Boston
University of Massachusetts-Lowell

Michigan

Andrews University
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

Michigan

Central Michigan University
Michigan State University
Michigan Technological University
Oakland University
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor
Wayne State University
Western Michigan University

Minnesota

Argosy University-Twin Cities Campus
Capella University
Mayo Graduate School
Mayo Medical School
Saint Mary's University of Minnesota
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
University of St. Thomas
Walden University

Mississippi

Jackson State University
Mississippi State University
University of Mississippi All Campuses
University of Southern Mississippi

Missouri

A T Still University of Health Sciences
Kansas City University of Medicine and Biosciences
Saint Louis University-Main Campus
University of Missouri-Columbia
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

Missouri

University of Missouri-Kansas City
University of Missouri-Rolla
University of Missouri-St. Louis
Washington University in St. Louis

Montana

Montana State University-Bozeman
University of Montana-Missoula

Nebraska

University of Nebraska at Lincoln
University of Nebraska Medical Center

Nevada

University of Nevada-Las Vegas
University of Nevada-Reno

New Hampshire

Antioch New England Graduate School-New Hampshire
Dartmouth College
University of New Hampshire-Main Campus

New Jersey

Drew University
New Jersey Institute of Technology
Princeton University
Rutgers University All Campuses
Seton Hall University
Stevens Institute of Technology
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey

New Mexico

New Mexico State University-Main Campus
University of New Mexico-Main Campus

New York

Adelphi University
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

New York

Albany Medical College
Clarkson University
Columbia University in the City of New York
Cornell University All Campuses
CUNY Graduate School and University Center
Fordham University
Hofstra University
Long Island University-C W Post Campus
Mount Sinai School of Medicine
New School University
New York Medical College
New York University
Pace University-New York
Polytechnic University
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Rockefeller University
St. John's University-New York
SUNY at Albany
SUNY at Binghamton
SUNY at Buffalo
SUNY at Stony Brook
SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry
SUNY Health Science Center at Brooklyn
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

New York

SUNY Health Science Center at Syracuse
Syracuse University
Teachers College at Columbia University
University of Roche.ster
Yeshiva University

North Carolina

Duke University
East Carolina University
North Carolina A & T State University
North Carolina State University at Raleigh
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Wake Forest University

North Dakota

North Dakota State University-Main Campus
University of North Dakota-Main Campus

Ohio

Bowling Green State University-Main Campus
Case Western Reserve University
Cleveland State University
Kent State University-Main Campus
Medical College of Ohio
Miami University-Oxford
Northeastern Ohio Universities College of Medicine
Ohio State University-Main Campus
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

Ohio

Ohio University-Main Campus
Union Institute & University
University of Akron Main Campus
University of Cincinnati-Main Campus
University of Dayton
University of Toledo
Wright State University-Main Campus

Oklahoma

Oklahoma State University All Campuses
Oral Roberts University
University of Oklahoma All Campuses
University of Tulsa

Oregon

George Fox University
Oregon Health & Science University
Oregon State University
Pacific University
Portland State University
University of Oregon

Pennsylvania

Carnegie Mellon University
Drexel University
Duquesne University
Immaculata University
Indiana University of Pennsylvania-Main Campus
La Salle University
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

Pennsylvania

Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine
Lehigh University
Pennsylvania State University All Campuses
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine
Temple University
Thomas Jefferson University
University of Pennsylvania
University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus
Widener University-Main Campus

Puerto Rico

Carlos Albizu University
Inter American University of Puerto Rico-Metro
Ponce School of Medicine
San Juan Bautista School of Medicine
Universidad Central del Caribe
University of Puerto Rico-Medical Sciences Campus
University of Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras Campus

Rhode Island

Brown University
University of Rhode Island

South Carolina

Clemson University
Medical University of South Carolina
South Carolina State University
University of South Carolina-Columbia

South Dakota

South Dakota State University
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

South Dakota

University of South Dakota

Tennessee

East Tennessee State University
Meharry Medical College
Tennessee State University
Trevecca Nazarene University
University of Memphis
University of Tennessee
Vanderbilt University

Texas

Baylor College of Medicine
Baylor University
Rice University
Southern Methodist University
Texas A & M University
Texas A & M University System Health Science Center
Texas A & M University-Kingsville
Texas Christian University
Texas Tech University
Texas Woman's University
University of Houston-University Park
University of North Texas
University ofNorth Texas-Health Sciences Center at Ft. Worth
University of Texas at Arlington, The
University of Texas at Austin, The
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

Texas

University of Texas at Dallas, The
University of Texas at El Paso, The
University of Texas Health Science Center
University of Texas Health Science-San Antonio
University of Texas Medical Branch
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas

Utah

Brigham Young University
University of Utah
Utah State University

Virginia

College of William and Mary
Eastern Virginia Medical School
Edward Via Virginia College of Osteopathic Medicine
George Mason University
Old Dominion University
Regent University
University of Virginia-Main Campus
Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Vermont

University of Vermont and State Agricultural College

Washington

University of Washington-Seattle Campus
Washington State University

West Virginia

West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine
West Virginia University
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Table 3: Continued.
State

Institution Name

Wisconsin

Marquette University
Medical College of Wisconsin
University of Wisconsin-Madison
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Wyoming

University of Wyoming

Source: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 2006.

260

Table 4: Change in institutional rank by obligations and percentage of total obligations (all earmarks).
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

1

University of Hawaii at Manoa

61

$62, 132,000

49

$ 167,877,000

0.0052

0.0067

29.58%

12

2

University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus

17

$ 1 78, 148,000

12

$394,701 ,000

0.0149

0.0 1 58

6.25%

5

3

Loma Linda University

147

$ 13,435,000

146

$33,752,000

0.001 1

0.0014

20.48%

1

4

University of Alabama

121

$25, 1 70,000

1 67

$2 1 ,323,000

0.0021

0.0009

-59.37%

-46

5

West Virginia University

92

$38,762,000

1 38

$36,639,000

0.0032

0.00 15

-54.67%

-46

6

1 02

$32,425,000

97

$79,395,000

0.0027

0.0032

17.43%

5

55

$66,974,000

60

$ 1 36,850,000

0.0056

0.0055

-2.01 %

-5

8

University of Alaska Fairbanks
Louisiana State Univ & A&M & Hebert Laws
Ctr
University of South Florida

1 36

$ 17,574,000

98

$77,720,000

0.0015

0.003 1

1 12.08%

38

9

Georgetown University

88

$39,328,000

93

$84,4 10,000

0.0033

0.0034

2.93%

-5

10

Texas A & M University

37

$93,733,000

67

$ 1 1 8,297,000

0.0078

0.0047

-39.48%

-30

11

Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus

18

$ 176,023,000

19

$345,920,000

0.0147

0.0139

-5.76%

-1

12

University of Mississippi Main Campus

148

$ 1 2,974,000

1 13

$58,223,000

0.001 1

0.0023

1 1 5.2 1 %

35

13

University of Missouri-Columbia

70

$5 1 ,943,000

70

$ 1 1 1 ,795,000

0.0043

0.0045

3.22%

0

14

University of New Hampshire-Main Campus

1 11

$29,126,000

1 18

$49,1 86,000

0.0024

0.0020

-19.01 %

-7

15

University o f Alabama in Huntsville

133

$ 1 7,972,000

1 59

$27,470,000

0.001 5

0.001 1

-26.70%

-26

16

Michigan State University

39

$91 ,675,000

54

$ 1 55,587,000

0.0077

0.0062

- 1 8.6 1 %

-15

17

University o f Alabama at Birmingham

43

$88,978,000

28

$253,617,000

0.0074

0.0102

36.69%

15

7
N

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B : Institution; C : Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D : Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued

N
N

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

1 07

$30,45 1 ,000

106

$68,046,000

0.0025

0.0027

7. 1 6%

1

73

$5 1 ,250,000

83

$95,8 1 1 ,000

0.0043

0.0038

- 1 0.35%

-10

1 03

$3 1 ,995,000

1 07

$67,977,000

0.0027

0.0027

1 .89%

-4

84

$42,506,000

72

$ 1 1 0,238,000

0.0035

0.0044

24.37%

12

Medical University of South Carolina

1 16

$26,545,000

71

$ 1 1 1 ,003,000

0.0022

0.0044

100.54%

45

23

University of Minnesota-Twin Cities

10

$2 12, 127,000

20

$345,802,000

0.0 177

0.0 1 38

-2 1 .82%

-10

24

University of Florida

30

$ 1 09,862,000

40

$ 1 95 ,296,000

0.0092

0.0078

-14.75%

-10

25

University of Michigan-Ann Arbor

5

$233,782,000

3

$520,754,000

0.0 1 95

0.0209

6.82%

2

26

Montana State University-Bozeman

1 30

$ 1 8,844,000

1 10

$62,09 1 ,000

0.00 16

0.0025

58.02%

20

27

Washington State University

95

$38, 1 02,000

1 08

$66,950,000

0.0032

0.0027

-1 5.73%

-13

28

University of New Mexico-Main Campus

82

$43,387,000

86

$93,757,000

0.0036

0.0038

3.63%

-4

29

Oregon State University

59

$62,960,000

84

$95,758,000

0.0053

0.0038

-27.06%

-25

30

University of Nebraska at Lincoln

94

$38,3 14,000

1 09

$63,799,000

0.0032

0.0026

-20. 14%

-15

31

Cornell University-Endowed Colleges

7

$2 1 8,542,000

21

$334, 1 08,000

0.0 1 82

0.0 1 34

-26.68%

-14

32

University of North Dakota-Main Campus

1 27

$20,880,000

1 55

$29, 140,000

0.0017

0.00 12

-33.07%

-28

33

Rutgers University-New Brunswick

52

$72,384,000

58

$140,72 1 ,000

0.0060

0.0056

-6.77%

-6

34

Clemson University

1 22

$23,390,000

129

$43,7 1 6,000

0.0020

0.00 1 8

- 1 0.37%

-7

A

B

18

Auburn University Main Campus

19

Iowa State University

20

Mississippi State University

21

Dartmouth College

22

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all eannarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued

N

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

35

North Carolina State University at Raleigh

48

$77,955,000

76

$ 1 0 1 ,444,000

0.0065

0.004 1

-37.59%

-28

36

New Mexico State University-Main Campus

75

$50,270,000

1 12

$6 1 ,503,000

0.0042

0.0025

-4 1 .33%

-37

37

North Dakota State University-Main Campus

141

$ 1 5,767,000

1 36

$38,092,000

0.00 1 3

0.00 1 5

1 5.86%

5

38

University of Wisconsin-Madison

6

$222, 1 63,000

8

$434,927,000

0.0 1 85

0.0 1 74

-6. 1 2%

-2

39

University of Arizona

26

$ 1 22,6 1 0,000

39

$207, 1 32,000

0.0 102

0.0083

- 1 8.98%

-13

40

Oklahoma State University-Main Campus

93

$38,472,000

1 15

$52,859,000

0.0032

0.002 1

-34. 1 1 %

-22

41

University o f Connecticut

71

$5 1 ,502,000

65

$ 1 1 9,729,000

0.0043

0.0048

1 1 .49%

6

42

Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus

51

$73,257,000

56

$ 144,324,000

0.006 1

0.0058

-5.52%

-5

43

University of Texas at Austin, The

27

$ 1 2 1 ,429,000

25

$274,827,000

0.0 1 0 1

0.0 1 1 0

8.54%

2

44

Oregon Health & Science University

68

$54,06 1 ,000

45

$ 1 76,3 1 9,000

0.0045

0.007 1

56.4 1 %

23

45

Texas Tech University

1 67

$8,767,000

153

$30,584,000

0.0007

0.00 12

67.30%

14

46

Carnegie Mellon University

54

$67,580,000

68

$ 1 1 6,405,000

0.0056

0.0047

- 1 7.40%

-14

47

Northwestern University

46

$84,1 89,000

33

$2 1 3,558,000

0.0070

0.0086

2 1 .65%

13

48

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

24

$ 147,492,000

26

$264, 1 78,000

0.0 123

0.0 1 06

-14. 1 0%

-2

49

University of Kentucky

66

$57,722,000

62

$ 129,790,000

0.0048

0.0052

7.83%

4

50

University of Iowa

34

$98,9 13,000

41

$ 1 88,861 ,000

0.0083

0.0076

-8.43%

-7

51

Florida State University

91

$38,788,000

95

$79,963,000

0.0032

0.0032

- 1 . 14%

-4

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4 : Continued

N

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

University of South Carolina-Columbia

125

$22,21 0,000

140

$36, 1 56,000

0.0019

0.0014

-2 1 .93%

-15

53

Kansas State University

1 12

$28,327,000

125

$45,53 1 ,000

0.0024

0.00 18

-22.92%

-13

54

University of Idaho

13 1

$ 1 8,430,000

130

$42,6 1 0,000

0.001 5

0.001 7

10.88%

1

55

Ohio State University-Main Campus

31

$109,413,000

32

$2 14,200,000

0.0091

0.0086

-6. 1 1%

-1

56

University o f Southern Mississippi

1 92

$5,703,000

1 64

$25,080,000

0.0005

0.0010

1 10.90%

28

57

University of Washington-Seattle Campus

2

$280,054,000

2

$63 1, 144,000

0.0234

0.0253

8.08%

0

58

University of Maryland-College Park

40

$90,648,000

51

$ 1 57,668,000

0.0076

0.0063

-1 6.59%

-1 1

59

San Diego State University

144

$14,661 ,000

1 37

$37,526,000

0.0012

0.00 1 5

22.75%

7

60

Purdue University-Main Campus

41

$89,8 1 7,000

63

$ 126,788,000

0.0075

0.005 1

-32.30%

-22

61

University of Miami

50

$75,487,000

59

$138,941 ,000

0.0063

0.0056

-1 1 .73%

-9

62

University of New Orleans

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

63

Polytechnic University

195

$5,457,000

220

$7, 1 60,000

0.0005

0.0003

-37.08%

-25

64

University of Nevada-Las Vegas

1 87

$6,61 6,000

1 73

$ 1 8,263,000

0.0006

0.0007

32.38%

14

65

University of Georgia

57

$64,375,000

78

$ 100,293,000

0.0054

0.0040

-25.29%

-2 1

66

University of Louisville

1 70

$8,550,000

1 16

$52,843,000

0.0007

0.0021

1 96.39%

54

67

University of Utah

47

$82, 1 05,000

43

$ 1 82, 199,000

0.0069

0.0073

6.42%

4

68

Illinois Institute of Technology

1 84

$6,989,000

201

$ 1 0,91 0,000

0.0006

0.0004

-25. 14%

-17

A

B

52

Key to column headings: A : Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B : Institution; C : Rank o f institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D : Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change betw�n 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued

N

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

69

Indiana University-Bloomington

33

$ 1 0 1 , 1 56,000

46

$ 1 74,268,000

0.0084

0.007

- 1 7.38%

-13

70

Boston University

45

$85,250,000

17

$347, 1 52,000

0.007 1

0.01 39

95.29%

28

71

Drexel University

149

$ 12,792,000

1 26

$45,328,000

0.001 1

0.00 1 8

69.93%

23

72

Tulane University of Louisiana

101

$34,068,000

91

$88,066,000

0.0028

0.0035

23.97%

10

73

Stevens Institute of Technology

239

$2,093,000

1 79

$ 1 6,476,000

0.0002

0.0007

277.5 1%

60

74

George Mason University

1 66

$8,957,000

1 50

$32,5 14,000

0.0007

0.001 3

74.08%

16

75

University of Tennessee, The

99

$35,446,000

111

$61 ,999,000

0.0030

0.0025

- 1 6. 1 2%

-12

76

Johns Hopkins University

1

$660,675,000

1

$ 1 , 1 37,366,000

0.0552

0.0455

- 1 7.44%

0

77

University of Arkansas Main Campus

1 15

$26,850,000

1 54

$29,554,000

0.0022

0.00 12

-47.2 1%

-39

78

University of Nevada-Reno

142

$ 1 5,657,000

1 14

$56,806,000

0.00 1 3

0.0023

73.99%

28

79

University of Montana-Missoula, The

1 77

$7,380,000

1 63

$25,343,000

0.0006

0.00 1 0

64.68%

14

80

University of Massachusetts-Amherst

96

$37,443,000

94

$8 1 ,9 1 5 ,000

0.003 1

0.0033

4.92%

2

81

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

3

$275,279,000

23

$29 1 ,879,000

0.0230

0.0 1 1 7

-49. 1 5%

-20

82

University of Texas Health Science Center

97

$36,322,000

77

$ 1 0 1 ,305,000

0.0030

0.004 1

33.75%

20

83

Colorado State University

65

$59,2 1 7,000

66

$ 1 1 9,497,000

0.0049

0.0048

-3.23%

-1

84

SUNY at Buffalo

78

$48,052,000

1 00

$73,935,000

0.0040

0.0030

-26.2 1%

-22

85

Utah State University

63

$60,349,000

90

$90,670,000

0.0050

0.0036

-27.95%

-27

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued

°'°'

N

A

B

86

University of Missouri-Rolla

87

University of Pennsylvania

88

University of Maine

89

University of Rochester

90

Florida International University

91

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

200

$4,814,000

1 88

$ 14,2 14,000

0.0004

0.0006

4 1 .60%

12

14

$ 193,366,000

4

$495,264,000

0.0 1 6 1

0.01 98

22.83%

10

15 1

$ 1 2,079,000

148

$33,252,000

0.0010

0.001 3

32.02%

3

25

$ 132,965,000

30

$228,985,000

0.01 1 1

0.0092

- 1 7.41 %

-5

216

$3,608,000

156

$28,5 1 1 ,000

0.0003

0.001 1

278.96%

60

Harvard University

13

$ 1 98,3 10,000

14

$384,89 1 ,000

0.0 1 66

0.01 54

-6.92%

-1

92

New York University

32

$ 102,009,000

47

$ 1 73,449,000

0.0085

0.0069

-18.46%

-15

93

University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey

85

$42,45 1 ,000

57

$ 14 1 ,8 17,000

0.0035

0.0057

60.2 1 %

28

94

University of California-Davis

35

$96,998,000

34

$212,7 1 8,000

0.008 1

0.0085

5 . 1 7%

1

95

Arizona State University at the Tempe Campus

1 13

$28,3 1 7,000

103

$72,483,000

0.0024

0.0029

22.75%

10

96

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

77

$48, 196,000

104

$71,843,000

0.0040

0.0029

-28.5 1 %

-27

97

University of Rhode Island

1 19

$25,378,000

1 35

$38,776,000

0.0021

0.001 6

-26.73%

-16

98

University of Notre Dame

1 32

$ 1 8,034,000

1 27

$44,01 7,000

0.001 5

0.0018

1 7.05%

5

99

University of Central Florida

181

$7,229,000

133

$41 ,486,000

0.0006

0.001 7

1 75.2 1 %

48

100

Tufts University

79

$47,324,000

101

$73,2 1 8,000

0.0040

0.0029

-25.80%

-22

101

University of Delaware

108

$29,746,000

102

$73,043,000

0.0025

0.0029

1 7.76%

6

102

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

20

$ 1 5 1,949,000

18

$346,008,000

0.0127

0.01 39

9.20%

2

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued

N

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

103

University of Colorado at Boulder

19

$ 1 67,427,000

15

$367,867,000

0.0 140

0.0147

5.37%

4

104

Wichita State University

237

$2,224,000

212

$8,328,000

0.0002

0.0003

79.58%

25

105

Howard University

120

$25,204,000

145

$33,805,000

0.002 1

0.00 14

-35.68%

-25

106

Jackson State University

188

$6,478,000

1 74

$ 1 8, 107,000

0.0005

0.0007

34.05%

14

107

Columbia University in the City ofNew York

12

$202, 128,000

9

$42 1 ,760,000

0.0 1 69

0.01 69

0.07%

3

108

University of California-Santa Barbara

72

$5 1 ,433,000

80

$99,070,000

0.0043

0.0040

-7.63%

-8

109

Indiana University of Pennsylvania-Main Campus

270

$524,000

263

$ 1 ,26 1 ,000

0.0000

0.0001

1 5.4 1%

7

1 10

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

126

$2 1 ,624,000

142

$35,255,000

0.00 1 8

0.00 14

-2 1 .8 1%

-16

111

Southern Illinois University Carbondale

178

$7,353,000

206

$9,948,000

0.0006

0.0004

-35. 12%

-28

1 12

University of California-San Francisco

11

$209,638,000

13

$393,078,000

0.0 1 75

0.0 1 57

-10.08%

-2

1 13

New Jersey Institute of Technology

1 89

$6,274,000

194

$ 12,765,000

0.0005

0.0005

-2.43%

-5

1 14

University of California-Riverside

139

$ 16,832,000

131

$42,3 17,000

0.00 14

0.00 1 7

20.57%

8

1 15

Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University

152

$ 1 1 ,988,000

1 57

$28,0 12,000

0.00 10

0.001 1

12.06%

-5

1 16

Wayne State University

81

$44,365,000

81

$98,738,000

0.0037

0.0040

6.73%

0

1 17

Florida Atlantic University-Boca Raton

179

$7,268,000

204

$ 10,399,000

0.0006

0.0004

-3 1 .38%

-25

1 18

University of West Florida, The

238

$2,094,000

24 1

$3,829,000

0.0002

0.0002

-1 1 . 1 6%

3

1 19

University of Southern California

21

$ 1 5 1 ,454,000

24

$279,442,000

0.0 126

0.01 12

-1 1 .52%

-3

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued

N

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

Syracuse University

138

$ 1 7,039,000

1 62

$25,896,000

0.00 14

0.00 1 0

-27. 1 2%

-24

121

University of Oklahoma Norman Campus

1 05

$30,787,000

96

$79,954,000

0.0026

0.0032

24.54%

9

1 22

University of Vermont and State Agricultural Coll

98

$36,3 1 9,000

89

$9 1 , 1 1 6,000

0.0030

0.0036

20.3 1 %

9

1 23

University of Kansas Main Campus

83

$43,128,000

82

$97,653,000

0.0036

0.0039

8.59%

1

1 24

George Washington University

1 23

$22,976,000

1 05

$70,820,000

0.00 1 9

0.0028

47.82%

18

1 25

Lehigh University

1 46

$ 13,636,000

1 84

$ 1 5,799,000

0.00 1 1

0.0006

-44.44%

-38

1 26

University of Houston-University Park

1 24

$22,78 1 ,000

1 43

$35 , 1 74,000

0.00 1 9

0.00 14

-25.95%

-19

1 27

Northeastern University

145

$ 14,6 14,000

1 58

$27,973,000

0.00 1 2

0.00 1 1

-8.2 1 %

-13

1 28

East Tennessee State University

248

$ 1 , 1 74,000

230

$6,026,000

0.0001

0.0002

146. 1 6%

18

1 29

Stanford University

4

$270,056,000

6

$467, 1 53,000

0.0225

0.0 1 87

- 1 7.04%

-2

1 30

South Carolina State University

1 98

$4,957,000

22 1

$7,027,000

0.0004

0.0003

-32.02%

-23

131

Brown University

86

$40,877,000

85

$94,1 96,000

0.0034

0.0038

1 0.5 1 %

1

1 32

University of Oregon

1 09

$29,605,000

1 34

$41 ,362,000

0.0025

0.00 1 7

-33.00%

-25

1 33

Medical College of Wisconsin

1 18

$25,402,000

79

$99,976,000

0.002 1

0.0040

88.75%

39

1 34

University of St. Thomas

275

$240,000

276

$408,000

0.0000

0.0000

- 1 8.47%

-1

1 35

University of Texas Southwestern Med Ctr (Dallas)

58

$63,950,000

44

$ 1 82, 1 42,000

0.0053

0.0073

36.59%

14

1 36

Wake Forest University

87

$40,480,000

64

$ 122,656,000

0.0034

0.0049

45.3 1 %

23

A

B

1 20

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4 : Continued

N

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

University of Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras Campus

1 56

$ 1 0,757,000

141

$35,35 1 ,000

0.0009

0.00 14

57.60%

15

1 38

Indiana State University

257

$950,000

264

$ 1 ,2 1 5 ,000

0.0001

0.0000

-38.67%

-7

1 39

University of Texas at El Paso

158

$ 1 0,257,000

1 68

$ 19,672,000

0.0009

0.0008

-8.02%

-10

140

University of South Dakota

232

$2,685,000

202

$10,72 1 ,000

0.0002

0.0004

9 1 .49%

30

141

Northern Arizona University

1 82

$7, 1 00,000

1 72

$ 1 8,723,000

0.0006

0.0007

26.46%

10

142

Northern Illinois University

203

$4,599,000

237

$4,086,000

0.0004

0.0002

-57.39%

-34

143

University of California-San Diego

9

$2 14,975,000

7

$466,450,000

0.0 1 79

0.0 1 87

4.06%

2

144

South Dakota State University

159

$9,856,000

1 83

$ 1 5 ,904,000

0.0008

0.0006

-22.62%

-24

145

University of Missouri-St. Louis

218

$3,478,000

247

$3,446,000

0.0003

0.0001

-52.48%

-29

146

Louisiana Tech University

1 57

$ 10,7 1 8,000

252

$2,620,000

0.0009

0.0001

-88.28%

-95

147

University of Virginia-Main Campus

44

$86,007,000

42

$ 1 85,567,000

0.0072

0.0074

3.47%

2

148

Portland State University

217

$3,55 1 ,000

226

$6,454,000

0.0003

0.0003

-12.84%

-9

149

Western Michigan University

1 93

$5,53 1 ,000

198

$ 1 1 ,884,000

0.0005

0.0005

3 .04%

-5

1 50

Case Western Reserve University

36

$94,254,000

38

$207,734,000

0.0079

0.0083

5 .70%

-2

151

University of Maryland-Baltimore

67

$54,644,000

61

$ 1 36,203,000

0.0046

0.0055

19.53%

6

1 52

Ohio University-Main Campus

2 14

$3,9 1 6,000

203

$ 1 0,637,000

0.0003

0.0004

30.26%

11

1 53

University of California-Berkeley

16

$ 1 85 ,232,000

29

$245,570,000

0.0 1 55

0.0098

-36.42%

-13

A

B

1 37

Key to column headings: A : Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B : Institution; C : Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D : Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued

N

A

B

1 54

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

Clark Atlanta University

1 10

$29,449,000

21 1

$8,646,000

0.0025

0.0003

-85.92%

-101

1 55

Idaho State University

252

$ 1 , 1 20,000

23 1

$5,497,000

0.000 1

0.0002

135.37%

21

1 56

Temple University

1 14

$27,472,000

122

$46,544,000

0.0023

0.0019

-1 8.75%

-8

1 57

Loyola University Chicago

1 62

$9,266,000

1 52

$32,271 ,000

0.0008

0.0013

67.02%

10

1 58

University of Dayton

106

$30,5 1 5 ,000

121

$46,599,000

0.0025

0.0019

-26.77%

-15

1 59

Morgan State University

220

$3,294,000

193

$ 12,836,000

0.0003

0.0005

86.88%

27

1 60

University of San Francisco

244

$ 1 ,504,000

272

$694,000

0.0001

0.0000

-77.87%

-28

161

Rush University

260

$752,000

120

$46,697,000

0.0001

0.001 9

2878.0%

140

1 62

Boston College

1 97

$5,004,000

1 77

$ 16,598,000

0.0004

0.0007

59.07%

20

1 63

West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

1 64

University of California-Los Angeles

8

$2 1 5,75 1 ,000

5

$475,65 1 ,000

0.01 80

0.0 1 90

5.73%

3

1 65

University of Toledo

205

$4,538,000

200

$ 1 1 ,277,000

0.0004

0.0005

19. 1 7%

5

1 66

University of Wyoming

140

$ 16,340,000

161

$26,807,000

0.0014

0.00 1 1

-21 .32%

-2 1

1 67

Yeshiva University

49

$77,808,000

52

$ 1 56,637,000

0.0065

0.0063

-3.46%

-3

1 68

University of California-Santa Cruz

129

$ 19,1 64,000

1 19

$48,141 ,000

0.001 6

0.0019

20.47%

10

1 69

University of San Diego

249

$ 1 , 1 48,000

268

$ 1,067,000

0.0001

0.0000

-55.43%

-19

1 70

Thomas Jefferson University

100

$34,914,000

92

$87,1 86,000

0.0029

0.0035

19.76%

8

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued

N

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

Barry University

265

$65 1 ,000

240

$3,896,000

0.0001

0.0002

1 87.00%

25

1 72

Rice University

1 17

$25,987,000

1 17

$5 1 ,472,000

0.0022

0.0021

-5.01 %

0

1 73

Wright State University-Main Campus

1 60

$9,649,000

1 85

$15,455,000

0.0008

0.0006

-23 . 1 9%

-25

1 74

Fordham University

246

$ 1,372,000

271

$805,000

0.0001

0.0000

-7 1 .86%

-25

1 75

University of Cincinnati-Main Campus

64

$59,65 1 ,000

69

$ 1 12,41 7,000

0.0050

0.0045

-9.62%

-5

1 76

Kent State University-Main Campus

1 86

$6,702,000

1 97

$ 1 2,287,000

0.0006

0.0005

-12.08%

-1 1

1 77

Immaculata University

285

$0

283

$84,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

2

1 78

Marquette University

227

$2,975,000

217

$7,772,000

0.0002

0.0003

25.28%

10

56

$66,369,000

55

$ 1 5 1 ,085,000

0.0055

0.0060

9.17%

1

134

$ 17,853,000

181

$ 1 6, 1 92,000

0.00 1 5

0.0006

-56.5 1%

-47

76

$48,580,000

88

$91 ,372,000

0.0041

0.0037

-9.80%

-12

A

B

171

1 79· University of California-Irvine
1 80

SUNY at Albany

181

Virginia Commonwealth University

1 82

Morehouse School of Medicine

1 69

$8,563,000

144

$34,887,000

0.0007

0.0014

95.38%

25

1 83

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

1 80

$7,260,000

1 78

$ 16,527,000

0.0006

0.0007

9. 1 7%

2

1 84

Old Dominion University

1 85

$6,869,000

1 75

$ 1 7,546,000

0.0006

0.0007

22.50%

10

1 85

Brandeis University

128

$ 19,302,000

151

$32,462,000

0.00 16

0.0013

-19.35%

-23

1 86

Central Michigan University

269

$548,000

244

$3,75 1 ,000

0.0000

0.0002

228.26%

25

1 87

University of Maryland-Baltimore County

208

$4,437,000

1 39

$36,529,000

0.0004

0.001 5

294.82%

69

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued

N
N

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

1 88

University of Akron Main Campus

202

$4,724,000

218

$7,698,000

0.0004

0.0003

-21 .85%

-16

1 89

University of Illinois at Chicago

74

$50,798,000

53

$ 156, 138,000

0.0042

0.0063

47.40%

21

1 90

University of Texas Medical Branch, The

104

$3 1 ,505,000

36

$208,286,000

0.0026

0.0083

2 1 7.05%

68

191

Meharry Medical College

1 50

$ 12,464,000

1 60

$27,3 1 8,000

0.0010

0.001 1

5. 1 1%

-10

1 92

University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences

1 55

$1 1 ,744,000

209

$8,883,000

0.0010

0.0004

-63.73%

-54

1 93

Northeastern Ohio Universities College of Medicine

254

$ 1,043,000

250

$3,075,000

0.0001

0.0001

4 1 .39%

4

194

Yale University

15

$ 190,388,000

16

$349,560,000

0.0 1 59

0.0140

- 1 1 .95%

-1

1 95

Princeton University

60

$62,373,000

73

$ 107,933,000

0.0052

0.0043

- 1 7.01 %

-13

1 96

University of Nebraska Medical Center

1 54

$ 1 1 ,747,000

124

$46,476,000

0.0010

0.0019

89.74%

30

1 97

North Carolina A & T State University

153

$ 1 1 ,866,000

1 69

$19,644,000

0.0010

0.0008

-20.61 %

-16

198

University of Missouri-Kansas City

190

$6,079,000

1 87

$ 14,8 10,000

0.0005

0.0006

1 6.83%

3

199

University of Texas at Dallas, The

199

$4,860,000

199

$ 1 1 ,327,000

0.0004

0.0005

1 1 .77%

0

200

College of William and Mary

1 72

$8, 1 88,000

1 86

$ 14,983,000

0.0007

0.0006

- 12.25%

-14

201

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

1 74

$7,868,000

232

$5,170,000

0.0007

0.0002

-68.49%

-58

202

DePaul University

26 1

$744,000

239

$3,91 0,000

0.0001

0.0002

1 52.03%

22

203

Ball State University

268

$55 1 ,000

242

$3,820,000

0.0000

0.0002

232.48%

26

204

University of Tulsa

222

$3,1 7 1 ,000

234

$4,5 1 1 ,000

0.0003

0.0002

-3 1 .78%

-12

Key to column headings: A : Rank o f institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank o f institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued
A

N

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

1 63

$9, 1 60,000

1 76

$ 1 7,279,000

0.0008

0.0007

-9.54%

-13

205

Tennessee State University

206

University of Texas Health Science-San Antonio

80

$45,700,000

87

$9 1 ,787,000

0.0038

0.0037

-3.68%

-7

207

Vanderbilt University

38

$93,0 1 0,000

27

$263,8 12,000

0.0078

0.0 1 06

36.02%

11

208

SUNY Coll of Environmental Science and Forestry

266

$61 8,000

246

$3,536,000

0.0001

0.0001

1 74.39%

20

209

Georgia State University

1 75

$7,529,000

1 70

$ 19,252,000

0.0006

0.0008

22.63%

5

210

Saint Louis University-Main Campus

137

$ 1 7,206,000

1 32

$4 1 ,983 ,000

0.00 14

0.00 1 7

1 7.01%

5

211

SUNY at Stony Brook

62

$6 1 ,976,000

74

$ 107,534,000

0.0052

0.0043

-1 6.79%

-12

212

Emory University

53

$68,1 64,000

31

$2 14,970,000

0.0057

0.0086

5 1 .24%

22

213

Michigan Technological University

1 76

$7,427,000

1 95

$ 12,602,000

0.0006

0.0005

-1 8.63%

-19

2 14

Duke University

22

$ 1 5 1 ,087,000

11

$412,069,000

0.0 1 26

0.0 1 65

30.79%

11

2 14

Medical College of Georgia

171

$8,413,000

149

$32,642,000

0.0007

0.00 13

86.07%

22

214

City o f Hope Graduate School of Biological Science

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

217

New York Medical College

143

$ 14,776,000

1 66

$22, 1 1 8,000

0.00 12

0.0009

-28.2 1%

-23

218

Southern Methodist University

204

$4,547,000

1 90

$ 1 3 ,26 1 ,000

0.0004

0.0005

39.86%

14

219

University of Northern Colorado

242

$ 1 ,764,000

259

$ 1 ,7 1 9,000

0.000 1

0.0001

-53 .27%

-17

220

University of Texas at Arlington, The

2 12

$4,03 1 ,000

205

$ 1 0,325,000

0.0003

0.0004

22.84%

7

22 1

Nova Southeastern University

262

$735,000

257

$ 1 ,973,000

0.000 1

0.000 1

28.73%

5

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4 : Continued
A

N

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

285

$0

288

$0

0

0

NIA

-3

222

Des Moines University-Osteopathic Medical Center

223

Washington University in St. Louis

23

$ 148,036,000

10

$4 1 9,0 14,000

0.0 1 24

0.0 1 68

35.74%

13

224

University of Chicago

28

$ 1 1 8,03 1 ,000

37

$208, 1 39,000

0.0099

0.0083

- 1 5 .43%

-9

225

Oakland University

224

$3,04 1 ,000

223

$6,73 1 ,000

0.0003

0.0003

6. 1 5%

226

Hofstra University

245

$ 1 ,40 1 ,000

1 92

$ 1 2,977,000

0.000 1

0.0005

344.2 1 %

53

227

East Carolina University

1 96

$5,239,000

216

$7,864,000

0.0004

0.0003

-28.0 1 %

-20

228

Texas A & M University-Kingsville

259

$783,000

245

$3,649,000

0.000 1

0.000 1

1 23.49%

14

229

Colorado School of Mines

191

$5,964,000

1 89

$ 14, 1 97,000

0.0005

0.0006

14. 1 6%

2

230

Cleveland State University

200

$4,8 14,000

227

$6,252,000

0.0004

0.0003

-37.72%

-27

23 1

Eastern Virginia Medical School

1 68

$8,742,000

229

$6,029,000

0.0007

0.0002

-66.93%

-6 1

232

Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine

280

$ 1 04,000

279

$232,000

0.0000

0.0000

6.98%

233

Mount Sinai School of Medicine

69

$52,529,000

48

$ 1 70,932,000

0.0044

0.0068

56.05%

21

234

Illinois State University

223

$3,079,000

243

$3,80 1 ,000

0.0003

0.0002

-40.80%

-20

235

Clark University

229

$2,894,000

254

$2,403,000

0.0002

0.000 1

-60. 1 8%

-25

236

University of Denver

1 83

$6,996,000

210

$8,8 1 8,000

0.0006

0.0004

-39.55%

-27

237

Adelphi University

264

$652,000

280

$20 1 ,000

0.000 1

0.0000

-85.22%

-16

238

Widener University-Main Campus

278

$ 1 14,000

282

$ 1 1 6,000

0.0000

0.0000

-5 1 .20%

-4

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued
A

N

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

239

Clarkson University

207

$4,498,000

235

$4,497,000

0.0004

0.0002

-52.05%

-28

240

Bowling Green State University-Main Campus

23 1

$2,720,000

225

$6,475,000

0.0002

0.0003

14. 1 6%

6

241

University of Massachusetts-Boston

209

$4,126,000

219

$7,452,000

0.0003

0.0003

-13.39%

-10

242

Georgia Southern University

258

$943,000

262

$ 1,309,000

0.0001

0.0001

-33.43%

-4

243

Medical College of Ohio

1 73

$7,924,000

191

$13,025,000

0.0007

0.0005

-2 1 . 1 7%

-18

244

University of Memphis

21 1

$4,094,000

214

$8, 148,000

0.0003

0.0003

-4.56%

-3

245

University of North Texas

230

$2,830,000

1 80

$ 16,41 6,000

0.0002

0.0007

1 78. 1 8%

50

246

University of Massachusetts-Lowell

206

$4,5 13,000

215

$7,870,000

0.0004

0.0003

- 16.37%

-9

247

Baylor University

272

$377,000

274

$56 1 ,000

0.0000

0.0000

-28.64%

-2

248

Long Island University-C W Post Campus

247

$ 1 ,2 18,000

25 1

$2,842,000

0.0001

0.0001

1 1 .90%

-4

249

University of Louisiana at Lafayette

234

$2,443,000

238

$3,952,000

0.0002

0.0002

-22.42%

-4

250

Brigham Young University

1 94

$5,485,000

207

$9,398,000

0.0005

0.0004

- 1 7.83%

-13

25 1

SUNY Health Science Center at Syracuse

1 65

$9,079,000

171

$ 19,091 ,000

0.0008

0.0008

0.84%

-6

252

Baylor College of Medicine

42

$89,304,000

22

$297,252,000

0.0075

0.0 1 19

59.63%

20

253

Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

253

University ofNorth Texas-Hlth Sci Ctr (Ft. Worth)

226

$2,981 ,000

288

$0

0.0002

0.0000

-100.0%

-62

255

Golden Gate University-San Francisco

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued
A

N

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

-17

256

University of the Pacific

249

$ 1 , 148,000

266

$ 1 , 1 12,000

0.0001

0.0000

-53.55%

257

Drew University

276

$ 1 86,000

275

$5 1 7,000

0.0000

0.0000

33.30%

258

University of Hartford

253

$ 1,095,000

269

$925,000

0.0001

0.0000

-59.49%

-16

259

SUNY Health Science Center at Brooklyn

1 35

$ 17,747,000

1 65

$23,01 1 ,000

0.00 1 5

0.0009

-37.82%

-30

260

Alliant International University-San Diego

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

261

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

228

$2,91 0,000

1 82

$ 1 6,1 86,000

0.0002

0.0006

1 66.74%

46

262

New School University

274

$321 ,000

260

$ 1 ,423,000

0.0000

0.0001

1 12.59%

14

263

Pace University-New York

267

$570,000

241

$3,879,000

0.0000

0.0002

226.36%

26

264

SUNY at Binghamton

215

$3,792,000

208

$9,1 05,000

0.0003

0.0004

1 5. 1 5%

7

265

Seton Hall University

241

$ 1 ,789,000

256

$2,021 ,000

0.0001

0.0001

-45.82%

-15

265

St. John's University-New York

256

$ 1 ,014,000

288

$0

0.0001

0.0000

- 100.0%

-32

267

Miami University-Oxford

210

$4,099,000

236

$4,491 ,000

0.0003

0.0002

-47.46%

-26

268

La Salle University

285

$0

277

$39 1 ,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

8

269

American University

233

$2,459,000

258

$ 1,754,000

0.0002

0.0001

-65.79%

-25

270

Spalding University

285

$0

286

$36,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-1

27 1

The Scripps Research Institute

279

$ 108,000

35

$209,937,000

0.0000

0.0084

93 120%

244

271

California Institute of Technology

29

$ 109,877,000

50

$ 164,054,000

0.0092

0.0066

-28.40%

-2 1

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all eannarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued
B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

27 1

University of Massachusetts Medical Sch Worcester

90

$38,955,000

75

$ 102,594,000

0.0033

0.0041

26.30%

15

271

Rockefeller University

89

$39,28 1 ,000

99

$75,1 56,000

0.0033

0.0030

-8.25%

-10

271

University of Arkansas at Little Rock

225

$3,019,000

123

$46,522,000

0.0003

0.0019

639.00%

1 02

271

Texas A & M University System Health Science Ctr

285

$0

1 28

$43,998,000

0.0000

0.001 8

NIA

1 57

271

University of Puerto Rico-Med Sciences Campus

161

$9,508,000

147

$33,729,000

0.0008

0.0014

70. 1 2%

14

271

Albany Medical College

1 64

$9,085,000

196

$ 12,488,000

0.0008

0.0005

-34.08%

-32

271

Universidad Central del Caribe

25 1

$ 1 , 142,000

213

$8,234,000

0.0001

0.0003

245.77%

38

271

Catholic University of America

213

$3,933,000

222

$6,765,000

0.0003

0.0003

-17.5 1 %

-9

271

Ponce School of Medicine

236

$2,356,000

224

$6,625,000

0.0002

0.0003

34.85%

12

271

Teachers College at Columbia University

235

$2,377,000

228

$6, 145,000

0.0002

0.0002

23.98%

7

27 1

Florida Institute of Technology-Melbourne

240

$ 1,897,000

233

$4,600,000

0.0002

0.0002

1 6.29%

7

271

Texas Christian University

221

$3, 194,000

248

$3,352,000

0.0003

0.0001

-49.67%

-27

271

CUNY Graduate School and University Center

219

$3,346,000

249

$3,1 29,000

0.0003

0.0001

-55 . 1 5%

-30

271

Duquesne University

263

$667,000

253

$2,580,000

0.0001

0.0001

85.50%

10

271

Inter American University of Puerto Rico-Metro

243

$ 1 ,572,000

255

$2,359,000

0.0001

0.0001

-28.03%

-12

271

Texas Woman's University

255

$ 1 ,029,000

261

$ 1,368,000

0.0001

0.0001

-36.24%

-6

271

Andrews University

283

$ 19,000

265

$ 1 , 135,000

0.0000

0.0000

2765%

18

A

N
-.l
-.l

Key to column headings: A : Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B : Institution; C : Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D : Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued
A

N

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

17

271

Claremont Graduate University

284

$ 10,000

267

$ 1 ,071 ,000

0.0000

0.0000

5036%

27 1

Midwestern University

27 1

$382,000

270

$846,000

0.0000

0.0000

6.2 1 %

271

Pepperdine University

277

$ 143,000

273

$570,000

0.0000

0.0000

9 1 . 1 6%

4

271

Carlos Albizu University

285

$0

278

$379,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

7

271

Pacific University

28 1

$64,000

28 1

$ 130,000

0.0000

0.0000

-2.59%

0

271

Western University of Health Sciences

285

$0

284

$70,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

1

271

Wilmington College

285

$0

285

$50,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

0

271

Saint Mary's University of Minnesota

273

$324,000

287

$25,000

0.0000

0.0000

-96.30%

-14

27 1

A T Still University of Health Sciences

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

271

Antioch New England Graduate School (NH)

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

27 1

Argosy University-Orange Campus

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

Argosy University-Sarasota Campus

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

Argosy University-Twin Cities Campus

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

27 1

Azusa Pacific University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

271

Biola University

282

$20,000

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

-1 00.0%

-6

27 1

California Institute of Integral Studies

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

27 1

Capella University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

NIA
NIA

NIA

NIA

-3
-3
-3
-3

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued
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N

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

271

Edward Via Virginia Coll of Osteopathic Medicine

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

27 1

Fielding Graduate University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

271

George Fox University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

Kansas City University of Medicine and Biosciences

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

Mayo Graduate School

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

271

Mayo Medical School

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

27 1

Midwestern University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

Northcentral University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

Oral Roberts University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

Pacifica Graduate Institute

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

27 1

Regent University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

Rosalind Franklin University of Med and Science

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

Samford University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

271

San Juan Bautista School of Medicine

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

271

Trevecca Nazarene University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

27 1

Trinity International University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

271

Union Institute & University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

NIA

NIA

NIA

NIA

NIA

NIA
NIA

NIA

-3
-3

-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 4: Continued
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

NIA

-3

27 1

University of Bridgeport

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

27 1

University of La Verne

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

University of Phoenix-Online Campus

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

271

Walden University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

NIA
NIA

-3
-3
-3

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007

N
00
0

Table 5: Change in institutional rank by obligations and percentage oftotal obligations (including only Science and
Engineering earmarks}.

N

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

1

University of Hawaii at Manoa

61

$62,1 32,000

49

$ 1 67,877,000

0.0052

0.0067

29.58%

12

2

University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus

17

$ 1 78,148,000

12

$394,701 ,000

0.0 149

0.0 1 58

6.25%

5

3

University of Alabama, The

121

$25,1 70,000

1 67

$21 ,323,000

0.0021

0.0009

-59.37%

-46

4

West Virginia University

92

$38,762,000

138

$36,639,000

0.0032

0.001 5

-54.67%

-46

5

Loma Linda University

147

$13,435,000

146

$33,752,000

0.001 1

0.0014

20.48%

1

6

University of Alaska Fairbanks

1 02

$32,425,000

97

$79,395,000

0.0027

0.0032

1 7.43%

5

7

Louisiana St Univ & A&M & Hebert Laws Ctr

55

$66,974,000

60

$136,850,000

0.0056

0.0055

-2.01 %

-5

8

University of South Florida

1 36

$ 17,574,000

98

$77,720,000

0.0015

0.003 1

1 12.08%

38

9

Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus

18

$ 176,023,000

19

$345,920,000

0.0147

0.01 39

-5.76%

-1

10

Georgetown University

88

$39,328,000

93

$84,41 0,000

0.0033

0.0034

2.93%

-5

11

University of Mississippi Main Campus

148

$ 12,974,000

1 13

$58,223,000

0.001 1

0.0023

1 15.2 1 %

35

12

University of Missouri-Columbia

70

$5 1 ,943,000

70

$ 1 1 1 ,795,000

0.0043

0.0045

3.22%

0

13

Texas A & M University

37

$93,733,000

67

$ 1 1 8,297,000

0.0078

0.0047

-39.48%

-30

14

University of New Hampshire-Main Campus

111

$29,126,000

1 18

$49,1 86,000

0.0024

0.0020

- 1 9.01 %

-7

15

University of Alabama in Huntsville

133

$ 17,972,000

1 59

$27,470,000

0.00 1 5

0.001 1

-26.70%

-26

16

Michigan State University

39

$91 ,675,000

54

$ 155,587,000

0.0077

0.0062

- 18.6 1 %

-15

17

University of Alabama at Birmingham

43

$88,978,000

28

$253,6 1 7,000

0.0074

0.01 02

36.69%

15

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D : Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.

N
N

J

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

1 07

$30,45 1,000

106

$68,046,000

0.0025

0.0027

7. 1 6%

73

$5 1 ,250,000

83

$95,8 1 1 ,000

0.0043

0.0038

- 1 0.35%

-10

Mississippi State University

1 03

$3 1,995,000

107

$67,977,000

0.0027

0.0027

1 .89%

-4

21

Medical University o f South Carolina

1 16

$26,545,000

71

$ 1 1 1 ,003,000

0.0022

0.0044

1 00.54%

45

22

University of Florida

30

$ 1 09,862,000

40

$ 1 95,296,000

0.0092

0.0078

- 14.75%

-10

23

University o f Michigan-Ann Arbor

5

$233,782,000

3

$520,754,000

0.0 195

0.0209

6.82%

2

24

University of Minnesota-Twin Cities

10

$2 12, 1 27,000

20

$345,802,000

0.0 1 77

0.0 1 38

-2 1 .82%

-10

25

Washington State University

95

$38, 102,000

108

$66,950,000

0.0032

0.0027

- 1 5 .73%

-13

26

University of New Mexico-Main Campus

82

$43,387,000

86

$93,757,000

0.0036

0.0038

3 .63%

-4

27

Oregon State University

59

$62,960,000

84

$95,758,000

0.0053

0.0038

-27.06%

-25

28

Montana State University-Bozeman

1 30

$ 1 8,844,000

1 10

$62,09 1 ,000

0.00 16

0.0025

58.02%

20

29

University of Nebraska at Lincoln

94

$38,3 14,000

1 09

$63,799,000

0.0032

0.0026

-20.14%

-15

30

Cornell University-Endowed Colleges

7

$2 1 8,542,000

21

$334, 108,000

0.0 1 82

0.0 1 34

-26.68%

- 14

31

Rutgers University-New Brunswick

52

$72,384,000

58

$ 140,72 1 ,000

0.0060

0.0056

-6.77%

-6

32

Dartmouth College

84

$42,506,000

72

$ 1 1 0,238,000

0.0035

0.0044

24.37%

12

33

Clemson University

122

$23,390,000

129

$43 ,7 1 6,000

0.0020

0.00 1 8

- 1 0.37%

-7

34

North Carolina State University at Raleigh

48

$77,955,000

76

$ 10 1 ,444,000

0.0065

0.004 1

-37.59%

-28

A

B

18

Auburn University Main Campus

19

Iowa State University

20

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5: Continued.

N

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

35

New Mexico State University-Main Campus

75

$50,270,000

1 12

$61 ,503,000

0.0042

0.0025

-41 .33%

-37

36

University of North Dakota-Main Campus

127

$20,880,000

1 55

$29,140,000

0.0017

0.0012

-33.07%

-28

37

North Dakota State University-Main Campus

141

$ 1 5,767,000

1 36

$38,092,000

0.0013

0.00 1 5

1 5.86%

5

38

University of Arizona

26

$122,6 10,000

39

$207,132,000

0.0102

0.0083

- 1 8.98%

-13

39

Georgia Institute o f Technology-Main Campus

51

$73,257,000

56

$ 144,324,000

0.0061

0.0058

-5.52%

-5

40

University of Connecticut

71

$5 1 ,502,000

65

$ 1 1 9,729,000

0.0043

0.0048

1 1 .49%

6

41

Oklahoma State University-Main Campus

93

$38,472,000

1 15

$52,859,000

0.0032

0.0021

-34. 1 1%

-22

42

Oregon Health & Science University

68

$54,061 ,000

45

$ 1 76,3 19,000

0.0045

0.0071

56.41 %

23

43

Carnegie Mellon University

54

$67,580,000

68

$ 1 1 6,405,000

0.0056

0.0047

- 1 7.40%

-14

44

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

24

$ 147,492,000

26

$264,1 78,000

0.0123

0.0106

- 14. 10%

-2

45

University of Texas at Austin, The

21

$ 1 2 1 ,429,000

25

$274,827,000

0.0101

0.0 1 10

8.54%

2

46

University of Iowa

34

$98,9 1 3,000

41

$ 1 88,861 ,000

0.0083

0.0076

-8.43%

-7

47

Northwestern University

46

$84,1 89,000

33

$21 3,558,000

0.0070

0.0086

2 1 .65%

13

48

Florida State University

91

$38,788,000

95

$79,963,000

0.0032

0.0032

- 1 . 14%

-4

49

Texas Tech University

1 67

$8,767,000

1 53

$30,584,000

0.0007

0.001 2

67.30%

14

50

University of South Carolina-Columbia

1 25

$22,2 10,000

140

$36,1 56,000

0.001 9

0.0014

-21 .93%

-15

51

University of Wisconsin-Madison

6

$222, 1 63,000

8

$434,927,000

0.01 85

0.0 1 74

-6. 1 2%

-2

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.

N

A

B

52

Kansas State University

53

Ohio State University-Main Campus

54

University of Southern Mississippi

55

University of Washington-Seattle Campus

56

San Diego State University

57

Purdue University-Main Campus

58

C

D

E

F

G

ff

I

J

1 12

$28,327,000

1 25

$45,53 1 ,000

0.0024

0.001 8

-22.92%

-13

31

$ 1 09,4 1 3,000

32

$214,200,000

0.009 1

0.0086

-6. 1 1%

-1

192

$5,703,000

1 64

$25,080,000

0.0005

0.0010

1 10.90%

28

2

$280,054,000

2

$63 1 , 144,000

0.0234

0.0253

8.08%

0

144

$ 14,66 1 ,000

1 37

$37,526,000

0.0012

0.001 5

22.75%

7

41

$89,81 7,000

63

$ 126,788,000

0.0075

0.005 1

-32.30%

-22

University of New Orleans

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

59

University of Idaho

131

$ 1 8,430,000

130

$42,6 1 0,000

0.0015

0.001 7

10.88%

1

60

University of Maryland-College Park

40

$90,648,000

51

$ 157,668,000

0.0076

0.0063

-1 6.59%

-1 1

61

University ofNevada-Las Vegas

1 87

$6,6 1 6,000

1 73

$ 18,263,000

0.0006

0.0007

32.38%

14

62

University of Kentucky

66

$57,722,000

62

$ 129,790,000

0.0048

0.0052

7.83%

4

63

University of Georgia

57

$64,375,000

78

$ 100,293,000

0.0054

0.0040

-25.29%

-2 1

64

Polytechnic University

195

$5,457,000

220

$7, 1 60,000

0.0005

0.0003

-37.08%

-25

65

University of Louisville

1 70

$8,550,000

1 16

$52,843,000

0.0007

0.002 1

1 96.39%

54

66

Boston University

45

$85,250,000

17

$347, 1 52,000

0.0071

0.01 39

95.29%

28

67

Indiana University-Bloomington

33

$ 1 0 1 , 1 56,000

46

$ 174,268,000

0.0084

0.0070

-1 7.38%

-13

68

Drexel University

149

$ 12,792,000

1 26

$45,328,000

0.001 1

0.001 8

69.93%

23

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, I 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between I 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003 .

...

Table 5: Continued.

N

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

Tulane University of Louisiana

101

$34,068,000

91

$88,066,000

0.0028

0.0035

23.97%

10

70

Illinois Institute of Technology

1 84

$6,989,000

201

$10,91 0,000

0.0006

0.0004

-25. 14%

-17

71

Stevens Institute of Technology

239

$2,093,000

1 79

$ 16,476,000

0.0002

0.0007

277.5 1 %

60

72

University of Tennessee, The

99

$35,446,000

111

$61,999,000

0.0030

0.0025

- 1 6. 12%

-12

73

George Mason University

1 66

$8,957,000

1 50

$32,5 14,000

0.0007

0.0013

74.08%

16

74

University of Texas Health Science Center, The

97

$36,322,000

77

$ 1 0 1 ,305,000

0.0030

0.0041

33.75%

20

75

University of Massachusetts-Amherst

96

$37,443,000

94

$8 1 ,9 1 5,000

0.003 1

0.0033

4.92%

2

76

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

3

$275,279,000

23

$29 1 ,879,000

0.0230

0.01 1 7

-49. 1 5%

-20

77

University of Arkansas Main Campus

1 15

$26,850,000

1 54

$29,554,000

· 0.0022

0.0012

-47.2 1 %

-39

78

University of Miami

50

$75,487,000

59

$138,941 ,000

0.0063

0.0056

-1 1 .73%

-9

79

University of Utah

47

$82,105,000

43

$ 1 82, 199,000

0.0069

0.0073

6.42%

4

80

University of Missouri-Rolla

200

$4,8 14,000

1 88

$ 14,2 14,000

0.0004

0.0006

41 .60%

12

81

Utah State University

63

$60,349,000

90

$90,670,000

0.0050

0.0036

-27.95%

-27

82

University of Rochester

25

$ 132,965,000

30

$228,985,000

0.01 1 1

0.0092

-17.4 1 %

-5

83

University of Maine

15 1

$ 12,079,000

148

$33,252,000

0.0010

0.001 3

32.02%

3

84

Colorado State University

65

$59,2 1 7,000

66

$ 1 19,497,000

0.0049

0.0048

-3.23%

-1

85

Harvard University

13

$ 198,3 1 0,000

14

$384,891 ,000

0.01 66

0.0 1 54

-6.92%

-1

A

B

69

Key to column headings: A : Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B : Institution; C : Rank o f institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D : Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.

N

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

86

SUNY at Buffalo

78

$48,052,000

1 00

$73,935,000

0.0040

0.003

-26.2 1 %

-22

87

University of Nevada-Reno

142

$ 1 5,657,000

1 14

$56,806,000

0.00 1 3

0.0023

73.99%

28

88

University of Montana-Missoula, The

1 77

$7,380,000

1 63

$25,343,000

0.0006

0.00 10

64.68%

14

89

University of Med and Dentistry of New Jersey

85

$42,45 1 ,000

57

$ 14 1 ,8 17,000

0.0035

0.0057

60.2 1 %

28

90

Florida International University

216

$3,608,000

1 56

$28,5 1 1 ,000

0.0003

0.00 1 1

278.96%

60

91

Johns Hopkins University

1

$660,675,000

1

$ 1 , 137,366,000

0.0552

0.0455

- 1 7.44%

0

92

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ

77

$48, 1 96,000

1 04

$71 ,843,000

0.0040

0.0029

-28.5 1%

-27

93

University of Notre Dame

1 32

$ 1 8,034,000

1 27

$44,0 1 7,000

0.00 1 5

0.00 1 8

1 7.05%

5

94

University of Pennsylvania

14

$193,366,000

4

$495,264,000

0.0 1 6 1

0.0 1 98

22.83%

10

95

Arizona State University at the Tempe Campus

1 13

$28,3 1 7,000

1 03

$72,483,000

0.0024

0.0029

22.75%

10

96

University of Rhode Island

1 19

$25,378,000

135

$38,776,000

0.002 1

0.00 1 6

-26.73%

-16

97

University of California-Davis

35

$96,998,000

34

$2 1 2,71 8,000

0.0081

0.0085

5 . 1 7%

1

98

New York University

32

$ 1 02,009,000

47

$ 1 73,449,000

0.0085

0.0069

- 1 8 .46%

-15

99

University of Central Florida

181

$7,229,000

133

$41 ,486,000

0.0006

0.00 1 7

175.2 1%

48

1 00

University of Delaware

1 08

$29,746,000

1 02

$73,043,000

0.0025

0.0029

1 7.76%

6

101

Wichita State University

237

$2,224,000

2 12

$8,328,000

0.0002

0.0003

79.58%

25

1 02

Jackson State University

1 88

$6,478,000

1 74

$ 1 8, 1 07,000

0.0005

0.0007

34.05%

14

Key t o column headings: A : Rank o f institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B : Institution; C: Rank o f institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.

N

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

103

Tufts University

79

$47,324,000

101

$73,2 1 8,000

0.0040

0.0029

-25.80%

-22

104

Columbia University in the City ofNew York

12

$202,128,000

9

$42 1 ,760,000

0.0 1 69

0.0 1 69

0.07%

3

1 05

University of California-Santa Barbara

72

$5 1 ,433,000

80

$99,070,000

0.0043

0.0040

-7.63%

-8

1 06

University of Colorado at Boulder

19

$ 1 67,427,000

15

$367,867,000

0.0140

0.0147

5.37%

4

1 07

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

20

$ 1 5 1 ,949,000

18

$346,008,000

0.01 27

0.01 39

9.20%

2

108

Indiana University of Pennsylvania-Main Campus

270

$524,000

263

$ 1 ,261 ,000

0.0000

0.0001

1 5.41 %

7

109

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

126

$21 ,624,000

142

$35,255,000

0.00 18

0.0014

-2 1 .8 1 %

-16

1 10

University of California�San Francisco

11

$209,638,000

13

$393,078,000

0.01 75

0.01 57

- 10.08%

-2

111

New Jersey Institute of Technology

1 89

$6,274,000

1 94

$ 12,765,000

0.0005

0.0005

-2.43%

-5

1 12

University of California-Riverside

1 39

$ 16,832,000

131

$42,3 1 7,000

0.0014

0.0017

20.57%

8

1 13

Florida Atlantic University-Boca Raton

1 79

$7,268,000

204

$ 10,399,000

0.0006

0.0004

-3 1 .38%

-25

1 14

Wayne State University

81

$44,365,000

81

$98,738,000

0.0037

0.0040

6.73%

0

1 15

University of Southern California

21

$ 1 5 1 ,454,000

24

$279,442,000

0.01 26

0.0 1 12

- 1 1 .52%

-3

1 16

University of Oklahoma Norman Campus

105

$30,787,000

96

$79,954,000

0.0026

0.0032

24.54%

9

1 17

University of Vermont and State Agricultural Coll

98

$36,3 1 9,000

89

$91 , 1 1 6,000

0.0030

0.0036

20.3 1 %

9

1 18

Syracuse University

138

$ 1 7,039,000

1 62

$25,896,000

0.0014

0.0010

-27. 12%

-24

1 19

University of West Florida

238

$2,094,000

241

$3,829,000

0.0002

0.0002

- 1 1 . 1 6%

-3

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.

N

00
00

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

120

University of Kansas Main Campus

83

$43, 128,000

82

$97,653,000

0.0036

0.0039

8.59%

1

121

Lehigh University

146

$13,636,000

1 84

$ 1 5,799,000

0.001 1

0.0006

-44.44%

-38

122

University of Houston-University Park

1 24

$22,78 1 ,000

143

$35, 1 74,000

0.0019

0.0014

-25.95%

-19

1 23

Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University

1 52

$ 1 1 ,988,000

1 57

$28,012,000

0.0010

0.001 1

12.06%

-5

1 24

Brown University

86

$40,877,000

85

$94, 1 96,000

0.0034

0.0038

10.5 1 %

1

1 25

Medical College of Wisconsin

1 18

$25,402,000

79

$99,976,000

0.0021

0.0040

88.75%

39

1 26

Stanford University

4

$270,056,000

6

$467, 1 53,000

0.0225

0.0 1 87

- 17.04%

-2

1 27

Howard University

120

$25,204,000

145

$33,805,000

0.0021

0.00 14

-35.68%

-25

128

University of Texas Southwestern Med Ctr (Dallas)

58

$63,950,000

44

$ 1 82, 142,000

0.0053

0.0073

36.59%

14

1 29

South Carolina State University

1 98

$4,957,000

22 1

$7,027,000

0.0004

0.0003

-32.02%

-23

1 30

Southern Illinois University Carbondale

1 78

$7,353,000

206

$9,948,000

0.0006

0.0004

-35 . 1 2%

-28

131

Wake Forest University

87

$40,480,000

64

$ 122,656,000

0.0034

0.0049

45. 3 1 %

23

1 32

University of Oregon

109

$29,605,000

1 34

$41 ,362,000

0.0025

0.001 7

-33.00%

-25

1 33

University of Texas at El Paso, The

1 58

$ 10,257,000

1 68

$ 19,672,000

0.0009

0.0008

-8.02%

-10

134

University of South Dakota

232

$2,685,000

202

$10,72 1 ,000

0.0002

0.0004

91 .49%

30

1 35

Northern Arizona University

1 82

$7, 1 00,000

1 72

$ 1 8,723,000

0.0006

0.0007

26.46%

10

1 36

University of Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras Campus

1 56

$ 10,757,000

141

$35,35 1 ,000

0.0009

0.0014

57.60%

15

Key to column headings: A : Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B : Institution; C : Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D : Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.

N

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

137

University of California-San Diego

9

$2 14,975,000

7

$466,450,000

0.01 79

0.01 87

4.06%

2

138

South Dakota State University

1 59

$9,856,000

1 83

$ 1 5,904,000

0.0008

0.0006

-22.62%

-24

1 39

University of Missouri-St. Louis

218

$3,478,000

247

$3,446,000

0.0003

0.0001

-52.48%

-29

140

Louisiana Tech University

157

$ 10,7 1 8,000

252

$2,620,000

0.0009

0.0001

-88.28%

-95

141

University of Virginia-Main Campus

44

$86,007,000

42

$ 185,567,000

0.0072

0.0074

3.47%

2

1 42

Western Michigan University

1 93

$5,531 ,000

198

$ 1 1 ,884,000

0.0005

0.0005

3.04%

-5

143

Northern Illinois University

203

$4,599,000

237

$4,086,000

0.0004

0.0002

-57.39%

-34

144

Portland State University

217

$3,55 1 ,000

226

$6,454,000

0.0003

0.0003

-12.84%

-9

145

George Washington University

123

$22,976,000

105

$70,820,000

0.0019

0.0028

47.82%

18

146

Case W estem Reserve University

36

$94,254,000

38

$207,734,000

0.0079

0.0083

5.70%

-2

147

University of Maryland-Baltimore

67

$54,644,000

61

$ 136,203,000

0.0046

0.0055

1 9.53%

6

148

University of California-Berkeley

16

$ 1 85,232,000

29

$245,570,000

0.0155

0.0098

-36.42%

-13

149

Clark Atlanta University

1 10

$29,449,000

211

$8,646,000

0.0025

0.0003

-85.92%

-101

1 50

Indiana State University

257

$950,000

264

$ 1 ,215,000

0.0001

0.0000

-38.67%

-7

151

Idaho State University

252

$ 1, 1 20,000

23 1

$5,497,000

0.0001

0.0002

1 35.37%

21

1 52

Ohio University-Main Campus

2 14

$3,91 6,000

203

$ 10,637,000

0.0003

0.0004

30.26%

11

1 53

University of Dayton

106

$30,5 15,000

121

$46,599,000

0.0025

0.0019

-26.77%

-15

Key to column headings: A : Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B : Institution; C : Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D : Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.

N

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

Temple University

1 14

$27,472,000

122

$46,544,000

0.0023

0.0019

-1 8.75%

-8

155

University of San Francisco

244

$ 1 ,504,000

272

$694,000

0.0001

0.0000

-77.87%

-28

1 56

Loyola University Chicago

1 62

$9,266,000

1 52

$32,27 1,000

0.0008

0.0013

67.02%

10

1 57

Rush University

260

$752,000

120

$46,697,000

0.0001

0.0019

2878%

140

1 58

Northeastern University

145

$ 14,614,000

1 58

$27,973,000

0.0012

0.00 1 1

-8.2 1 %

-13

1 59

University of California-Los Angeles

8

$215,75 1 ,000

5

$475,65 1,000

0.01 80

0.01 90

5.73%

3

1 60

Morgan State University

220

$3,294,000

193

$ 12,836,000

0.0003

0.0005

86.88%

27

161

University o f Toledo

205

$4,538,000

200

$ 1 1 ,277,000

0.0004

0.0005

1 9. 1 7%

5

1 62

University of Wyoming

140

$ 1 6,340,000

161

$26,807,000

0.0014

0.001 1

-2 1 .32%

-2 1

1 63

West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

1 64

University of California-Santa Cruz

129

$ 1 9,1 64,000

1 19

$48, 141 ,000

0.001 6

0.0019

20.47%

10

1 65

University of San Diego

249

$ 1 , 148,000

268

$ 1,067,000

0.0001

0.0000

-55.43%

-19

1 66

Thomas Jefferson University

100

$34,914,000

92

$87,1 86,000

0.0029

0.0035

1 9.76%

8

1 67

Rice University

1 17

$25,987,000

1 17

$5 1 ,472,000

0.0022

0.0021

-5.01 %

0

1 68

Wright State University-Main Campus

1 60

$9,649,000

1 85

$ 15,455,000

0.0008

0.0006

-23 . 1 9%

-25

1 69

University of Cincinnati-Main Campus

64

$59,65 1 ,000

69

$ 1 12,417,000

0.0050

0.0045

-9.62%

-5

1 70

Immaculata University

285

$0

283

$84,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

2

A

B

1 54

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.

N

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

227

$2,975,000

217

$7,772,000

0.0002

0.0003

25.28%

10

56

$66,369,000

55

$ 1 5 1 ,085,000

0.0055

0.0060

9. 1 7%

1 34

$ 1 7,853,000

181

$ 1 6, 1 92,000

0.00 1 5

0.0006

-56.5 1%

-47

76

$48,580,000

88

$9 1 ,372,000

0.0041

0.0037

-9.80%

-12

Morehouse School of Medicine

1 69

$8,563,000

144

$34,887,000

0.0007

0.00 14

95.38%

25

1 76

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

1 80

$7,260,000

1 78

$1 6,527,000

0.0006

0.0007

9. 1 7%

2

1 77

Old Dominion University

1 85

$6,869,000

1 75

$ 17,546,000

0.0006

0.0007

22.50%

10

1 78

Yeshiva University

49

$77,808,000

52

$ 1 56,637,000

0.0065

0.0063

-3.46%

-3

1 79

Brandeis University

128

$ 19,302,000

151

$32,462,000

0.00 16

0.00 1 3

-19.35%

-23

1 80

Barry University

265

$65 1 ,000

240

$3,896,000

0.0001

0.0002

1 87.00%

25

181

Central Michigan University

269

$548,000

244

$3,75 1 ,000

0.0000

0.0002

228.26%

25

1 82

University of Maryland-Baltimore County

208

$4,437,000

139

$36,529,000

0.0004

0.00 1 5

294.82%

69

1 83

University of Akron Main Campus

202

$4,724,000

218

$7,698,000

0.0004

0.0003

-2 1 .85%

-16

1 84

University of Texas Medical Branch, The

1 04

$3 1 ,505,000

36

$208,286,000

0.0026

0.0083

2 1 7.05%

68

1 85

Meharry Medical College

1 50

$ 12,464,000

1 60

$27,3 1 8,000

0.00 10

0.00 1 1

5.1 1%

-10

1 86

University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences

1 55

$ 1 1 ,744,000

209

$8,883,000

0.00 10

0.0004

-63.73%

-54

1 87

Boston College

197

$5,004,000

1 77

$ 1 6,598,000

0.0004

0.0007

59.07%

20

A

B

171

Marquette University

1 72

University of California-Irvine

1 73

SUNY at Albany

1 74

Virginia Commonwealth University

1 75

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.

N
N

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

254

$ 1,043,000

250

$3,075,000

0.0001

0.0001

4 1 .39%

4

Yale University

15

$ 190,388,000

16

$349,560,000

0.01 59

0.0140

-1 1 .95%

-1

1 90

Princeton University

60

$62,373,000

73

$ 107,933,000

0.0052

0.0043

-17.0 1 %

-13

191

University of Nebraska Medical Center

1 54

$ 1 1 ,747,000

124

$46,476,000

0.00 10

0.00 19

89.74%

30

1 92

North Carolina A & T State University

1 53

$ 1 1 ,866,000

1 69

$ 19,644,000

0.00 10

0.0008

-20.6 1%

-16

1 93

University of Missouri-Kansas City

1 90

$6,079,000

1 87

$ 14,8 10,000

0.0005

0.0006

1 6.83%

3

1 94

University of Texas at Dallas, The

1 99

$4,860,000

199

$ 1 1,327,000

0.0004

0.0005

1 1 .77%

0

195

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

1 74

$7,868,000

232

$5, 1 70,000

0.0007

0.0002

-68.49%

-58

1 96

Ball State University

268

$55 1 ,000

242

$3,820,000

0.0000

0.0002

232.48%

26

1 97

University of Tulsa

222

$3, 1 7 1 ,000

234

$4,5 1 1 ,000

0.0003

0.0002

-3 1 .78%

-12

1 98

Tennessee State University

1 63

$9, 160,000

1 76

$ 17,279,000

0.0008

0.0007

-9.54%

-13

1 99

University of Texas Health Science-San Antonio

80

$45,700,000

87

$91 ,787,000

0.0038

0.0037

-3.68%

-7

200

College of William and Mary

1 72

$8, 1 88,000

1 86

$ 14,983,000

0.0007

0.0006

-12.25%

-14

201

Vanderbilt University

38

$93,01 0,000

27

$263,8 12,000

0.0078

0.0 106

36.02%

11

202

SUNY College of Environmental Sci and Forestry

266

$618,000

246

$3,536,000

0.0001

0.0001

1 74.39%

20

203

Georgia State University

1 75

$7,529,000

1 70

$ 19,252,000

0.0006

0.0008

22.63%

5

204

Saint Louis University-Main Campus

1 37

$ 17,206,000

132

$41,983,000

0.00 14

0.00 17

1 7.0 1 %

5

A

B

1 88

Northeastern Ohio Universities College of Medicine

1 89

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.
B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

205

SUNY at Stony Brook

62

$61 ,976,000

74

$ 107,534,000

0.0052

0.0043

- 16.79%

-12

206

Emory University

53

$68,1 64,000

31

$214,970,000

0.0057

0.0086

5 1 .24%

22

207

Kent State University-Main Campus

1 86

$6,702,000

197

$ 12,287,000

0.0006

0.0005

-12.08%

-1 1

208

DePaul University

261

$744,000

239

$3,9 10,000

0.0001

0.0002

1 52.03%

22

209

University of Illinois at Chicago

74

$50,798,000

53

$ 1 56, 1 38,000

0.0042

0.0063

47.40%

21

210

Duke University

22

$ 1 5 1 ,087,000

11

$412,069,000

0.0126

0.01 65

30.79%

11

2 10

Medical College of Georgia

171

$8,4 13,000

149

$32,642,000

0.0007

0.0013

86.07%

22

210

City of Hope Graduate School of Biological Science

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

213

New York Medical College

143

$ 14,776,000

1 66

$22,1 1 8,000

0.0012

0.0009

-28.2 1 %

-23

214

Southern Methodist University

204

$4,547,000

190

$ 13,261 ,000

0.0004

0.0005

39.86%

14

215

University of Northern Colorado

242

$ 1 ,764,000

259

$ 1 ,7 19,000

0.0001

0.0001

-53.27%

-17

216

University of Texas at Arlington, The

212

$4,03 1 ,000

205

$ 10,325,000

0.0003

0.0004

22.84%

7

217

Nova Southeastern University

262

$735,000

257

$ 1,973,000

0.0001

0.0001

28.73%

5

218

Des Moines University-Osteopathic Medical Center

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

219

Washington University in St. Louis

23

$ 148,036,000

10

$419,014,000

0.0124

0.0168

35.74%

13

220

University of Chicago

28

$ 1 1 8,03 1 ,000

37

$208, 139,000

0.0099

0.0083

-15.43%

-9

221

Oakland University

224

$3,041 ,000

223

$6,73 1 ,000

0.0003

0.0003

6. 1 5%

1

A

N

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between I 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.
A

N

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

222

Hofstra University

245

$ 1 ,401 ,000

192

$ 12,977,000

0.0001

0.0005

344.2 1%

53

223

East Carolina University

196

$5,239,000

216

$7,864,000

0.0004

0.0003

-28.01 %

-20

224

Michigan Technological University

1 76

$7,427,000

195

$ 12,602,000

0.0006

0.0005

-1 8.63%

-19

225

Cleveland State University

200

$4,8 14,000

227

$6,252,000

0.0004

0.0003

-37.72%

-27

226

Texas A & M University-Kingsville

259

$783,000

245

$3,649,000

0.0001

0.000 1

123.49%

14

227

Eastern Virginia Medical School

1 68

$8,742,000

229

$6,029,000

0.0007

0.0002

-66.93%

-6 1

228

Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine

280

$ 104,000

279

$232,000

0.0000

0.0000

6.98%

229

Mount Sinai School of Medicine

69

$52,529,000

48

$ 170,932,000

0.0044

0.0068

56.05%

21

230

University of Denver

1 83

$6,996,000

210

$8,8 1 8,000

0.0006

0.0004

-39.55%

-27

23 1

Adelphi University

264

$652,000

280

$20 1 ,000

0.0001

0.0000

-85.22%

-16

232

Illinois State University

223

$3,079,000

243

$3,801 ,000

0.0003

0.0002

-40.80%

-20

233

Widener University-Main Campus

278

$ 1 14,000

282

$ 1 16,000

0.0000

0.0000

-5 1 .20%

-4

234

Clarkson University

207

$4,498,000

235

$4,497,000

0.0004

0.0002

-52.05%

-28

235

Bowling Green State University-Main Campus

23 1

$2,720,000

225

$6,475,000

0.0002

0.0003

14. 1 6%

6

236

University of Massachusetts-Boston

209

$4, 126,000

219

$7,452,000

0.0003

0.0003

-1 3.39%

-10

237

Colorado School of Mines

191

$5,964,000

1 89

$ 14, 197,000

0.0005

0.0006

14. 1 6%

2

238

East Tennessee State University

248

$ 1 , 1 74,000

230

$6,026,000

0.0001

0.0002

146. 16%

18

Key to column headings: A : Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B : Institution; C : Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D : Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.
A

N

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

239

Georgia Southern University

258

$943,000

262

$ 1 ,309,000

0.0001

0.0001

-33.43%

-4

240

University of Memphis

21 1

$4,094,000

214

$8, 148,000

0.0003

0.0003

-4.56%

-3

241

University of North Texas

230

$2,830,000

1 80

$ 16,41 6,000

0.0002

0.0007

1 78. 1 8%

50

242

University of Massachusetts-Lowell

206

$4,5 13,000

215

$7,870,000

0.0004

0.0003

- 1 6.37%

-9

243

Baylor University

272

$377,000

274

$561 ,000

0.0000

0.0000

-28.64%

-2

244

University of Louisiana at Lafayette

234

$2,443,000

238

$3,952,000

0.0002

0.0002

-22.42%

-4

245

Clark University

229

$2,894,000

254

$2,403,000

0.0002

0.0001

-60. 1 8%

-25

246

Brigham Young University

1 94

$5,485,000

207

$9,398,000

0.0005

0.0004

- 1 7.83%

-13

247

SUNY Health Science Center at Syracuse

1 65

$9,079,000

171

$ 19,091 ,000

0.0008

0.0008

0.84%

-6

248

Baylor College of Medicine

42

$89,304,000

22

$297,252,000

0.0075

0.01 19

59.63%

20

249

Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

249

University of North Texas-Hlth Sci Ctr (Ft. Worth)

226

$2,98 1 ,000

288

$0

0.0002

0.0000

-100.0%

-62

25 1

University of St. Thomas

275

$240,000

276

$408,000

0.0000

0.0000

- 1 8.47%

-1

25 1

Golden Gate University-San Francisco

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

253

University of the Pacific

249

$ 1 ,148,000

266

$ 1 , 1 12,000

0.0001

0.0000

-53.55%

-17

254

Drew University

276

$ 186,000

275

$5 1 7,000

0.0000

0.0000

33.30%

1

255

SUNY Health Science Center at Brooklyn

135

$ 1 7,747,000

1 65

$23,01 1 ,000

0.001 5

0.0009

-37.82%

-30

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

256

Alliant International University-San Diego

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

257

Fordham University

246

$ 1 ,372,000

27 1

$805,000

0.0001

0.0000

-7 1 .86%

-25

258

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

228

$2,9 10,000

1 82

$ 16, 1 86,000

0.0002

0.0006

1 66.74%

46

259

Medical College of Ohio

173

$7,924,000

191

$13,025,000

0.0007

0.0005

-2 1 . 1 7%

-18

260

New School University

274

$32 1 ,000

260

$ 1 ,423,000

0.0000

0.000 1

1 12.59%

14

26 1

Pace University-New York

267

$570,000

24 1

$3,879,000

0.0000

0.0002

226.36%

26

262

SUNY at Binghamton

215

$3,792,000

208

$9, 105,000

0.0003

0.0004

1 5 . 1 5%

7

263

Seton Hall University

24 1

$ 1 ,789,000

256

$2,02 1 ,000

0.0001

0.0001

-45.82%

-15

263

St. John's University-New York

256

$ 1 ,014,000

288

$0

0.0001

0.0000

-100.0%

-32

265

Miami University-Oxford

210

$4,099,000

236

$4,491 ,000

0.0003

0.0002

-47.46%

-26

266

La Salle University

285

$0

277

$39 1 ,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

8

267

Spalding University

285

$0

286

$36,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-1

268

Long Island University-C W Post Campus

247

$ 1 ,2 1 8,000

25 1

$2,842,000

0.000 1

0.0001

1 1 .90%

-4

268

University of Hartford

253

$ 1 ,095,000

269

$925,000

0.000 1

0.0000

-59.49%

-16

268

American University

233

$2,459,000

258

$1,754,000

0.0002

0.0001

-65.79%

-25

268

The Scripps Research Institute

279

$ 108,000

35

$209,937,000

0.0000

0.0084

. 93 120%

244

268

California Institute of Technology

29

$ 109,877,000

50

$ 1 64,054,000

0.0092

0.0066

-28.40%

-2 1

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5: Continued.
C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

268 University of Massachusetts Medical Sch Worcester

90

$38,955,000

75

$ 102,594,000

0.0033

0.0041

26.30%

15

268 Rockefeller University

89

$39,281 ,000

99

$75,1 56,000

0.0033

0.0030

-8.25%

-10

268 University o f Arkansas at Little Rock

225

$3,0 19,000

1 23

$46,522,000

0.0003

0.0019

639.0%

102

268 Texas A & M University System Health Science Ctr

285

$0

128

$43,998,000

0.0000

0.00 1 8

NIA

1 57

268 University of Puerto Rico-Medical Sciences Campus

161

$9,508,000

147

$33,729,000

0.0008

0.0014

70. 12%

14

268 Albany Medical College

1 64

$9,085,000

196

$ 12,488,000

0.0008

0.0005

-34.08%

-32

268 Universidad Central del Caribe

25 1

$ 1 , 142,000

213

$8,234,000

0.0001

0.0003

245.77%

38

268 Catholic University of America

213

$3,933,000

222

$6,765,000

0.0003

0.0003

-17.5 1 %

-9

268 Ponce School of Medicine

236

$2,356,000

224

$6,625,000

0.0002

0.0003

34.85%

12

268 Teachers College at Columbia University

235

$2,377,000

228

$6, 145,000

0.0002

0.0002

23.98%

7

268 Florida Institute of Technology-Melbourne

240

$ 1,897,000

233

$4,600,000

0.0002

0.0002

1 6.29%

7

268 Texas Christian University

22 1

$3, 194,000

248

$3,352,000

0.0003

0.0001

-49.67%

-27

268 CUNY Graduate School and University Center

219

$3,346,000

249

$3, 129,000

0.0003

0.0001

-55 . 1 5%

-30

268 Duquesne University

263

$667,000

253

$2,580,000

0.0001

0.0001

85.50%

10

268 Inter American University of Puerto Rico-Metro

243

$ 1 ,572,000

255

$2,359,000

0.0001

0.0001

-28.03%

-12

268 Texas Woman's University

255

$ 1 ,029,000

261

$ 1 ,368,000

0.0001

0.0001

-36.24%

-6

268 Andrews University

283

$ 19,000

265

$ 1 , 1 35,000

0.0000

0.0000

2764%

18

A

B

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B : Institution; C : Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D : Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.
C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

Claremont Graduate University

284

$ 10,000

267

$ 1 ,07 1 ,000

0.0000

0.0000

5036%

17

268

Midwestern University

27 1

$382,000

270

$846,000

0.0000

0.0000

6.2 1%

1

268

Pepperdine University

277

$ 143,000

273

$570,000

0.0000

0.0000

9 1 . 1 6%

4

268

Carlos Albizu University

285

$0

278

$379,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

7

268

Pacific University

28 1

$64,000

281

$ 1 30,000

0.0000

0.0000

-2.59%

0

268

Western University of Health Sciences

285

$0

284

$70,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

1

268

Wilmington College

285

$0

285

$50,000

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

0

268

Saint Mary's University of Minnesota

273

$324,000

287

$25,000

0.0000

0.0000

-96.30%

-14

268

A T Still University of Health Sciences

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Antioch New England Graduate School (NH)

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Argosy University-Orange Campus

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Argosy University-Sarasota Campus

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Argosy University-Twin Cities Campus

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Azusa Pacific University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Biola University

282

$20,000

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

- 1 00.0%

-6

268

California Institute of Integral Studies

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Capella University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

A

B

268

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued.

'°
'°

N

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

Edward Via Virginia Coll of Osteopathic Medicine

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Fielding Graduate University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

George Fox University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Kansas City University of Medicine and Biosciences

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

268

Mayo Graduate School

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Mayo Medical School

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Midwestern University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Northcentral University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Oral Roberts University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Pacifica Graduate Institute

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Regent University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Rosalind Franklin University of Med and Science

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

268

Samford University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

San Juan Bautista School of Medicine

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Trevecca Nazarene University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Trinity International University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

Union Institute & University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

A

B

268

NIA

NIA

-3

-3

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.

Table 5 : Continued
A

B

268

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

University of Bridgeport

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

-3

268

University of La Verne

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

268

University of Phoenix-Online Campus

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

268

Walden University

285

$0

288

$0

0.0000

0.0000

NIA

NIA

NIA

-3
-3
-3

Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H:
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003.
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007

v.)
0
0

Table 6: Effect of earmark ranking on rank of total science and engineering obligations,
using all earmarks
Ranks Included
All

Total Earmarks Rank
on Total 1992
Obligations Rank
••
0.70 13 •
(0.46 1 7)

Total Earmarks Rank
on Total 2003
Obligations Rank
0.682 1 •••

Total Earmarks Rank
on Total Obligations
Rank Change

(0.43 1 7)

0.0 192
(0.0036)

1 - 20

0.04 14
(0.0000)

-0. 1 399
(0.0003)

0. 1 8 12
(0.0024)

1 - 50

-0.6 1 68
(0.0432)

-0.63 1 5
(0.0437)

0.0 146
(0.000 1)

1 - 1 00

0.3266 #
(0.0257)
...
0.8377
(0.3209)

0.2 1 1 7
(0.0 126)
•••
0.7920
(0.27 1 9)

0. 1 149
(0.0253)

101 - Last

0.0457
(0.0070)

Numbers in parentheses are the R2 values. Statistical significance notation is as follows, #: p � 0 . 1 0;
* : p � 0.05 ; * * : p � 0.0 1 ; ***: p � 0.00 1 .

Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007.
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Table 7: Effect of earmark ranking on rank of total science and engineering obligations,
using only science and engineering earmarks

Ranks Included

Total Earmarks Rank
on Total 1992
Obligations Rank

..

Total Earmarks Rank
on Total 2003
Obligations Rank

..
0.6979 .
(0.4450)

Total Earmarks Rank
on Total Obligations
Rank Change

All

0.7 1 69 .
(0.4750)

1 - 20

0.0805
(0.000 1)

-0.0496
(0.0000)

0. 1301
(0.0013)

1 - 50

-0.5268
(0.0342)

-0.5724
(0.0389)

0.0456
(0.0013)

1 - 100

0.2902
(0.0204)
..
0.89 1 9 .

0. 1 748
(0.0086)
...
0.8468
(0.3016)

0.1 154
(0.0256)

101 - Last

(0.353 1)

0.0190
(0.0034)

0.045 1
(0.0066)

Numbers in parentheses are the R2 values. Statistical significance notation is as follows, #: p � 0. 10;
* : p � 0.05; **: p � 0.0 1 ; ***: p � 0.00 1 .
Source: Chronicle o f Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007.
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Table 8: Percentage earmarks received are of science and engineering obligations using
all earmarks, by year.
Year

Total S&E Obligations

Total Earmarks

Percent

1 992

$ 1 2,729,720,000.00

$ 684,000,000.00

5 .3 7%

1 993

$ 1 2,724,675 ,000.00

$ 763,000,000.00

6.00%

1 994

$ 1 3 ,739,27 1 ,000.00

$ 650,800,000.00

4.74%

1 995

$ 14,364,042,000.00

$ 600,000,000.00

4. 1 8%

1 996

$ 1 4,337,90 1 ,000.00

$ 296,000,000.00

2.06%

1 997

$ 1 5 ,08 1 ,369,000.00

$ 440,000,000.00

2.92%

1 998

$ 1 6,03 1 ,984,000.00

$ 528,000,000.00

3 .29%

1 999

$ 1 8,057,927,000.00

$ 797,000,000.00

4.4 1%

2000

$ 1 9,879, 1 55,000.00

$ 1 ,044,000,000.00

5 .25%

200 1

$ 22,488,2 1 9,000.00

$ 1 ,n6s,ooo,ooo.oo

7.42%

2002

$ 24,393,846,000.00

$ 1 ,837,000,000.00

7.53%

2003

$ 26,653,898,000.00

$ 2,01 2,000,000.00

7.55%

Source: Brainard and Borrego 2003 ; National Science Foundation 2007.
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Table 9: Effect ofearmark ranking on peer-reviewed funding ranking, using all earmarks.
Including All Institutions

Excluding Non-Recipients

Year

Effect

Strength (R )

Effect

Strength (R2)

1992

0.687

0.45 14

0.452

0.2094

1993

0.7 1 8

0.4897

0.40 1

0. 1 394

1994

0.704

0.4692

0.55 1

0.2210

1995

0.705

0.4695

0.560

0.2376

1996

0.680

0.4383

0.446

0.1 309

1997

0.68 1

0.4400

0.406

0. 1287

1998

0.676

0.4298

0.593

0.2504

1999

0.690

0.4534

0.453

0. 1 778

2000

0.701

0.47 15

0.603

0.3 130

2001

0.699

0.47 13

0.590

0.3040

2002

0.679

0.4474

0.523

0.2486

2003

0.680

0.445 1

0.62 1

0.3528

2

Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007.
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Table 10: Effect of earmark ranking on peer-reviewed funding ranking, usmg only
science and engineering earmarks.
Including All Institutions

Excluding Non-Recipients

Year

Effect

Strength (R2)

Effect

Strength (R2)

1992

0.702

0.4647

0.457

0.2348

1993

0.733

0.501 6

0.349

0. 1 145

1994

0.7 13

0.474 1

0.539

0.2076

1995

0.720

0.4823

0.535

0.2409

1996

0.695

0.4509

0.418

0. 1210

1997

0.696

0.4533

0.376

0. 1 152

1998

0.690

0.4406

0.589

0.2384

1999

0.704

0.4649

0.442

0. 1 602

2000

0.7 15

0.4798

0.600

0.2989

200 1

0.7 13

0.4824

0.574

0.2887

2002

0.695

0.4605

0.5 19

0.2385

2003

0.696

0.4596

0.623

0.3487

Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007.
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VITA
Andy Dunsmore has served as Director ofDevelopment for the Department of
Neurosurgery at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland since September
2006. In this role, he is the Department's chiefdevelopment and alumni officer and is
responsible for all departmental fundraising activities.
Prior to assuming this role at Johns Hopkins University, Dunsmore served as
Director ofDevelopment and Alumni Affairs for the University ofTennessee College of
Social Work from September 2002 through August 2006. In this role, Dunsmore was the
College ofSocial Work's chiefdevelopment and alumni officer and was responsible for
leading the college's fundraising and alumni relations efforts. Dunsmore was also a
graduate student in political science at the University ofTennessee during his time as a
member ofthe University ofTennessee development staff. He began his graduate studies
in August 2000.
Dunsmore completed a Bachelor ofArts degree in political science at the
University ofTennessee in 1990. Prior to returning to the University for graduate studies
in 2000, he served from 1995 to 1999 as Associate Director ofMedical Development at
Washington University School ofMedicine in St. Louis, Missouri. In this role, he
provided the staff leadership for a $50 million capital campaign for a cancer center on the
Washington University Medical Center campus that occurred as a component ofa $400
million capital campaign for the entire School ofMedicine. The School ofMedicine's
$400 million capital campaign was a part ofa University-wide effort that had a $1 billion
goal. At Washington University School ofMedicine, Dunsmore also managed a portfolio
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of about 150 major gift prospects, some of whom were not prospects for the cancer center
campaign, and traveled extensively to the Northeast corridor of the United States to
identify, cultivate, and solicit major and planned giving prospects and conduct various
alumni and donor events.
Prior to his service at Washington University in St. Louis, Dunsmore served from
1992 through 1995 in a number of alumni and development roles at Hiwassee College in
Madisonville, Tennessee. His service there included a stint as chief development officer
for the college and was marked by great success in securing major gifts for the college's
endowment and capital needs, in establishing annual giving and alumni affairs programs,
and in editing a magazine and other publications.
Dunsmore has served as a member of several non-profit boards and has been
active in professional associations and the University of Tennessee National Alumni
Association.

308
. ""JC'"')O Al 00"1
.. c..
I J£.D &ff.JD£. � J. � �1U
.,, ,,,.
ttr7
£DI U I

"'
'vn

�
ffiI

